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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to arrive at a holistic understanding of how and why the Polish Solidarity 
Movement succeeded, against great odds,  within a regime hostile to its existence. From this 
movement emerged Solidarnosc, the first independent labor union in the Communist Bloc. 
Solidarnosc evolved into a political party that succeeded in replacing the Communist Party in 
Poland. Seven factors are elaborated on, each contended to have facilitated Solidarnosc's success. 
Some factors occurred naturally (such as the structural conduciveness of Poland's industrially-
based economy), some occurred fortunately (such as the political opportunity afforded by 
Mikhail Gorbachev's liberalizing policies), and some were deliberately constructed (such as use 
of samizdat communications in mobilizing the movement). This study is a synthesis of  these 
various facilitating factors. Ethnographic description is also part of the explanation, as is 
inclusion of eclectic factors that do not "pigeon-hole" well into conventional social movement 
theory compartments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
     This study is a synthetic analysis of the Polish Revolution during the 1980s. The central 
problems to be addressed are explaining how the labor union, Solidarnosc, was able to initially 
emerge, survive illegally for seven years within a regime hostile to its existence, and eventually 
succeed in displacing the regime. 
      Solidarnosc was much more than a labor union. Some analysts, such as Kubik (1994: 2), 
taking a very holistic approach, consider it part of broader sociological construct known as, "the 
Solidarity culture." For the purposes of this paper, it will be considered in terms of how it 
functioned as a social movement organization and acted as a central hub for a broader, overall 
social movement. This movement's  ultimate goals were the restructuring of the social and 
economic order of Poland through democratization and restoration of human rights. This goal 
was eventually achieved; a domino-like effect then began with Poland as its source, and within 
two years of its realization most of Eastern Europe was democratized and the Soviet Union 
ceased to exist. These rapid and monumental changes altered the course of world history by 
displacing the authoritarian control of the Soviet Union and a system of closed socialist 
economies with (generally) democratic governments and capitalist economies. This restructuring 
directly affected perhaps one-third of the world's population and contributed to the emergence of 
the current global capitalist system. Although many other factors and forces converged to create 
the conditions necessary for this gigantic socioeconomic shift, it can be argued that the persistent 
collective actions of Solidarnosc and the Polish Solidarity Movement were indispensible 
elements in the process. 
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    Three major theoretical perspectives are generally used in explaining the workings of social 
movements: resource mobilization theory, political opportunity theory, and issue framing theory. 
A synthetic analysis combines elements of these three perspectives in an effort to explain the 
complexities of social movements in light of material/economic realities, political/historic 
factors, and ideological/cultural presentation and manipulation of issues.  
     However, this study, while considering the above mentioned perspectives,  will also make 
reference to the older "collective behavior" perspective with emphasis on structural 
conduciveness and shared worldview.  It will also consider the charismatic leadership of Lech 
Walesa as a facilitating factor, as well as the political opportunity afforded by the liberalizing 
effects of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost. In researching the Solidarity Movement, 
it was concluded that limiting analysis of  it to the three general bodies of social movement 
theory left out some very critical factors that facilitated its success. In reality, the theoretical 
perspectives overlap as do the explanations of them and the real-world historical events that they 
attempt to explain. In some cases the attempt may result more in description instead of 
explanation. However, the aim of this study is to arrive at a holistic understanding of how and 
why the Polish Solidarity Movement held together against great odds. Description, then, is part 
of the explanation, as is inclusion of eclectic factors that do not "pigeon-hole" well into 
conventional social movement theory compartments. 
     Within affluent liberal democracies, such as the U.S. or Western Europe, resource 
mobilization is often considered the prime factor in the success of social movements. Obviously, 
without the material resources of money, labor, and infrastructure and the means of 
communication and networking to organize and utilize these resources, social movements will 
fail; more likely, they will simply fail to emerge under such adverse conditions. However, the 
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Polish Solidarity Movement emerged within the unlikely conditions of an authoritarian political 
regime within a closed, faltering economy. Material resources were limited in the former 
Peoples' Republic of Poland, but more importantly, all means of communication - TV, radio, 
newspapers, all forms of journalism, mass mailings, and even public signs - were controlled by 
the Communist Party. All open dissent against the Party and its ideology was immediately 
suppressed, and the networking, organizing, and communications necessary for mobilization of 
labor and material resources was extremely hindered. Additionally, in the 1980s current personal 
technological conveniences such as cell phone networks, email through the World Wide Web, 
and computer printing, were not  available. The lack of these technologies, and even a shortage 
of conventional pre-computer era printing and copying devices and basic telephone service, was 
an additional hindrance to networking and mobilizing. 
        Therefore, it is the contention of this paper that in the case of the Polish Solidarity 
Movement the use of conventional forms of resource mobilization as the prime social movement 
facilitator is not applicable; structural conditions were too adverse for the conventional 
movement strategies. Based on readings of historic accounts, news reports, and academic 
articles, and through data obtained by in-depth personal interviews with current and former 
members of Solidarnosc, this paper identifies seven factors by which the movement was 
facilitated in its emergence, maintained through its adversities, and brought to its success. In 
general, these factors enabled the activists of the Polish Solidarity Movement to overcome the 
extreme difficulties of organizing and mobilizing a social movement within an authoritarian 
regime by creation of a collective identity and sense of common purpose strong enough to 
overcome the hindrance of a highly constricted ability to network and to mobilize resources. 
Additionally, unconventional methods of resource mobilization were used in lieu of standard 
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procedures. As mentioned above, some of the factors do not fall neatly within the three basic 
categories of social movement theory, thus, the proposed explanations are not only synthetic but 
eclectic. However,  based on the data obtained in this study, the author believes that these are the  
most substantial and salient factors  best accounting for the success of the movement. 
       Most of these factors are not entirely original contributions to the study of the Polish 
Solidarity Movement, in that within the plethora of information and analysis available on this 
topic nearly every conceivable contributing factor has, in one form or another, been explored. 
Certain factors, such as the "Gorbachev Effect," for example, are so well documented that they 
have taken on 'patented' names. This study is a synthesis of existing data with the addition of 
new data obtained by several interviews and direct communications with individuals having first-
hand knowledge concerning the Solidarity Movement. The synthesis is  intended to elaborate on 
and clarify the seven chosen factors. 
      Some of these factors, such as the role of structural conduciveness as a facilitator to social 
solidarity, are not, as related to the Solidarity Movement in particular, directly documented (no 
specific discussion of this topic was found in the academic literature). This study uses secondary 
data and comparative analysis in attempt to validate this claim. Additionally, the notion of  
intentional construction of "fraternal proletarian solidarity," (an idea mentioned frequently in 
the memoires of Nikita Khrushchev, for example)  and the ability of this idea to facilitate 
Solidarnosc is undocumented in this specific terminology. The Soviet Union intentionally 
cultivated social solidarity within its borders and within the Eastern Bloc nations (as theorized by 
Lynd [1945] and as described and elaborated on through personal interviews obtained for this 
paper). This paper contends that Solidarnosc became an alternative object of  fraternal loyalty. 
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An attempt is made to validate the idea mainly through a synthesis of secondary data with 
personal accounts of individuals who lived in Poland prior to 1989.  
      As a comparative factor, in terms of the contentions made concerning social cohesion in 
industrial settings, several interviews were conducted with former  U.S. industrial workers. The 
findings are compared in "factor 1" of chapter six. 
     As these findings (and all interview data in this paper) were very personal accounts obtained 
through informal, open-ended interviews, the structure of this paper often deliberately shifts from 
third-person form to first-person form when interview dialogue is presented. Occasionally, the 
first-person form  is also used to emphasize important direct observations made during the course 
of this research project. This is intended for clarity (bypassing awkward circumlocution) as well 
as to humanize certain points.  
_____________________________________ 
 
 Below are listed the seven factors which will be elaborated on in chapter six of this paper:  
 
1)   The emergence of the Polish labor union, Solidarnosc, was facilitated by the structural 
conduciveness of a society based on a heavy industrial economy. 
 
2)   Social solidarity within the movement was facilitated by the existing sociocultural 
construct of   "fraternal proletarian solidarity," as cultivated by the USSR.  Solidarnosc 
became an alternative object of fraternal loyalty. 
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3)   The  Solidarity Movement was facilitated and maintained (particularly during its outlawed 
period when Poland was under martial law) by persistent and intentional use of "samizdat" 
or "bibula" (illegal, self-published communications) as well as by other nonconventional 
means of communication. 
 
4)   Solidarity was able to overcome severe limitations to resource mobilization by use of 
"super-effective" ideological framing. 
 
5)   Solidarity's success was due in part to the charismatic leadership of Lech Walesa. 
 
6)   A three-way coalition between the industrial working class, the " Poslska inteligencja" (or 
prominent Polish public intellectuals, such as lawyers and academics), and the Polish 
Catholic Church further contributed to social solidarity within the movement and each group 
contributed elements lacking by the others. 
 
7)   Solidarity's success was due in part to the "Gorbachev Effect." 
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Chapter Two  
Methodology 
 
     The primary data used in this study was obtained through 16 interview sessions and through 
direct personal communication and discussion with several other individuals. Six interview 
sessions were conducted in Gdansk, Poland from March 7th through 13th, and seven interview 
sessions were conducted in Gdansk from December 12th through 22nd. Additionally, as a 
comparative feature in this study (in regard to the contention that Solidarity was facilitated by the 
structural conduciveness of a society based on a heavy industrial economy) three interview 
sessions were conducted in Ironton, Ohio with former employees of the Allied Chemical Semet 
Solvay plant and the Dayton Malleable Iron Foundry. These were conducted in January and 
February, 2010. One interview was conducted in Ithaca, New York and one was conducted in 
Malmo, Sweden (both with former activists from Poland). Altogether, 29 individuals were 
interviewed (the interview sessions ranged from 1 to 5 participants).  
     Background information and literature concerning the Black Madonna of Czestochowa was 
also obtained through direct personal communications at Cestohowa, Texas, during the summer 
of 2010.  Two Americans with ties to Poland also provided background information for this 
study by means of personal communications. One individual has family members living in 
Opole, Poland and makes yearly trips to that city. Likewise, the other individual has a parent 
from Poland. This informant speaks both Polish and Russian and was working in Poland prior to 
martial law and in Russia during martial law. This informant also  provided short Polish and 
Russians translations to English for clarification of certain terminology used in some secondary 
sources. 
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     Six individuals assisted in Polish to English translations: In March, I was assisted by Andrzej 
Falkowski and Marta Rutkowska, local business operators in the Gdansk area. In December, 
Marta Skibinska and Aleksandra Kristiansen, under the direction of Dr. Paula Gorszczynska  of 
Uniwersytet Gadanski, were my translators. Additional Polish and Russian language assistance 
came from Zofia Rudnicka, of Walbrzych, Poland. 
     Some of the respondents came to be "key informants" due to the depth of their interview 
responses, complexity of their answers, and due to their first-hand experiences concerning 
certain interview topics. These individuals will be referred to as "Informant B," Informant J," 
"Informant PZ," etc. throughout this paper simply for expediting  the writing process and  as a 
means of clarification between the various informants. In less exacting circumstances, statements 
such as, "A Polish informant told me...." or "An informant from Ironton said...," will be used. 
Additionally, as a means to further protect the identity of the informants, the pronoun "he" will 
be used throughout the paper in reference to all informants regardless of gender; this is not to be 
taken as a form of sexism but simply as an alternative to the awkward use of terms such as 
he/she or s/he. All of the interviews were very informal and were guided by a set of open-ended 
questions  included in an appendix to this paper. I encouraged the informants to relate to me their 
stories, memories, and anecdotes of their experiences in Solidarnosc or of their life experiences 
as they pertained to the topics of the interview questions. 
     During the first trip to Poland,  I was able to spend an entire day with a retired employee of 
Stocznia Gdanska (the former Lenin Shipyard where the labor union, Solidarnosc, originated) 
and tour the interior of the yard with him. The informant was able to get me directly into the 
working area of the yard, into now abandoned areas of the yard that held considerable historic 
significance to the Solidarity Movement, and into the office of the current shipyard director. This 
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informant, who was 67 years old and  had started work at  the shipyard in 1963,  had been highly 
involved in the Solidarity Movement since its very first days. His interview (and others) 
constitutes a direct oral history that will supplement the secondary sources for the historical 
background section of this thesis. A considerable amount of first-hand recollections of  life in 
Poland prior to democratization is included in the historical section.  
     During the second trip to Poland, I was able to meet and interview the current director of the 
Gdansk local of Solidarnosc, who had also worked in Stocznia Gdanska for nearly thirty years. 
This interview provided me with not only an historic perspective, but with an update on the 
current state of the union, and with an informed opinion concerning its future. 
      Finally, during both trips to Gdansk, I spent several hours each day  in the nearby working-
class neighborhoods adjacent to the shipyards, and at other  industrial sites near the shipyards. I 
was invited to the homes of several of the interviewees living in these neighborhoods. One visit 
was with a relatively high-ranking official in Solidarnosc, and  another was to the home of a 
couple who were former publishers of underground literature (samizdat publishers). I was also 
invited to a conference and to a ceremony commemorating the 40th anniversary of the 
December, 1970 shootings in Gdynia, and to the premier of a locally-filmed movie concerning 
the 1970 shootings.  I observed and photographed all these events, the industrial sites, and the 
homes, apartments, businesses, neighborhoods, and gardens near the yards. I attempted to follow 
the daily patterns of local residents, such as the patterns of daily commuting - mostly pedestrian 
or by tram - and I observed the daily patterns of residents as they attended schools or churches, 
and visited shopping areas. I studied maps of the Gdansk area and also spent a day with a tour 
guide visiting historic buildings, churches, and monuments. 
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     The aim of all this was to arrive at a more holistic perspective of Gdansk in general, and of 
the events that had occurred there. I felt this was necessary in order to better understand the 
significance of my informants' descriptions of their experiences in Gdansk. It is nearly 
impossible in a qualitative study to maintain complete objectivity, but, I believe, the concentrated 
observations and direct experience in the neighborhoods  - albeit for only 17 days altogether - 
contributed significantly to my ability to accurately interpret the meaning of the data I was 
obtaining from local residents. I consider all these activities as further sources of primary data in 
this study. 
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Chapter Three 
Historical Background 
 
     This chapter will focus on three primary reasons for the  Polish revolution of the 1980s:  1) 
economic exploitation of Poland by the USSR;  2) eventual economic failure; 3)  demand for 
independent labor unions as alternatives to existing State-controlled unions. These conditions set 
the historical stage for the emergence of the Solidarity Movement and motivated participants to 
take the actions necessary for change. Rather than reiterate details from the many complete 
histories of Poland and Eastern Europe during the 1980s (such as Kenney 2002, and Stokes 
1993) and rather than document in journalistic style the many events that comprise the totality of 
the Solidarity Movement, (such as done by Ash 2002) this section is a thematic account 
generally limited to the three above mentioned conditions. It will mainly utilize data obtained 
through personal interviews as a means of describing the conditions as they pertain to the 
contentions of this thesis. A final concluding section will briefly recount the main historical 
events from the August 1980 signing of the Gdansk Agreement to the December 1990 election of 
Lech Walesa as the first president of The Republic of Poland.  
_____________________________       
General Background: 
      Ash's (2002) account of the Polish Revolution (deemed on the back cover as "the definitive 
account" by the New York Times Book Review) begins with a rather emotionalized discussion 
of the 'betrayal' of Poland at the Yalta Conference ("...their country was delivered up by their 
western allies, Britain and America, into the famously tender care of 'Uncle Joe' Stalin") (3), and 
continues this 'messianic theme', citing Adam Mickiewicz's notion of Poland as "the Christ 
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among nations" sacrificed for Europe's redemption (5). Ash cites the figure of some six million 
Polish causalities  in WWII, or "one in every five citizens..."(3). 
      As a permanent monument to the destruction as described by Ash, the city of Gdansk  has 
left Granary Island (Wyspa Spichrzow) on the Martwa Wisla (a branch in the delta of the 
Vistula) in its utterly ruined state. Smaller structures were reduced to crumbling piles of  brick 
while the  massive masonry walls of industrial buildings still lie some 30 degrees askew, literally 
jolted off their  foundations by Nazi bombing. Enlarged panoramic photos within the Zlota 
Brama (the "Golden Gate" into Gdansk's Old Town area) of the rebuilt city testify to similar 
conditions of  war time devastation across Poland (personal observations, Gdansk 2010). The 
ruined state of Poland in 1945, not only in terms of its infrastructure but also in regard to near 
complete political disarray and economic collapse, left the country vulnerable to the will of its 
Soviet "liberators."  
       However, with no intentions of downplaying the suffering of Poland during WWII or during 
the long period of Soviet domination (from 1945 to 1989), it seems also necessary to  consider 
the war time  losses and post war intentions of the Soviet Union in order to understand the 
urgency of the Soviet agenda for Eastern Europe. It is from the Soviet perspective that the 
society and economy of post-war Poland were built, and from the result, the Solidarity 
Movement, out of necessity, emerged. Thus, a very brief historical and ideological background 
will clarify this theme. 
     Taubman (2003: 179) describes the unimaginable economic setback and human losses that 
the Soviet Union encountered as a result of WWII. He cites war casualties as an estimated 27 
million lives, 1700 towns destroyed, 70,000 villages destroyed, 32,000 factories destroyed, 
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52,000 miles of railroad destroyed, and 100,000 collective farms laid waste. Taubman says these 
figures translate into roughly a 30% to 40% loss of national wealth for the nation. In contrast, the 
United States' economic infrastructure emerged from WWII virtually unharmed and, in fact, 
'geared up,' due to massive war-time industrial investments. Thus, the Soviet economy was then 
forced to play 'catch-up' with Western capitalism which was enjoying tremendous growth in the 
post-WWII years. This was accomplished not only by rapid and urgent  rebuilding of industrial 
and economic infrastructure within the Soviet Union proper but also by developing and 
expropriating industrial and agricultural production in the Soviet 'sphere of influence.' The 
nations of Eastern Europe became, in effect, exploited peripheries of a core state (to use 
Emmanuel Wallenstein's terminology). It was under the above mentioned historic and economic 
scenario that the post-WWII Polish Peoples' Republic came to be, and the eventual dysfunction 
of the system was a primary reason for the civil unrest that led to the emergence of the Solidarity 
Movement.  
     In legal terms, the Yalta Accords agreement of February, 1945 had called for "...the rights of 
all people to choose the form of government under which they will live", as per the Atlantic 
Charter (Stokes 1991: 15). Poland's provisional wartime government, established in 1942 (Ash 
2002:7), calls it a "puppet communist party" that replaced Polish officials ordered killed by 
Stalin) was then fully co-opted by Stalin's NKVD through rigged elections in January 1947. The 
NKVD translates to, "The Peoples Ministry For Internal Affairs," and was actually a secret 
police group and forerunner of the KGB, that brutally enforced Stalin's orders with little mercy 
for "enemies of the people." Full "sovietization" of Poland began in earnest shortly thereafter 
(Ash 2002: 7 - 8). 
      Informant "PN" explained it this way: 
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"There was a Communist party here (in Poland) before the Russians came (referring to 
the early post-WWII years). Polish communists did not like the Russians - this goes way 
back to many problems between our countries - between how we believe socialism to be. 
The Russians killed a lot of Polish Communist Party members. They were afraid they 
would not be loyal to Russia and to Lenin! Poles in school read Lenin - not Marx. Even 
Lenin was afraid of workers reading Marx! (laughter) The people in the Soviet Union 
read what was give them - not true Marxism, I don't think - no, it was Lenin's version. It 
was that the workers need the Party to represent them and that the Party is always right - 
so whatever the Party decides is what happens. They control everything - economy, 
where you live, where you work, what you learn in school, what you see on TV! The 
Party will make a world for you! Don't ask questions! So they took over this way." 
 
    This Sovietization entailed both political/economic control of Poland (and all of Eastern 
Europe) as well as an attempt at a cultural shift toward the USSR. Informant "B" described 
Sovietization this way: 
 "They were aiming everything toward the Soviet Union - not only political ideology but 
literature in school, language - we began learning Russian language in 2nd grade. They 
wanted to make all Eastern Europe as one country - yes, was like colonial times! They 
were colonizing us! Supposedly they were Polish (referring to Communist Party officials 
in Poland at the end of WWII)  - but many - in the beginning, right after the war - were 
not. The government was then pretty much run by Russian military." 
 
Informant "AF" added this comment: 
"There was a minister of education responsible for sovietizing of Polish education and 
culture. Everything had to fit the Communist ideology - if history did not fit they just 
changed it! Yes, they were trying to change our way of thinking  - either by fear or by 
propaganda in schools and on TV. And you could not see a movie or hear music or radio 
or TV from Western Europe  - they kept it blocked. You see that big hill where the cross 
is on? (he points to a hill overlooking Gdansk, called Gradowa Wzgorze) There was 
tower up there that blocked all radio and TV - all you get is what that tower sends - 
nothing else!" 
 
    Sovietization was based on Bolshevik notions of singularity and "...absolute denial of any 
possibility of pluralism - an intransigence rooted in a worldview based on class and class 
struggle, whereby only the interests of one class, the proletariat, could become universal" 
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(Kotkin 1995: 151).  Lynd (1945: 184) condenses this worldview and the goals of  Soviet society 
as follows: 
 
"It is a society with (a) announced collective goals; (b) the upmost speed of movement 
toward these goals...;(c) a single, authoritarian leadership apparatus and geographical 
segment in the pursuit of these goals; and (d) a positive policy of encouraging total social 
organization for the achievement of these goals and changing, or when necessary, 
destroying all tendencies to opposition and cleavage at every level in society, including 
the leadership apparatus itself...Here is a society that sets bold objectives for itself, or, 
more accurately, has them set for it by the Communist party; that conceives of these 
objectives as necessarily the objectives of everyone in society; that encourages everyone 
to identify his personal goals with the stated goals; and that allows no organized 
opposition." 
 
    The ultimate positive aim of this system (at least from the idealized Marxist tradition and 
ignoring the negative means  used to reach the goal) was creation of a worldwide egalitarian 
workers' society in which each individual had the economic means to reach his/her greatest 
human potential. The great inequalities of condition, exploitation of human life, and chaotic 
market swings inherent in a capitalist society, as driven by the profit motive, would be abolished. 
The Soviet Union invested very heavily in promotion of this ideology.  Labin (1960) estimated 
the Soviet budget for direct propaganda to Eastern Europe alone at equivalent of $500 million 
per year (during the 1950s and calculated in that era's currency value) with 140,000 full-time 
government workers employed in this specialized area. Kovaly (1997: 54 - 55) describes the 
proliferation of  "pamphlets printed on cheap paper" in early post-WWII era Eastern Europe, 
which all eventually arrived at the conclusion  "...that all injustice, discrimination, misery, and 
war...stem from...the exploitation of the working class... As soon as the working people - the 
creators of all value - understand what must be done, they will overthrow the exploiters...and the 
Kingdom of Heaven will come to earth."   No doubt, many adherents of this system truly 
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believed that they were elevating the material conditions of humankind and that their system 
could provide the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Thus, the second world-war 
was directly preceded by the ideological and economic struggle of the Cold War. As stated by 
Kotkin (1995: 151 - 152) socialism and capitalism soon became defined by their opposition to 
each other: 
 
 "Socialism, which began as a way of looking at the world based on a critique of 
capitalism, became a concrete form of social organization based on the suppression and 
ultimate elimination of capitalism...Those ideas [referring to the Soviet Union's official  
ideology] centered on the proposition, "socialism is the antidote to capitalism." 
Capitalism had bourgeois parliaments; socialism would have soviets of workers... 
Capitalism had selfish individualism; socialism would have collectivism. Capitalism had 
the chaos of markets; socialism would have planning. Capitalism had private property; 
socialism would have societal property, and so on...To put it another way, one achieved 
socialism by eradicating capitalism." 
 
         Thus, in light of the above ideology, and in regard to operationalizing this ideology by a 
nation devastated by war, in a world dominated by a capitalist superpower which had survived 
the war with no damage to its infrastructure (with the exception of Pearl Harbor), one can readily 
see the urgent agenda of the USSR as it began consolidating its assets in 1945.  Poland, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria, as 'military allies' within the 
Warsaw Pact and as 'economic partners' in COMECON (Communist East European Economic 
Community) became industrial workhorses for the Soviet Union in a form of 'peripheral 
exploitation' (again, as per Wallenstein's core-peripheral theory). The economic exploitation and 
resulting decline in living standards in these peripheries brought on strikes, riots, and protests 
against Soviet domination many years before the beginning of the Polish Solidarity Movement. 
The most well known of these were the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the revolt of Prague 
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in 1968, but Wejnert (2002: 65 - 90) provides a statistical analysis on dozens of smaller episodes 
of collective protest in all nations of Eastern Europe from the late 1940s to the 1980s.  
_______________________ 
 Interview Data: 
    I interviewed a former employee of a Gdansk port facility, a former member of a Student 
Union during the time of the Solidarity Movement,  two former employees of the Gdansk 
Shipyard in which the labor union, Solidarnosc, originated, and a former resident of Gdansk now 
living in Malmo, Sweden. Their stories provide original oral histories concerning the themes of 
Soviet exploitation, economic failure in Poland, and the demand for independent labor unions - 
three primary reasons for the Polish Revolution of the 1980s. Secondary data will also be used in 
this section. 
_____________________ 
 
Economic Exploitation Of Poland By The USSR: 
     The Gdansk Shipyard (in Polish, Stocznia Gdanska; from 1952 to 1989 it was called the 
Lenin Shipyard), four other related shipyards, and several port-loading facilities are located in 
the province of Pomorskie (Pomerania) on the Baltic Sea. Here the Wisla (Vistula River) forms a 
delta of three branches: the Leiwka Wisla, Smiala Wisla, and the Martwa Wisla. The city of 
Gdansk is over 1000 years old and lies along the coastal estuary formed by the Wisla as it 
empties into Zatoka Gdanska (Bay of Gdansk). The city is surrounded to the south by wooded 
hills, the highest being Gradowa Wzgorze, on which is erected the Millennium Cross, a 
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monument to 1000 years of Christianity in Gdansk. Shipyards and sea-ports have been located 
on this protected coastal plain since the 1400s, first established by rich merchants of the 
Hanseatic League. A German company owned by Ferdinand Schichau built the first modern-era 
shipyards at the Gdansk site in 1890, called the Schichau Seebeckwerft. In 1921 the Danziger 
Werft yards (referring to the German name for city, Danzig) were opened as additions to the 
Schichau yards. The shipyard complex and various port facilities expanded and prospered until 
WWII. During the war the shipyards and most of the city of Gdansk sustained heavy damage. 
After the war the Gdansk yards were restored and modernized through loans from the Soviet 
Union and became part of the state owned enterprise of The Polish Peoples' Republic. In this 
way the USSR established a very profitable means of production in Gdansk (personal 
observations and personal communications with informant "AF", Gdansk, 2010).  
     However, the wealth generated by the shipyards was not realized by the residents of Gdansk; 
it was extracted by the USSR. According to my informants, the Gdansk Shipyard produced 30 - 
40 large ocean-going ships per year during its prime (1960s and 1970s). Most of the ships were 
coal and ore carrying ships, oil and chemical tankers, and cargo ships. Most of the ships were 
produced for the Soviet Union, which sold them around the world as a source of income for the 
State. The shipyard workers felt that they were producing these ships "for free," as  informant 
"PZ" told me, for the benefit of the USSR: 
"We built all kinds of ships here - military ships, commercial ships, fishing ships. But we 
were building them for free for the Soviet Union...we built them in Gdansk, the Russians 
put their name on them, and sold them to Albania, to Brazil - all over the world. They 
made good money on our ships...and we couldn't even afford to buy basic food on a 
regular basis..." 
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     "PZ" was 67 years old at the time of this interview and had started working in the Lenin 
Shipyard at age 20 in 1963 (he is now retired). He was married in 1970, at which time, he told 
me,  he had worked in the shipyard for seven years but still could not afford to buy  a suit for the 
wedding. "I worked hard every day and was still poor," he commented. Once he asked the 
shipyard manager why wages were so low in the yard: 
"I asked him where  the money is going - you know how many ships we build - why can 
we not have a pay raise? He said the money is all going to Warsaw, to the government to 
pay for our benefits. But we didn't have any benefits! If we got sick, yes, we had our own 
hospital right here in the shipyard. But that's the only benefit I know of. Everything else 
we pay for from our pockets!" 
 
     Informant "AF" had worked in a port facility near the Lenin Shipyard. Coal, ore, grain, and 
chemicals were shipped from the interior of Poland up the Vistula by barge and loaded onto 
ocean-going ships here. He commented on the low wages in proportion to living expenses and on 
the constant promises of "better days ahead." 
"You could work here - we had policy of full employment - but you can not buy what 
you need. Sometimes all the stores had was vinegar and tea! You had ration cards to buy 
everything with, like in war-time. Meat was hard to get - if you were a worker you could 
buy something like two kilos - if worked in an office, half that amount. Now I see all 
kinds of meat in stores! Back then...no. It was a miserable time - no hope, no food, no 
future. I didn't even think there was a possibility for a different kind of life. They kept 
telling us things will get better - just keep working and life will be a paradise someday! 
They had all kinds of slogans. In the '70s it was, "We will build a second Poland." But all 
they built was more industrial things - it didn't seem to help us - "more industrial 
production", they said, but less to buy in stores. Why is this? Because that is the way of 
Communist Party." 
 
 
    The last lines of  "AF"s observations, above,  parallel the general thesis of Kotkin's 1995 
Stalinism as a Civilization: industrialization was synonymous with civilization in the Soviet 
Union and its sphere of influence. With all means of production planned and controlled by the 
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State, and private investment forbidden, production of consumer goods was greatly neglected in 
favor of heavy industrial production. A "forced austerity" was demanded of all citizens in the 
Soviet Bloc, (with the exception of the Party elite) foregoing the "luxuries" (necessities?) of the 
present for a promised utopia of the future. Heavy industrial output would generate the wealth 
needed for rebuilding the system in the aftermath of WWII, for providing social welfare 
programs for citizens, for military competition with the capitalist world, and for operation of the 
enormous government bureaucracy necessary in a planned economy. Consumer needs would be 
deferred until these priorities were met.  
     According to Mansfield (1974:405) this plan actually worked and was one reason for the 
fantastic growth in the Soviet economy from the 1930s through the 1960s. During this period, 
per capita consumption remained practically flat while industrial output soared. Mansfield 
reports that the Soviet Central Planning Commission re-invested about 30% of all gross national 
product during this time, as compared to about half that amount in the U.S. Obviously, in human 
terms, this meant that the quality of life in the USSR, in terms of living standards, was about the 
same in 1960 as it had been in 1930. 
      In Poland, industrial output  increase through the 1950s, '60s and '70s but living conditions 
continued to deteriorate. According to my informants, in December, 1970 the government of The 
Polish Peoples' Republic, headed by Wladyslaw Gomulka, announced tremendous  price hikes 
on food (cited by Ash 2002:13 to be  as high as 36% on all staple food items.) The increase was 
justified by the State as a needed 'correction' in the planned economy. This 'correction,' as 
unreasonable as it was and coming two weeks before Christmas, resulted in widespread strikes 
and riots across Poland. My informants speculated that the price hike was simply a method to 
generate more revenue for the State, even though newspaper reports had suggested that the 
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increase was an attempt to lower the Christmas season demand as a result of actual food 
shortages. The Lenin Shipyard, with some 20,000 workers, went on strike to protest the price 
increases. About a week before Christmas, Gomulka responded by sending in a police and 
military contingent to break the strike at the shipyard and restore order. The crackdown resulted 
in a conflict at the gates of the shipyard in which an unspecified number of workers were killed 
by police gunfire. Ash (2002: 13) reported "dozens" of workers killed in the event and an online 
source (Gdansk- Life.com 2009) reports 80 killed. Dziewanowski (1976: 307) reports 45 killed 
and 1,165 wounded. One of my informants in Gdansk told me that the exact number is not 
known because the Polish government contacted the families of the slain workers and threatened 
them with more violence if they told  anyone  how their family members died. Thus, funerals 
were held for the victims but the  cause of death was not attributed to police intervention. A large 
monument now stands outside the gates of the Gdansk Shipyard to mark this event. The strikes 
and rioting lasted five days and spread beyond Gdansk to Gdynia and Szczecin (Dziwanowski 
1976: 307.) Lech Walesa, the future leader of Solidarnosc, was a witness to the shootings in 
December, 1970. 
     Ironically, in Nikita Khrushchev's memoires, published in 1974, (Khrushchev died in 1971) 
he very aptly summarizes the cause of the Polish wage and price riots of 1970 - the direct 
predecessor of Solidarnosc's 1980 actions - and the potential outcomes of the Soviet system if 
reforms were not enacted. Khrushchev's statements proved to be a very accurate ideological 
summary and historical prediction: 
 
"I believe that we can compete successfully with capitalism only if we alter the priorities 
and organizational structure of our economy so as supply our citizens  with the food and 
consumer goods they want. A man labors and lives in order to satisfy his material and 
spiritual needs. If capitalism satisfies those requirements better than socialism, it will 
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become increasingly difficult for us to propagate our point of view and consolidate our 
way of life. Eventually, we will run the danger of losing everything - of going bankrupt. 
The danger is political as well as economic. Just look what happened in Danzig... [He is 
referring to Gdansk as Danzig, and to the 1970 riots there]. What happened in Poland 
represents a lesson for us. The events on the Baltic coast were a direct result of a food 
shortage and a consumer revolt against rising prices...The teachings of Marx, Engels, and 
Lenin cannot be hammered into people's heads only in the classroom and newspapers and 
at political rallies...Our people must be able to use their wages to buy high-quality 
products  manufactured under socialism if they are to accept our system and reject 
capitalism" (Khrushchev 1974: 146 - 147.) 
 
 
Economic Dysfunction in Poland - Examples From Gdansk: 
   
     Mansfield (1974: 397 - 407) explains the  attempted "balancing act" beginning in the 1960s 
"Khrushchev Thaw" and extending through the '70s that became necessary in the  planned 
economies of the Soviet system. According to Mansfield,  production of  much demanded 
consumer goods cut into production of export commodities. Less state revenue from lower 
exports of industrial products  meant less money available for reinvestment in future growth. In 
theory, all goods and service in communist economies would be produced at cost and wages 
would be set so that every citizen has a decent standard of living. But in a closed  system, as was 
the Soviet Bloc, the increased burden of producing consumer goods had to be offset by some 
exploitative differential. Thus, economic planners attempted to make up the difference by 
limiting the newly available consumer goods by raising prices on them and by imposing a heavy 
'turn-over tax' on items deemed luxuries. This tax was simply an additional cost beyond the 
production cost, tacked on to certain items. 
      For example, informant "AF" told me of working and saving for five years in order to buy a 
used "Fiat Bambino." Yet, when he actually tried to buy one he realized that he was still short of 
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cash as a 25% turn-over tax was to be added. Car loans were nearly impossible to get, reported 
the informant. He also said that refrigerators, TVs, washing machines, and even upholstered 
furniture were considered luxuries in Poland in the 1970s and were heavily taxed.  
     Discontent in Poland reached intolerable levels several times during the 1970s. Despite the  
shooting incident at the gates of the Gdansk Shipyard,  other factories and shipyards in the 
Gdansk-Sopot- Gydnia tri-city area went on strike soon after to protest low wages, high taxes, 
and shortages of every kind (Ash 2002: 14 - 15).  Informant "B" said, "The reason for the strikes 
was that the people were starving in the cities. There was nothing on the shelves but tea and 
macaroni! That's all - was all empty shelves! No goods on the shelves of any kind. I mean like 
shoes, clothes too - besides food. Nothing for us!" 
     Soon after the December 1970 shooting incident at the Gdansk Shipyard,  Wladyslaw 
Gomulka was replaced by a new Communist Party leader, Edward Gierek, in an attempt by 
Politburo strategists to appease the  discontent.  A group of some thirty factories in Szczecin 
province had banded together forming an inter-factory strike committee, a first attempt at the  
large-scale organized protest Solidarity would master a decade later. On January 24, 1971, 
Gierek  met with the strikers for over nine hours and by way of emotional appeal and by 
successfully identifying with the workers, convinced them to end the strike (Ash 2002: 15 - 16). 
     According to Laba (1991: 80 - 81) Gierek emphasized his own background as a coal miner, 
shed tears as he persuaded  the strikers to cooperate with him in proposed solutions to food 
shortages and high taxes, and finally pleaded with them, "Will you help me?"  The strikers 
agreed to go back to work, to cooperate with Gierek, and to work with his new administration to 
jointly solve the economic problems of Poland. Gierek froze food prices, granted some wage 
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increases, and proposed 'new and improved' Socialist Five-Year Plans. However, he and his 
economic planning committee could do little about the overall dysfunction of the Soviet 
dominated system and still remain in ideologically accepted territory. Privatization of any means 
of production was forbidden.  The significance of this scenario is that it came to represent the 
standard practice for dealing with workers' demands throughout the 1970s; promises were made 
that could not be fulfilled and resulted in appeasements that simply delayed real solutions. 
     In addition to food shortages, there was a serious housing shortage in Poland during the 
Communist years. There were no private building contractors and nearly all residential 
construction and all commercial construction was controlled by the State. The only exception 
was in rural areas where some private ownership of land still existed. Informant "B" told me that 
full collectivization of Poland's  farms never occurred, probably because the State saved money 
by excluding farmers from social welfare programs. "B" said that private farmers had no health 
insurance, no form of old-age retirement or pension, and no support from the government in case 
of crop failure. One advantage rural families did have was the freedom to construct their own 
houses, that is, if building supplies could be obtained.  A conversation with informant "AF" 
details the Polish housing shortage and the rural alternatives: 
"Before '89, how long did it take to get an apartment in Gdansk?" 
    "Before transformation, for an apartment, people were waiting 25 years! We would 
pay a membership price to be member of cooperative - to start to get an apartment. Every 
month, we pay into this. But you might pay - wait - 25 years. Now developers are making 
apartments in every city. But right now not everyone can borrow money from bank." 
     "For me - after I was married, we stayed with my wife's family for 20 years! That was 
typical - two generations - even grandchildren - three generations, all in same apartment. 
Today is less common, but that was for everyone in my generation. We had no choice." 
 
25 
 
"So, did everyone live in apartments? I mean, did anyone have a private home? I mean, 
like a house - not an apartment." 
 
     "Private people could construct own house or apartment but borrowing rate at banks 
was very high. Was impossible to pay back the bank at such high rates. And State 
controlled building - I don't think there were private building companies. But in the 
country the people built houses for themselves. In city, only State Cooperatives could 
build." 
     "In rural areas some people had some land. When I wanted - let's say we wanted to 
build a house - OK - we help each other! When I'm finished with mine I help you - we 
help neighbor build his. We didn't pay - didn't charge - it was labor for labor. And if I 
knew a trade like electricity, pipes - the guys who know that helped with that kind of 
work. The guys who know bricks trade their work - you see, we traded what we knew - 
we helped each other!" 
    "Like with everything else, you wait in line to buy things to build with. Maybe you can 
buy two bags of cement today - wait a month, buy two more bags. Lay some bricks - wait 
for cement - it was slow! And for roof - the tiles for roof - hard to get!" 
 
 
     There were no real economic solutions for nations such as Poland who were dependent on the 
USSR for approval of economic plans as the USSR intended on maintaining a 'favorable balance 
of trade' with Eastern Europe. Khrushchev even admits that "trading concessions favorable to the 
Russians" were established by Stalin to exploit satellite nations' resources (Khrushchev 1974: 
209) but he insists that these were terminated upon Stalin's death. In reality, the USSR 
maintained nearly total control of Poland's economy by requiring 'permission' for Poland to make 
adjustments in its economy as part of Comecon. Under these conditions the quality of life and 
quality of goods produced in Poland continued to decline through the 1970s. Ash (2002: 18) 
sums it up well in reference to the Polish economy of the 1970s: "...ham and beef are wanted by 
all, but Polish machine tools and cars will not be bought by anyone who is quite sane." 
26 
 
    But by 1976 even Polish ham and beef production - and all agricultural production, for that 
matter - was in decline, and food shortages led to yet another round of strikes and 
demonstrations. In June of '76 food prices were again increased in an effort to reduce demand. 
Sucharczuk (1974: 31) reports cheese and butter prices up 60%,  meat prices up 69%, and sugar 
prices up 100%. Police and military were readied for the inevitable backlash and violent conflicts 
did occur in several locations. Eventually the prices lowered, but between 1976 and 1980 
Poland's economic planners  were behaving, in Ash's words, "... like the pilots of an airliner 
which has gone into a nosedive. Starting with the so-called 'economic maneuver' of late 1976, 
they tried every trick they knew , but the machine would not respond to the controls...the debt 
dial whizzed up into red, from $10 billion mark in 1976 to around $17 billion in 1979..." (Ash 
2002: 19). 
An Alternative To Dysfunction: 
     A final example from observations and interviews at Gdansk will demonstrate the severity of 
food shortages in that city prior to democratization; remnants of  an alternative means of 
production are still evident: 
     Up the wooded hillsides surrounding the outskirts of Gdansk I noticed what seemed to 
resemble the squatters' towns outside the city of Juarez, Mexico where live the maquiladoras, or 
in-migrating factory workers. The slopes were divided into small plots, each with a little lean-to 
shed or shack made of scrap wood, sheet metal, and assorted odds and ends. I saw this again in a 
city park; a little 'settlement' seemed to have once occupied the park's extremities, but I could  
see it was now abandoned. Later I noticed similar 'shanty towns' built on the property of a coal-
fired power plant. The old plant, according to an informant, was said to be "a gift from Uncle Joe 
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Stalin," and apparently still used pollution control technology from Stalin's era; that is, it had 
none. I noticed fly ash in the air near the plant and the acrid smell of burning low-grade, high 
sulfur coal, reminiscent of childhood memories of coal and coke processing plants in Appalachia 
of the 1960s.  
     A local resident told me that these "shanty towns" were actually tool storage sheds for little, 
private gardens. Some had large south-facing windows or clear sheet-plastic covers and had been 
used to start tender plants in early spring. These gardens were not at all 'picturesque European 
flower gardens,' but were ramshackled hillside conglomerations of recycled industrial materials, 
home-made, and protected by woven brush fences and sagging barbed wire. In some places the 
steep hillsides had even been terraced using everything from aluminum siding scraps to 
splintered utility poles, to hold back the soil and form small flat strips that contoured with the 
terrain. Some plots had long-neglected fruit trees and grape arbors. These private plots had fed 
the people of Gdansk during the worst years of Poland's economic crisis. All of my informants 
(those old enough to remember) have described to me the hardships of those years, especially 
1981 - 1983, during the time of martial law.  
    In order to survive, people bought and sold garden produce, fruits, and berries grown on these 
little plots for the 'black market.' As everything produced in The Peoples' Republic of Poland 
during the Communist era was subject to a state tax, the operators of these little market gardens 
were, technically, committing tax evasion. However, my informants told me, the State generally 
ignored this 'crime.' The tradition continues and I saw several 'old-timers' selling jam, honey, and 
home-canned fruit on the sidewalks of Gdansk (perhaps it is again necessary due to globalization 
of capital and deindustrialization.) Most of the gardens are abandoned today but I was told that in 
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the worst economic times the 'garden shacks' were also used as hen houses, rabbit hutches, and 
occasionally as a shed for a milk goat or two.   
     It is not unusual to see backyard gardens or community gardens within any city. Many 
residents do this as a hobby, for fun, or as a throwback to more traditional times. However, it is 
the economic and historic context of the Gdansk gardens that make them so striking and so 
telling. They extended up the hillsides and into city parks of a town that was the site of one of the 
largest industrial works ever built. The Gdansk Shipyards are immense and once produced great 
wealth for the State. The current director of the Gdansk local of Solidarnosc told me that at one 
time some 70,000 workers were employed in shipbuilding alone in the Gdansk-Sopot-Gdynia 
region. Yet, this city was dependent on little hillside gardens and chicken houses as a 
supplemental food source. 
      The significance of this observation of a material cultural tradition (or perhaps the hillside 
gardens may be called folk culture relics) as an antidote or correction to the economic 
dysfunction of an ideological/political system cannot be understated. It is analogous to imagining 
New York City residents forced to take up gardening in Central Park to avert starvation, or 
Washington, D.C. residents grazing goats on the National Mall in order to earn extra money to 
buy shoes; this, however, not by the unemployed - because full employment was guaranteed in 
Poland - but by people working 40 - 60 hour weeks in highly capitalized, heavy industrial 
facilities.  It reflects not only a long-term dysfunction of the economic system, but a realization 
by Gdansk residents that the system was beyond repair and that reform or relief was not coming. 
As one informant told me, "You can't make soup out of ideas." Resolved to materially fend for 
themselves by gardening and 'black market trading,' while their 'official' labor - the output of 
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their industrial jobs -  went to  support, in effect, a colonizer, the people of Gdansk who formed 
Solidarity understood the long-term nature of the struggle they were in.  
      Even more outrageous than the necessity to become self-sufficient food producers while fully 
employed in heavy industry was the attitude of lower-level government economic planners who 
placated the Politburo in Moscow when strikes and riots over food shortages occurred in Poland. 
A quote from an official sent to Poland to investigate the situation reveals the denial of the 
shortages and greater concern that the government was being shortchanged in tax revenue: 
"...the Poles have plenty; there is grain, meat products, vegetables, and so on. But they 
give nothing to the State and are adopting a wait-and-see attitude.  In the private markets, 
a rather active trade is being conducted at very elevated prices. They buy what they 
need...the people are not going hungry" (Paczkowski 2007: 447). 
 
 Demand For independent Labor Unions: 
       The out-of-control Polish economy under Edward Geirek during the late 1970s and the 
accumulating social unrest the situation generated would come to a "boiling point," so to speak, 
by August 1980. Each crisis, each conflict, and each temporary "fix" resulted in three things:   1) 
With each event the Poles lost more and more confidence in the ability of their government to 
remedy the economic problems through 'socialist-approved' methods - that is, through 
adjustments to market forces;  2) With each event the leaders of the workers, such as Lech 
Walesa, gained valuable experience in organizing protests and in negotiating demands; 3) With 
each event there must have began to emerge the 'assurance' (or at least the hope) that dissent in 
Poland  - although it had resulted in some deaths - would apparently not result in massive Soviet 
military intervention as had occurred in Hungary in 1953 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. This 
factor must have led the future Solidarity Movement leaders to the belief that a 'political 
opportunity' through apparent Soviet liberalization was emerging. The perception of possibility 
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of favorable outcome as a facilitating factor is a noted concept in general social movement 
theory. 
       In the summer of 1980 waves of strikes, protests, and demonstrations swept across Poland as 
they had in prior years in response to the failing economy. However, this series of strikes was the 
most organized and coordinated to date. Ash (2002: 36) states that government officials were 
confounded by "...the speed with which the information about the strikes spread around the 
country, despite the complete silence of all the government-controlled mass media." 
Additionally, this time workers did not simply demand wage/price corrections. Even before 
Solidarity's late August agreements (which resulted in government recognition of a series of 
legally constructed rights for workers) the workers at  Lublin truck factory near Warsaw, for 
instance, had drawn up a list of 35 points they wanted addressed including creation of free labor 
unions. Also, the various striking factories and shipyards were not 'going it alone' this time.  In a 
matter of weeks, in late summer of 1980,  an  "Inter-enterprise Strike Committee" (know in 
Poland as the MKS, Miedzyzakladowa Komisja Robotnicza) was formed which represented the 
demands of workers from several dozen of the huge industrial works on and near the Baltic 
Coast. The MKS was a direct predecessor to Solidarnosc (Walesa 1987: 115 - 130). 
       Although various strikes had been occurring across Poland through the summer of 1980, the 
Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk did not go out on strike until August 14th. The immediate cause of the 
strike was the firing of Anna Walentynowicz, a crane operator who had worked nearly 30 years 
in the shipyard. Walesa (1987: 116) states that she was fired just five months before her 
scheduled retirement ,  at age 53, thus making her ineligible for receiving retirement benefits. 
Ash (2002: 42) adds the reason given for her dismissal was claimed to be  petty theft;  gathering 
the butts of candles used in a ceremony to honor the 1970 shootings of striking workers at the 
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gates of the shipyard. This outraged her fellow  workers at the shipyard who  obviously realized 
the dismissal had nothing to do with candle butts. The intention of the Lenin Shipyard 
management was to 'teach a lesson' to workers by threatening them with losing their job and 
retirement benefits (even with 30 years service) for participating in memorials to worker 
solidarity. Lech Walesa had been fired some months earlier from the Lenin Shipyard for 
attempting to organize construction of a monument to the slain workers just outside the shipyard 
gates and for passing out samizdat publications at the yard. He said that he used his 'time off'  
from work to continue passing out more samizdat at many other plants and shipyards  in the tri-
cities area (Gdansk,  Sopot, and Gdynia) during the summer of 1980 while looking for work 
(Walesa 1987: 100 - 101.) No doubt his actions contributed to inter-factory support and 
cooperation in August. 
     By evening of the first day of the strike (August 14th 1980) the shipyard manager, Klemens 
Gniech, had appeased the workers by promise of negotiations if they went back to work. Lech 
Walesa, though at that time considered a former employee (due to his earlier dismissal),  is said 
to have "jumped the fence" into the shipyard as Gniech was addressing the workers and proposed 
the formation of an occupation strike within the yard until some basic demands were met. The 
workers enthusiastically followed Walesa's lead and thus his position as leader of the growing 
movement began (however, at that moment, obviously,  his role was still unofficial and it was  
not imagined the degree to which his participation would affect events to come.)  A negotiation 
committee was formed with immediate demands being stated as the re-hiring of both Anna 
Walentynowicz and Lech Welesa (as per their former plant seniority positions so that 
Walentynowicz could work her last five months and receive retirement), a specified pay raise, 
family allowances similar to that of police and government workers, assurance of no further 
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reprisals for striking workers, and permission to build a monument to the memory of the workers 
killed during the 1970 strike (Ash 2002: 44 - 47).   
   Informants "JB" was "PZ" were both employees of the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk during the 
initial days of the formation of Solidarnosc. They were eyewitnesses of the above described  
events. I asked them to describe those times: 
(JB) "It was August 1980. Thousands of people were coming to the gate of the shipyard 
to see what was going on. We had went on strike because we had enough - the shortages - 
and everything was forbidden - we had to apply for apartment, and wait for years, even to 
buy furniture, we wait for years - food bought on points card - Come on! Like war-time 
but no war! The people learned, in those days, that they have a voice. They can criticize 
the State and were not afraid anymore. They just said, "This is enough!"  
 
     "JB" emphasized to me the resolution of the strikers at Gdansk to unite all workers in the 
process of peaceful change; he used the phrase, "evolution not revolution," several times. He 
continued: 
 
 "We knew after 1970 (referring to the shootings at the shipyard gate) that we had to act 
with good against bad - this was policy of Walesa too. Like the Pope used to say, if you 
have something bad against you then present yourself as good, and fight like that. You 
see, people respect this - respect words of Pope. This was the peaceful way. The plan was 
not to pull down the Communist Party but to build our own organization. Before, they 
burnt some buildings of the Party - like in Poznan in '68 - and here in Gdansk - right 
down the street they burnt the Communist Party building! We stopped that - it would not 
work. We changed our policies. 
 
     "PZ" was a witness at the moment Lech Walesa became the "unofficial" leader of 
Solidarnosc. He described the moment and insisted that I take several pictures of the exact 
location as a new shopping center is planned to be built on the existing site. "PZ" was very proud 
of his involvement in the Solidarity Movement and had worked very hard in supporting the 
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union. He had been jailed for six months for passing out samizdat literature and had worked 
directly with Lech Walesa in organizing city-wide strikes in Gdansk in the early days of the 
movement. He was still amazed at the rapid spread of the Solidarity Movement in 1980; "The 
movement organized itself," he said. "From here - right here, where we are standing,  
Solidarnosc spread across Poland. Ten million people joined the union!" PZ continued: 
"Here is where you hear of how 'Lech jumped the fence!' See, there are houses here - 
apartments, up against the fence. The shipyard manager was talking to the workers here - 
trying to calm them down - a guy named Gniech. Walesa jumped up on an excavator 
beside him. He said, "Remember me? You fired me a while back. Now I'm back!" The 
crowd yelled, shouted, laughed! And they drowned out Gniech. In this way they just 
started following Walesa - he just took the lead!" 
 
       What followed was a two week strike centered at the gates of Stocznia Gdanska,(the Gdansk 
Shipyards - at that time still called, Lenin Shipyard) and in the old red-brick administrative 
buildings located nearby. Eventually, a document with twenty-one demands was drawn up by the 
strike committee. PZ took me to the old building where this document, the Gdansk Agreement, 
was formally signed on August 31, 1980 by Lech Walesa and the Deputy Prime Minister of The 
Polish Peoples' Republic, Mieczyslaw Jagielski. PZ shook his head in disbelief and remorse that 
this historic site - where for the first time in an Eastern Bloc nation, the Communist Party 
recognized any formal, representative body other than itself  - was now in the process of being 
converted to general office space for local Gdansk companies. He explained: 
"People have forgotten already what this was all about - what happened here. We had 
mass here every day during the strike...we made a wooden cross and put it here - before 
the big monument you now see outside the gates was built. The whole country was on 
strike with us...yes, it all spread from this spot! We had mass because we were afraid this 
might be our last days! The military might come in and wipe us all out - who knows? 
Back then things like that happened." 
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     Ash describes the last two weeks of August, 1980 in Poland as "something like a nationwide 
general strike,"  and states that, "it was officially estimated that c. 750,000 workers in some 750 
enterprises took part in the August strikes. This is certainly an underestimate" (2002: 63).  
       Informant "B" also remembered the August 1980 strikes, and confirmed the reality of  
informant PK's fears of violent reprisal during the strike. I asked "B" if the Gdansk Shipyard 
strikes had been an occupation strike or a walkout: 
"Initially they stayed in the buildings because prior years when they walked out into the 
streets they were killed. But they said, "OK - we are stopping work." And they stopped! 
Everyone - totally! The workers in the plants, the students in the schools - they said, "OK 
- we are  not coming to class." They stopped. The faculty said, "OK - we are not 
teaching." They stopped. That's it - that's solidarity! Everybody stopped...students said, 
"We don't care if you expel all the students." Faculty said, "We don't care if you fire us." 
Workers said, "We don't care if you kill us." You can do it - but there is nobody to take 
our place... 
     We were afraid the Polish military might try to end the strikes - or maybe the Soviet 
army would come in...yes, it was a very scary time! I remember tanks did come to 
shipyard - Polish tanks - Polish soldiers. Women took flowers and put them on the tanks 
and said, "Sons, we don't want you to fight your fathers" - and they didn't! The guys 
knew, of course, they risk desertion, or disobey of orders...but the military knew also, that 
they cannot get rid of whole army - cannot tell Polish army to attack Poland! One person, 
yes - but whole army, no! Whole factory no! See, that is how solidarity worked!" 
 
     The number one goal of the Gdansk strikes was to gain official government recognition of 
independent labor unions; this was the first demand of the Gdansk Agreement.  Ash (2002: 61) 
quotes a strike committee negotiator, Florian Wisniewski, as saying, "...on the question of free 
trade unions we shall not be moved." The wording of the Gdansk Agreement on this subject is as 
follows: 
"The activity of the trade unions of People's Poland has not lived up to the hopes and 
aspirations of the workers. We thus consider that it will be beneficial to create new union 
organisations, which will run themselves, and which will be authentic expressions of the 
working class. Workers will have the right to join the old trade unions and we are looking 
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at the possibilities of the two union structures co-operating" (from, The Gdansk 
Agreement, in, The Polish August: Documents from the beginning of the Polish Workers' 
Rebellion - Gdansk - August, 1980. MacDonald. 1981: 102.) 
 
      Kotkin (1995: 206) describes the traditional labor unions of the Soviet Union as tools through 
which the government advanced its own interests by pushing worker productivity, not as 
defenders of workers' interests. Dziewanowski (1976: 23) describes even the earliest versions of 
Communist parties in Poland as considered by many to be, "...heritics to the creed of Marx and 
Engels, whose doctrine they pretend to worship but whose opinions concerning Poland and her 
right to free and independent existence they ignored" (referring to the early Polish Socialist Party 
advocating Partition by Russia and Germany.)  Thus, through Soviet intervention after WWII, 
the Party and the Union in Poland became virtually the same organization. The writers of the 
Gdansk Agreement saw the absolute necessity of establishing independent unions as the first step 
in true social change for Poland. Ash (2002:71) quotes Lech Walesa's statement at the signing of 
the Gdansk Agreement as evidence for this: 
 "We got all we could in the present situation. And we will achieve the rest, because we 
now have the most important thing: in-de-pen-dent self governing trade unions. That is 
our guarantee for the future...I declare the strike ended." 
 
     Informants PZ, JB, and AF,  like nearly all Poles (and for that matter, like nearly all workers 
in the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence at the time),  were  members of  State sponsored 
labor unions before Solidarnosc was formed. Informant B helped organize an independent 
student's union as an alternative to a State sponsored union at a university. I asked all four 
informants what the State sponsored unions were like before the alternative of Solidarnosc: 
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PZ: "They were a bunch of assholes! Their job was just to make you work harder. They 
say, "We will get you a raise." Then, a week later, prices on everything go up - so there 
goes the raise!" 
JB: "We  had a union at the shipyard - yes...but it was just one big trade union of the 
Communist Party - membership was compulsory. We had no right to strike - so what 
good was it? How can we make change? They were for the interests of the Party - not 
us." 
AF: "Well, they took care of families - got time off for mothers to have babies - got us 
medical care. But our pay was so low...didn't we deserve at least to have a doctor, a 
hospital visit? You just took what they offered...and hoped things would not get worse." 
B: "It was believed that you didn't need a union - independent union, like in U.S. - 
because in Poland the State cares for people - provides for people. But they didn't do 
anything - didn't represent us. They might have end of year party or coffee time - little 
present for kids at Christmas - or organize trip around the factory - nothing! (laughs) You 
know, mushrooms? - yes, wild mushrooms in the forest. Well, they organize a trip to 
gather mushrooms - hahahah! Nothing to do with issues or grievances that workers had! 
They maintained the system that the State wanted - that was their main job." 
 
____________________________________ 
      
     The above viewpoints aptly demonstrate the dysfunction of Poland's State sponsored unions 
and the memberships' dissatisfaction with their agenda. The previous section of this chapter 
provided evidence of major, systemic economic failure in Poland and the first section provided 
evidence of economic exploitation of Poland by the USSR.  In light of the  interview data 
obtained and in conjunction with other historical accounts of the era, I believe  these three issues 
were the primary factors that brought the Polish people to the brink of revolution by August, 
1980. 
      Out of this turmoil the labor union, Solidarnosc, was created and along with it a long-term, 
international social movement  - the Solidarity Movement - first emerged. These two events are 
very significant, historically and sociologically. First, in that the recognition of Solidarnosc by 
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the USSR as an independent representative body of citizens in a Communist State constituted the 
first act of political plurality within a system ideologically founded on Leninist principles of non-
plurality. Secondly, the Solidarity Movement did eventually bring about the freeing of Eastern 
Europe from Soviet political and economic domination in a peaceful transition.  
____________________________________ 
     The followings sections briefly summarizes the history of the Solidarity Movement from the 
signing of the Gdansk Agreement in 1980 to the election of Lech Walesa as the first president of  
The Republic Of Poland in 1990. It is drawn entirely from secondary sources. 
 
Signing Of The Gdansk Agreements: 
     Without recounting all the details of the long and tedious 18 days of negotiations, we can 
arrive at Sunday, August 31,  1980, at which time the final meeting took place between the 
Solidarity negotiating committee and the representatives of the Polish government. Most of the 
items in the list of demands had been accepted (some in altered form) by the government 
negotiating team and a promise in good faith had been made to continue to pursue items of 
conflict. Walesa addressed the workers at the Lenin Shipyard calling the negotiations a success 
and calling an end to the strike. Work was to resume the next day, Monday, September 1st.  A 
signing ceremony was carried out in which General Wojciech Jagielski, representing the 
government of The Polish Peoples' Republic, accepted the agreed upon terms of the negotiations 
and also officially recognized  the right of the Polish people  to organize free and independent 
trade unions. Walesa and Jagielski shook hands and Walesa thanked him and those he 
represented for the peaceful settlement of the strike and for the advancements made. He claimed 
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no victory, but said that they had settled "As Pole talks to Pole." Jagielski is reported to have 
picked up on this and said to the effect, (paraphrasing) "Yes, Pole to Pole, for the sake of our 
People in the Socialist Fatherland" (Ash 2002: 71). 
     On September 17th, in a meeting of the representatives from some thirty-five newly formed 
unions (directly formed in the days immediately following the official legalization of trade 
unions in Poland) the name,  Solidarnosc, (Solidarity) was chosen as the simplified name for the 
"Founding Committee of Independent Self-Governing Trade Unions" (NSZZ; Niezalezny 
Samorzadny Zwiazek Zawodowy.)  Within a week 3500 factories across Poland, representing an 
estimated three million individuals, had joined the union. A year later Solidarity had ten million 
members. MacDonald (1981: 13) describes the original organization of Solidarnosc as being "a 
federation of 17 autonomous regional bodies with a coordinating commission on the national 
level based in Gdansk." Mac Donald adds that about 500 individuals representing the newly 
formed unions from all across Poland were in attendance.  
     The most important of the original 21 demands had been met. Ash (2002: 74 - 75) describes 
the conditions of the final agreement as follows:  All Poles would have the option to join the 
newly formed  independent trade unions which would coexist with the old State operated unions; 
The right to strike was granted; The new unions agreed to continue to honor  the role of the Party 
as "the leading force in the building of socialism"; The new unions were allowed their own 
independent publications;  The government agreed to make public economic information 
concerning the nation; The demands concerning pay increases and cost of living/family 
allowances were to be achieved over time with gradual increases beginning immediately; 
Retirement age was lowered; The issues concerning food supplies, maternity leave, and housing 
programs were said to be "vaguer,"  but were supposed to be remedied over time. All of these 
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items were major victories for Solidarity; this kind of social contract was unheard of in the 
Communist world - practically 'too good to be true'- which turned out to be the case! 
     Within days of this agreement it became apparent that major obstacles stood in the way of its 
realization. In fact, it may have been physically impossible, that is, economically impossible,  to  
fulfill much of the agreement; Poland's economy simply could not sustain the demands. 
      It soon became apparent that it was also politically impossible for two centers of power to 
coexist in the Soviet system; as stated earlier in this chapter, Lenin's version of Marxism was 
absolutely "non-plural." This reality was stated aptly by Adam Michnik, as quoted in Walesa's 
book, A Way Of Hope (1987: 150.) 
"The truth is that without agreement between the government and the people, this country 
cannot be governed. That truth is also that, in spite of official pronouncements at national 
functions, this country is not a sovereign country. This is the truth: Poles should admit the 
fact that their sovereignty is limited by the national and ideological interests of the USSR. 
In the last analysis, the truth is that the only Polish government acceptable to the leaders 
of the USSR is one controlled by communists; there is no reason to think this state of 
affairs is going to change overnight, if ever." 
 
     Five days after the Gdansk Agreement was signed the Party's Central Committee replaced 
Edward Gierek with Stanislaw Kania as First Secretary Of The Party. Just as Wladyslaw 
Gomulka had been replaced by Geirek in 1970 (after the riots and shootings of workers in 
Gdansk) so Kania's appointment was meant as a break in a failed leadership (failed in the 
assessment of the Party.) MacDonald (1981: 12 - 13) states that Kania's acceptance speech as 
Party leader openly indicated his goal of breaking Solidarity. MacDonald says that Kania 
immediately began a "petty crackdown" on all Solidarity activities, "...requiring the workers to 
struggle every inch of the way to build their new organization..."(12). This crackdown included 
"…arrests, harassment, denial of offices and access to the media, vicious slanders of individual 
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leaders in the media, house searches and confiscation of materials. Desperate attempts were 
made to preserve the old official unions and to intimidate workers seeking to join the new 
unions” (12). 
     On October 3rd, thirty-three days after the signing of the Gdansk Agreements, Solidarity 
called a "one hour warning strike," to call attention to the lack of wage increases (supposed to be 
incremental but immediate as per the agreement), the failure of the government to allow the 
union full access to mass media, and the worker harassment that Kania had instigated.   
     A series of confrontations between Solidarity activists and the Kania administration continued 
throughout the remainder of the year.  The continued delay by the government to abide by the 
Gdansk Agreement and the intensification of harassment eventually led to longer and more wide 
spread strikes. Unable to break the Union by intimidation, slander, and the offering of separate, 
competitive settlements, legal action was undertaken. {Kania  had attempted to bargain with 
certain "less militant" branches of Solidarity advising them to take concessions on the original 
agreement and excluding from further negotiation those branches that demanded full adherence 
to the original agreement.  This was meant to divide the Union. The administration also spread 
rumors of an imminent Soviet invasion if Solidarity continued to press its demands;  this rumor 
may have had some truth behind it.}  
     This legal action set the precedent for arrest of Solidarity activists on the grounds of "anti-
Socialist activities." It was based on the wording of a clause in the final, elaborate  version of the 
Gdansk Agreement as accepted by the government negotiating committee and MKS. The clause 
reads as follows: 
 "These new unions are intended to defend the social and material interests of the 
workers, and not to play the role of a political party. They will be established on the basis 
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of the socialization of the means of production and of the socialist system which exists in 
Poland today. They will recognize the leading role of the PUWP [Polish United Workers 
Party; Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, or more clearly, the Communist Party] in 
the state, and will not oppose the existing system of international alliances" (The Gdansk 
Agreement, taken from MacDonald 1981: 102). 
 
     In effect, this clause entirely negated the notion of independent trade unions in Poland.  By 
recognizing the leading role of the Party in the State and not opposing the "existing alliances," 
which referred to Poland's necessity to answer to the USSR on all economic matters, the 
"independent trade unions" would simply enter a "parental-like" relationship with State as 
"mother" and Party as "father"; if the unruly "children" misbehaved they would be punished. 
Thus, the Kania administration enforced this interpretation of the Gdansk Agreement (approve 
by the Supreme Court in Warsaw) and began arresting the more militant and outspoken 
Solidarity activists, charging them with anti-socialist activities as per the interpretation, and 
sentencing them to prison terms up to five years (MacDonald 1981: 13 - 16.)   
     Lech Walesa recalled the months directly after the signing of the Gdansk Agreement, initially 
jubilant, then with a sickening realization that the old system would not be broken: 
"We spent the autumn haggling with the government. It was a difficult dialogue between 
two camps who spoke different languages. ..For every term defining the growing trade 
union and its activities, the government insisted on resorting to the standard lexicon 
patented in the Eastern Bloc. Everything departing,  however slightly,  from the wooden 
forms was suspect, treated as "counter-revolutionary" and "anti-socialist." The result was 
an exhausting struggle over each word, each definition...they remained enslaved to 
"petrified" forms, incapable, with rare exceptions, of taking part in the new 
dialogue...They always trotted out the old Party theses, afraid to let go of the ideological 
lifeline that had supported them for so long.." (Walesa 1987: 158.) 
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Poland under General Wojciech Jaruelski: 
 
     Kania's tactics were not working. His attempts to break Solidarity only resulted in more 
strikes which worsened the economic situation, which in turn added to the rising frustration level 
of the Polish people, which increased their propensity to strike and protest even more.  Kania 
was simply creating a 'vicious circle' of ever-rising mass discontent. 
      In February 1981, after six months of ineffective leadership, Kania was replaced by General 
Wojciech Jaruzelski. His appointment was met with mixed feelings by most Poles who knew his 
background. Jaruzelski had close ties to Moscow, having held several trusted, high-ranking 
positions.  He had been Poland's  Minister of Defense during the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, in which he oversaw the Polish Army's participation in this event.  This 
fact, and other links to the Soviet military "...suggested a communist soldier completely loyal to 
Moscow..." [however] "...he was widely reputed to have opposed the use of force against  the 
workers both in December 1970 and August 1980"(Ash 2002: 151.) This background 
information led the Solidarity leadership to see Jaruzelski's attempt at governing Poland as 
possibly "...the last card before the use of force" (Ash 2002: 152.) In his inaugural address on 
February 12, 1981 he attempted a display of good faith toward the Polish workers and Solidarity 
calling for a voluntary 90-day freeze on all strikes and work stoppages in exchange for renewed 
commitment to dialogue. He made his appeal on the basis of mounting  economic problems 
which were only exacerbated by work stoppages. He proposed the creation of "wide ranging 
economic reforms" though these were yet unspecific and were to be forthcoming.  
     As they had done with both Geirek and Kania, the Solidarity leadership agreed to work with 
Jaruzelski, to attempt renewed dialogue and to attempt to improve the workings of the Polish 
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economy. Work stoppages as a form of protest were set aside for the duration that Jaruzelski had 
requested and some factories and mines even agreed to Saturday work as a gesture of good will.  
     In the mean time, university students and faculty had joined in with the workers of the 
Solidarity movement in attempting to gain needed reforms in their sphere.  Student sit-in strikes 
had occurred in recent weeks on several campuses and, like the workers of the Solidarity 
movement, the students had drawn up a list of grievances and demands. Among these were 
opposition to compulsory Russian language classes and compulsory Marxism-Leninism classes. 
Probably thinking that "giving in" to these demands would seem a good bargaining gesture for 
his incoming  administration, Jaruzelski granted the students their request. Only a few days later, 
in late March 1981, Jaruzelski was summoned to the Kremlin for a 'talk' with First Secretary of 
The Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev,  and several other of the highest ranking officials in the 
Party. Among these was "Supreme Guardian Of Ideological Orthodoxy," Nikolai Tikhonov, who 
was enraged that Jaruzelski had allowed the Polish university students the option to disregard 
Marx, Lenin and Russian language studies. The Soviet leadership, already barely tolerating the 
Solidarity movement saw this ideological 'blasphemy' as the last straw. Ash (2002: 155) notes 
that Jaruzelski's orders from the Politburo concerning the dissent in Poland  were, "to reverse the 
course of events." 
     The Jaruzelski administration prolonged negotiations with Solidarity eight months from that 
point. No real progress was made and the economic situation continued to worsen. Seeing no 
progress, Solidarity called a nationwide strike in April, reported to be the largest in the history of 
the Soviet Bloc. By midsummer shortages of nearly all basic consumer  goods were common. By 
autumn of 1981, "...shops were virtually empty; the lines grew longer and longer. Never before 
had there been such a scarcity of the most basic consumer goods (Walesa 1987: 204.) The 
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Jaruzelski administration spread rumors that Solidarity was to blame for the shortages (due to 
strikes.) This was yet another attempt to break the union, however, by this time, after literally 
years of broken promises and disinformation from their various government administrations, few 
Poles believed the simplified allegations (they probably realized  by this time that a plethora of 
economic problems were to blame.)  Ash (2002: 248) reports that by November a near "collapse 
of the system" was underway.  Factories were shutting down as supply chains were disrupted. 
Harvesting and processing of the fall harvests were disrupted in the same manner. It was 
estimated that some 30% of agricultural production went to waste in 1981 due to processing 
plant disruptions and to lack of repair parts for farm machinery.  Heavy industrial plants were 
also idled due to lack of basic repair parts. 
       Rumors also spread about the possibility of a Soviet invasion to "restore order" as had 
occurred in 1956 in Hungary and in  Czechoslovakia in 1968. Poland, however, was spared 
foreign invasion. On December 13, 1981 General Jaruzelski declared Poland under Martial Law. 
 
Poland Under Martial Law: 
     By both the account of Ash and Walesa,  martial law in Poland went into effect at midnight 
December 13, 1981. Jaruzelski addressed the nation at 6:00 AM that morning but tanks, police 
and soldiers had began patrolling streets in major cities overnight. Roads were blocked, phone 
lines were cut, and "...thousands of Solidarity activists, advisors, intellectuals, and even critical 
Party members were carried off to 'interment' camps (Ash 2002: 273.) Jaruzelski announced that 
as Poland was 'at the brink of an abyss' and as Solidarity's leadership was set on 'overthrowing 
socialism', he had no choice but to bring order to the State by military intervention.   
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     In his book, Walesa reprints the account of beginnings of martial law as described by Jan 
Mur, a samizdat publisher: 
 
"...the announcers read the communiqué from the Council Of State, the declaration of 
martial law, and all its attendant provisions, including curfew, suspension of the right to 
travel, shutdown of all telephone and telex communications, suppression of freedom of 
expression, suspended publication of all newspapers and magazines, reduction in radio 
and television programming, suspension of classes in schools and universities, forced 
contribution of funds to the army, militarization of numerous businesses, service in the 
civil defense, suspension of all student organization activities, freezing of bank accounts. 
This went on all day. People began to understand what had happened. They realized 
they'd been reduced to nothing in their own country, and that those that had declared war 
on the nation could do whatever they pleased with them (Walesa 1987: 210 - 211.) 
 
Ash (2002: 274 - 275) adds that, 
  "All gatherings, processions, and demonstrations ...were banned.  All trades unions and 
student organizations were suspended, as was the right to strike. All mail and telephone 
communications would be censored. A Curfew from  10 p.m. to 6 a. m. was imposed. 
Everyone over the age of thirteen had to carry an identity card...Anyone who was thought 
to threaten the interests of state could be immediately interned for an indefinite period. In 
a long list of 'militarized' enterprises the workers came directly under military discipline. 
Absenteeism or disobedience would be punishable by court martial sentences  from two 
years' imprisonment to death...The first popular reaction to the self-invasion" [referring to 
Polish troops imposing martial law on fellow citizens] "was shock and incredulity." 
 
          Even under  threats such as these,  a series of uncoordinated strikes erupted at major 
industrial sites.  The Huta Katowice steel works and Gdansk Oil Refinery were surrounded by 
the army as workers staged occupation strikes. Tanks crashed through the gates of the Lenin 
Shipyard, occupying workers were driven out, and the yard was shut down. Academics who had 
supported solidarity were rounded up at universities and taken to jail. Riots broke out in cities all 
over Poland. Ash (2002: 277) says that due to the crackdown on mass communications and the 
general chaos during the initial period of martial law, no exact figures are available pertaining to 
deaths and injuries in civilian/military conflicts. "Unofficial" estimates indicate near 1000 
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injuries and perhaps ten deaths. By early January 1982 an estimated 5000 Solidarity activists 
were serving long prison sentences; some up to seven years; distribution of illegal publications 
(samizdat) was punishable with three years in prison. Thousands more  striking workers and 
protesters had been jailed in the first week of martial law, but had been released. Among the 
leaders serving long sentences was Lech Walesa. He was held in a former government mansion 
near Warsaw in "...relatively decent physical conditions. The same could not be said about the 
unknown worker activists freezing behind barbed wire on the Hel peninsula near Gdansk..."(Ash 
2002: 282). 
 
Solidarity Underground: 
     "By imprisoning its leaders and outlawing its publications, the party intended for Solidarity to 
slip into silenced obscurity" (Penn 2005: 101.)  
     In the introduction to this thesis I list as one of the factors that facilitated the Solidarity 
Movement the following:  The Solidarity Movement was maintained by persistent and 
intentional use of "samizdat." Without samizdat Solidarity would have 'slipped into silenced 
obscurity.'  A very dedicated group of activists, mainly women as the male leaders of Solidarity 
were, for the most part, in jail, kept the movement alive. As mentioned earlier in the description 
of life in Poland under martial law, all forms of communication were entirely under the control 
and the watchful eye of the State. Obviously, in the early 1980s, the current World Wide Web 
and cell phone networks were nonexistent; home computers and printers were just emerging in 
the U.S. market (and were very expensive) and were probably nonexistent in the Soviet Bloc 
countries. Thus, the samizdat publishers made use of antiquated printing presses -  many of them 
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simple, hand operated  presses - the remnants of raids, shut-downs, and confiscation under 
martial law. A lengthy section will address this important subject in the next chapter of this 
thesis. 
 
Re-Emergence of Solidarity: 
     Solidarity, as a legally recognized union, re-emerged in January, 1989. Amnesty had been 
granted to those imprisoned for participation in the movement in September 1986. However, 
many of the freed activists as well as several thousand  individuals in university teaching 
positions,  the news media,  journalism, and publishing fields were unable to find work in their 
former professions. Stokes (1993:  103) reports that the Jaruzelski administration conducted a 
"verification process" in which employees were "...interviewed concerning his or her attitude 
toward the regime and toward Solidarity." If one "passed the test" (presumably those fired from 
their jobs did not or would not conceal their support of Solidarity) then a written statement was 
required promising to break all ties with Solidarity. This practice was intended to silence and 
isolate media and academic supporters of Solidarity in an ideological sense; that is, the Polish 
government already fully controlled (by censorship or outright ownership) TV, newspapers, 
magazines, etc. and the content of such, but firing academics and media personnel was meant to 
silence the source of  intellectual dissent.  
     Yet many of those who lost 'official jobs' found their way into the underground Solidarity 
movement (this was being funded, in part, by contributions from Western labor unions, from 
funds "stashed away" during legalized Solidarity, and from continued dues payments from 
workers supporting the underground movement.) In this way their ideological contributions 
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remained, quite literally, 'in circulation,' through samizdat. Helena Luczywo, a publisher and  
frequent  contributor to underground publications during the years in which Solidarity was 
banned, described the goal of her group in preparation for possible reemergence of the union:  
"Once the military blocked all the strike efforts that followed the declaration of martial 
law, people stopped protesting. They lost confidence in Solidarity. They believed that 
they could no longer win more than they had already gained during the movement's legal 
period. They were afraid.  We worried that no one would care about Solidarity anymore.  
Consequently, the goal of the underground was not to fight the regime but to restore 
Solidarity's legitimacy and credibility among its members" (Penn 2005: 168.) 
 
     They were remarkably successful, not only in simply restoring faith in the continuation of the 
movement after martial law, but in maintaining interest in activism which materialized very 
shortly after the' more liberalized ' climate and release of political prisoners in the mid '80s. The 
major factor in bringing about the political liberalization in Poland occurred in the Soviet Union;  
it is summed up as "The Gorbachev Effect." 
     Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of The Communist Party of The Soviet Union 
on March 11, 1985. In April, at the Plenum of the Communist Party, he announced his plans for 
perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness.)  Zdravomyslova ( 1996: 122 - 137) explains 
that "restructuring " was impossible as the USSR, ideologically built on Leninism, was a static 
system stagnating within an outdated worldview. She quotes a slogan from the Democratic 
Union (a radical democratic organization that emerged in the USSR in 1988) which aptly 
condenses this idea: "Perestroika actually means the rejection of perestroika , which goal is 
impossible to achieve without a radical restructuring in ideology" (Zdravomyslova 1996: 128.) 
The leaders and intellectuals in Solidarity had realized this fact years earlier and perhaps the 
Communist leaders of Poland had also realized it.  Perhaps many others had realized it too but, 
just as Nikita Khrushchev had risked his life and career by denouncing Stalinism, so Mikhail 
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Gorbachev took great risk in proposing dimocratizatsia  (free elections and open competition 
between political candidates and parties - pluralism in contrast to one-party, authoritarianism.) 
The tradition of Stalinism, a throwback to Czarism, still plagued the modern Soviet Union, and 
the proposition of "enlightened" ideas continued to be very risky. However, as 'desperate times 
often call for desperate measures', Gorbachev may have been as much a 'victim' of political and 
economic dysfunction than an 'enlightened reformer.'  Regardless , the favorable political climate 
created by Gorbachev was a very critical factor in Solidarity's reemergence and re-legalization.  
"The Gorbachev Effect" will be fully discussed in a later  chapter as one of the eight critical 
factors in this synthetic analysis. 
     Ash (2002: 369 - 371) summarizes the political essence of Gorbachev's reforms in relation to 
Eastern Europe by humorously referring to them as the "Sinatra Doctrine"; do it your way. This 
is a reference to the content of a 1987 speech by Gorbachev, "...which legitimized the 
independence of all Communist parties and called for reform throughout the bloc (Wejnert 2002: 
67.) Without this political liberalization the Solidarity Movement would have had a very 
different historic trajectory and perhaps would have never been re-legalized. By releasing the 
various Soviet States proper and the states of the Eastern Bloc to pursue their own political 
interests, Gorbachev's "Sinatra Doctrine" unleashed a chain of events that led not only to 
Solidarity's re-legalization, but within four years, the complete political reconfiguration of the 
Soviet world.  
     However, Gorbachev's role must be viewed as a "facilitating factor" (one among many) in 
Solidarity's success and, as Ash (2002: 367 - 378) points out, the workers of the reemerging 
movement still had to  resort to their old tactics of strikes, protests, and negotiations right up to 
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the 1989 re-legalization. "The Gorbachev Effect"  created political opportunity but it was up to 
the reemerging Solidarity participants to take advantage of it. 
     The details of the final months before re-legalization are complex and constitute another 
lengthy history in itself.  For the purposes of this thesis the events may be condensed,  below, as 
per the final chapters of Ash 2002, and Kreis 2004: 
      The liberalized political climate in the Soviet Bloc (beginning  in 1985 with Gorbachev's 
perestroika,  as discussed above) and the granting of amnesty to imprisoned Solidarity activists 
in September 1986 led to reconstitution of Solidarity as a (still illegal) social movement under 
the coordination of the (still illegal) federation of cooperative labor unions, under the general 
name, Solidarnosc. In 1987 Lech Walesa headed a movement to form a new National Executive 
Commission which began reorganizing the union and rebuilding support and communication 
networks among  the old Solidarity leadership. A new generation of members also entered at this 
time, as many had been children in the 1980 - '81 period of legalization and were now entering 
the workforce.  
    In the spring of 1988 a wave of coordinated strikes again swept the nation culminating in 
August 31, the eighth anniversary of the Gdansk Agreement and Solidarity's initial recognition 
as a legal and independent labor union. On this date official negotiations between Solidarity and 
the Polish government were reopened, beginning the first of the "Round Table Discussions" that 
would lead to re-legalization of the union in January 1989. In the June elections of that year, 
(1989) Solidarity backed candidates  won 99 of 100 seats in the Polish Senate (upper house) and 
all of the contested seats (161out of 460 total) in the Sejm (lower house.) In August a new 
coalition government was formed between the remnants of the Communist government (United  
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Workers' Party) and the new Solidarity party. In December the name, "Republic of Poland", was 
restored to the nation, and Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Solidarity advisor from the KOR group, was 
temporarily appointed as Prime Minister. In  December 1990 Lech Walesa was elected as the 
first president. 
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Chapter Four 
Theoretical Background 
 
     This chapter will first briefly describe three general bodies of social movement theories, 
resource mobilization, political opportunity, and issue framing. It will then describe several 
theoretical constructs that will be combined under the heading "collective behavior theories." In 
chapter six each of the contentions proposed in the introduction as facilitating factors to 
Solidarity's success will be introduced with a very short reference as to how they relate to the 
theoretical background below. 
 
Resource Mobilization Theories 
     This perspective takes into consideration the rational choice of individuals to actively 
mobilize dissent into collective action by use of material resources and organizational tactics. 
Rather than a ‘spontaneous emergence’ of collective action, (as some early theorists proposed, 
such as George Herbert Mead as described in Ritzer 2009: 411 - 433) in resource mobilization 
theory,  activists, union committees, party leadership – some core group – consciously begins to 
organize funding, media coverage, public support, staff or volunteers, all aimed at furthering the 
growth of the movement.  
    According to Della Porta and Diani (2006) this has been the dominant American perspective 
on social movement organization since the 1970s and is still a widely used body of theory. They 
cite such well known theorists as Charles Tilly, Mayer Zald, John D. McCarthy, and Anthony 
Oberschall as early contributors (14.) Della Porta and Diani describe the resource mobilization 
model as collective action resulting from, "...a calculation of the costs and benefits influenced by 
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the presence of resources - in particular by organization and by the strategic interactions 
necessary for the development of a social movement...The capacity for mobilization depends on 
the material resources (work, money, concrete benefits, services) and/or nonmaterial resources 
(authority,  moral engagement, faith, friendship) available to the group" (2006: 14 - 15).   
     Zald and McCarthy’s 1987 “entrepreneurial model” of resource mobilization is generally not 
too concerned with the resources themselves or even how resources are used but with how they 
are acquired and organized. In contrast, McCarthy, nearly ten years later (1996), added another 
concept to the resource mobilization perspective when he elaborated on the importance of 
mobilizing structures, which he defines as, “…those collective vehicles, informal as well as 
formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action (McAdam et al. 1996: 3). 
Whereas McCarthy and Zald’s entrepreneurial model emphasizes (in the form of eleven stated 
propositions; Zald and McCarthy 1987: 25 - 39) the quantity of resources available to SMOs as a 
defining factor in their structure, operation, and success, McCarthy’s 1996 comments emphasize 
how mobilizing structures affect SMOs outcomes through the various mobilization strategies and 
protest tactics available to specific mobilizing structures.  
     In simplest terms, McCarthy’s idea is this: the mobilization structure of a movement will 
affect its outcome because different mobilizing structures have different mobilizing strategies 
available to them, or, (for whatever reasons) different mobilizing structures utilize different 
strategies. For example, McCarthy cites the fact that  the U.S. civil rights movement, the 
women’s movement, the environmental movement, and the peace movement all had similar 
mobilization structures; with one important exception: the peace movement lacked a “litigious 
formal structure.” That is, the peace movement failed to evolve a SMO that was able to link its 
agenda to the U.S. legal system; the civil rights, womens', and environmental movements all 
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were able to establish legal precedents and see the passing of laws defending their goals. Thus, 
the lack of the “litigious formal structure” in the peace movement greatly hindered its ability to 
legalize any of its goals (this probably being that there was no political opportunity broad enough 
to allow for a citizen’s group to attempt to intact legislation that would affect U.S. military 
withdrawal in Viet Nam). A slight difference in structure made a great difference in outcome 
(McAdam et al.1996: 146). 
      A wide variety of mobilization structures exists and John D. McCarthy explains that, “…the 
choices that activists make about how to…pursue change have consequences for their ability to 
raise material resources and mobilize dissident efforts…which can directly affect the chances 
that their common efforts will succeed” (McCarthy in McAdam et al. 1996: 141). 
      The two broadest general categories of mobilization structures are simply the informal and 
the formal structures. Informal mobilization structures include family and friendship networks, 
neighborhood connections, work networks, activist networks, affinity groups, and “memory 
communities” (defined by McCarthy as networks of de-mobilized protestors or activists who still 
maintain connections but are not active). Formal groups include churches, unions, professional 
organizations, social movement organizations (including social movement unionism groups), 
protest committees, and formal movement schools (McCarthy in McAdam et al.1996:142 – 145).  
Some scholars apparently may spend much time and effort in creating taxonomies for the 
plethora of possible mobilization structures but the more meaningful analysis seems to be in 
linking the given mobilization structure to available mobilization strategies and protest tactics.  
    Mobilization strategies, like the mobilization structures from which they evolve, will vary 
greatly per situation. A key point here is simply the legality, or lack thereof, of the movement.  
Legal strategies of mobilizing support and legal protest tactics may lend more legitimacy to a 
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movement if such are possible. Grassroots movements for change in totalitarian regimes are 
seldom tolerated as dissent and opposition are illegal in these societies. Attempts at such are 
often squelched by brutal retaliatory force as was the case, for example, in the summer of 2009 
concerning the disputed election results in Iran. Thus, well organized social movement 
organizations with legal rights and the privilege of litigation of grievances do not evolve in 
totalitarian societies (in Poland, for example, the outlawed Solidarity movement operated 
underground for a decade before its legitimacy was acknowledged).  Lacking legal recourse such 
situations call for creative tactics in both mobilization and in protest repertoire. McCarthy notes   
that in the U.S. the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and the environmental 
movement all made use of formal litigation in reaching their aims and formal social movement 
organizations connected to professional groups, churches, and lobbying committees evolved in 
the process. This was not the case in Poland as Solidarity had no rights as it had no legal 
recognition from the State. Thus, mobilizing and protesting without legal rights calls for more 
creative measures and more risk taking than in situations where none exist. 
    Concerning protest tactics, Harvard University professor Gene Sharp has identified 198 
different tactics or methods of nonviolent action available to participants of social movements or 
collective action in general. In part two of his 1973 book, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, he 
explains each tactic and gives concrete historical examples of the use of each. Obviously, violent 
actions may be used also, but as history often shows, violence is often met again with violence. 
Violent tactics were for the most part abandoned in the 1970s in Poland, as it became evident 
that military and police force would be used to maintain order. 
      Sharp’s detailed and exhaustive analysis seems to indicate that study of the methods or 
repertoires of protest possibly constitutes a separate branch altogether in the study of social 
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movements. Many of the eclectic tactics he describes, such as various forms of walkouts and 
strikes, symbolic public acts, processions, honoring the dead, declarations by prominent 
individuals, and the use of newspapers, leaflets, and pamphlets to spread ideology, were all used 
by Solidarnosc. These and many other innovative means of resource mobilization were used in 
Poland as conventional, overt, legal methods were not possible in the authoritarian society of 
Communist Poland. 
 
Political Opportunity or Political Process Perspective 
     This perspective emphasizes structural weaknesses, divisions, breakdowns, or otherwise 
weakening of existing political power structures as a facilitative condition for social movements. 
Some scholars (such as Skocpol 1979) place more emphasis on the weakening of political 
regimes in precipitating major societal changes than on the actions of social movement groups; 
McAdam comments, “Most contemporary theories of revolution…argue that revolutions owe 
less to the efforts of insurgents than to the work of systematic crises which render the existing 
regime weak and vulnerable to change from virtually any quarter” (McAdam et al 1996). 
      Barbara Wejnert (2002) studied the correlation between frequencies of protest activities in 
Eastern Europe and changes within the makeup of top political office holders. She found that 
protest activities increased as ‘regime adjustments’ occurred; that is, as perceptions of a regime’s 
vulnerability increases (due to changes in leadership) so does the frequency of protest against the 
regime. Additionally, she notes a “variability in the degree of liberalization” within the former 
Communist governments of  Eastern Europe and in those deemed less hard-lined (Poland and 
Hungary less so, she reports, than Czechoslovakia and East Germany).  “It is believed that the 
variability…was partly due to internal conflicts and divisions that plagued the authoritarian 
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power of Communist parties” (Wejnert 2002: 68). Party disunity or changes in Party leadership 
then may create a political opportunity for dissidents as the perception of weakness or 
liberalization (even relative liberalization in comparison to other regimes) raises the perception 
of the chance for success of a protest or movement.  
      Additionally, Wejnert proposes that a reciprocal dynamic exists between the opposition and 
established regimes. As vulnerability is perceived as an opportunity, groups may take action and 
in doing so further ‘soften’ the regime. A counter hegemony may evolve out of grassroots 
mobilization that poses a real threat to a regime by offering alternatives to it. This cycle may 
have greater and greater impact upon the regime. Wejnert refers to this as “perestroika from 
below” (2002:69). 
    In addition to domestic political opportunities some social movements may benefit from 
international political opportunities. The Polish Solidarity Movement is a prime example of this. 
“The Gorbachev Factor” is a phrase commonly found in much of the literature on international 
political opportunities of the Solidarity Movement. This refers to the general liberalizing policies 
of perestroika and glasnost (restructuring and openness) advocated by Mikhail Gorbachev. One 
might argue that a “Reagan Factor” as well created political opportunity for Solidarity. 
     Doug McAdam warns that analysts of social movements must carefully differentiate political 
opportunities from other facilitating factors, such as cultural or ideological components, that may 
be closely related to political opportunity. Otherwise, he states, the political opportunity 
paradigm risks losing its effectiveness as it becomes so broad as to encompass factors not 
necessarily within its boundaries (McAdam et al. 1996:25). 
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Issue Framing 
     The contention that a strong collective identity and a unified sense of purpose were major 
facilitating factors in Solidarity’s success will be backed up in chapter six by use of examples 
from interview data and from secondary sources. This section will elaborate on the 
theoretical/conceptual framework that is intended to support these contentions. The framework 
draws from several separate grounded fields of sociological theory. It unites these several fields 
to create a theoretical perspective that fits and explains the workings of Solidarity in relation to 
use of issue framing and ideology in creating a strong collective identity. This strategy is based 
on social historian Arthur  L. Stinchcombe’s notion that, “One does not apply theory to history; 
rather one uses history to develop theory” (Stinchcombe 1978: 1). 
     Issue framing or frame theory as an analytical tool for explaining certain elements of social 
movements has its roots in Erving Goffman’s, Frame Analysis, (1974) and Gofmann’s notion of 
“schemata of interpretation.” Frames are a form of this “schemata” and they constitute a 
“…primary framework {that} allows its user to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly 
infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms” (Goffman 1974: 21).  Primary 
frameworks occur naturally or are simply expressions of benign events. 
 
 “Natural frameworks identify occurrences seen as undirected, unoriented, unanimated, 
unguided, “purely physical” … Elegant examples of versions of these natural frameworks 
are found, of course, in the physical and biological sciences. An ordinary example would 
be the state of the weather as given in a report” (Goffman 1974: 22).  
 
     Social frameworks, however, are not ‘naturally occurring.’ They are ‘social constructions of 
reality,’ to use Berger and Luckmann’s term (1966). Goffman states: 
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"Social frameworks, on the other hand, provide background understanding for events that 
incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence, a live agency, the chief 
one being the human being. Such an agency is anything but implacable; it can be coaxed, 
flattered, affronted, and threatened. What it does can be described as “guided doings.” 
…Guided doings…allow for two kinds of understanding. One…pertains to the patent 
manipulation of the natural world in accordance with the special constraints that natural 
occurrings impose; the other understanding pertains to the special worlds in which the 
actor can become involved…” Goffmann 1974: 22 – 23). 
 
 
     It is this element of “live agency” -  of will and intent -  that elevates social frameworks from 
benign mental schemata to potential animation of the schemata. The schemata becomes a 
condensation of much complex meaning and in the process of grasping this profound and 
complex meaning it can engender in the individual (and in the collective aligned with the 
schemata) the famous question posed by V.I. Lenin, “What is to be done?”  
     Benford and Snow paint a very clear picture of this process. They state that framing, 
 
“…denotes an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the 
level of reality construction. It is active in the sense that something is being done, and 
processual in the sense of a dynamic, evolving process. It entails agency in the sense that 
what is evolving is the work of social movement organizations or movement activists. 
And it is contentious in the sense that it involves the generation of interpretative frames 
that not only differ from existing ones but may also challenge them. The resultant 
products of this framing activity are referred to as “collective action frames” (Benford 
and Snow 2000: 614). 
 
 
    This paper contends  that the activists of the Solidarity Movement used various forms of 
framing and manipulation of frames in such a way that in the process thereof they created a very 
high degree of collective identity and common purpose, so high in fact, that Solidarnosc was able 
to overcome the great structural constraints to its mobilization through its very real social 
solidarity.  
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     I now state four specific ways in which Solidarity manipulated frames or was manipulated by 
frames:  
1)   Solidarity aligned its frames with other existing frames. 
2)   Solidarity linked its frames with existing cultural constructs.   
     By the same token, members of Solidarity and the general population of Poland were, as   
individuals and as a collective, shaped, manipulated, and indoctrinated, over time, by 
frameworks established, maintained, and empowered by the Soviet Union. I contend that one 
“master frame” of the Soviet Union in particular, “fraternal proletarian solidarity,” was truly 
internalized by the Polish working class in general, and that Solidarity capitalized on this frame 
construct. Fraternal proletarian solidarity was achieved but its loyalty was not to the Soviet 
Union.  Thus: 
4)  Solidarity was strengthened by the existing frame of fraternal proletarian solidarity. 
     Additionally, Solidarity did not develop its entire ideological framework from scratch. 
Although the totalitarian government of The Polish People’s Republic controlled access to 
information and greatly limited communication, cross-national diffusion of ideologies did occur. 
Thus: 
5)  Solidarity was ideologically informed by diffusion of ‘frames of dissent’ from the Soviet 
Union and by ‘frames of resistance’ from Poland's past (resistance to German, Austrian, and 
Russian control in various historical eras.) 
    I will now elaborate on the theoretical/conceptual framework to be used in conjunction with 
the four statements listed above.  
     First, I wish to look at frame analysis as associated with social movements in light of  two 
different version of collective identity theory as described by Taylor (1975) and elaborated on by 
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Abizadeh (2005.) The particularist version (as opposed to cosmopolitanism version) has roots in 
Hegel’s notion of the self developing from recognition of the other – another self, another human 
being – but Taylor (1975) extends Hegel’s thesis beyond individual self to include the collective 
(this is known as the “Hegel-Taylor” argument; Abizadeh 2005: 48). The Hegel-Taylor argument 
is strictly a particularist version of creation of collective identity. The cosmopolitanist version of 
collective identity supposes that global solidarity is possible as individuals taking part in a 
collective will identify within that collective – thus, there is no need of an external other in the 
creation of collective identity,  and in turn,  creation of social solidarity. The particularist version 
supposes that collective identity and social solidarity are possible only in relation to an external 
other, and most often in terms of that other being an adversary. There are different shades of this 
theory, different degrees of intensity, so to speak, but Abizadeh states, in describing the “stronger 
version” of the particularist thesis: 
 
 “The second, stronger version of the particularist thesis goes further and specifies the 
nature of the relation to the other that the constitution of a collectivity supposedly 
requires: a relation of either antagonism or hostility. On this interpretation, a collectivity 
inherently requires adversarial exclusion: the existence of some external other against 
which it can define itself” (Abizadeh 2005: 45). 
 
 
     The concept of collective identity as a component of social solidarity is a common theme.  It 
ranges from macro-level versions such as George Orwell’s, 1984, which pits the fictional 
Oceania against Eurasia, to Samuel P. Huntington’s,  Clash of Civilizations and The Remaking of 
World Order (1996) , which divides the world into eight archetypical cultures based on 
commonalities of language and religion. On a mid-range level, Fantasia’s 1988 compilation of 
three case studies of workplace strikes and attempts at unionization (Cultures Of Solidarity) is 
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based, in a large part, on realization of collective identity as a prerequisite to emergence of class 
consciousness and ultimately, social solidarity. A micro-level example that extends to the global 
level is illustrated in a traditional Middle-Eastern folk saying: “Me against my brother. My 
brother and me against our uncle. Me, my brother and our uncle against the village. The village 
against the state. The state against the world” (Sethi 2009, personal communication). 
     The point is, identity, be it individual as in Hegel’s thesis, or collective as in Taylor’s is 
constructed in relation to the other. In constructed oppositions, as Orwell made the ideologies of 
Oceania and Eurasia, identification within the collective emerges easily (in opposition to the 
‘extreme otherness’ of the other) as does identification by the collective as a whole in relation to 
the collective of the other; that is, externally. Collective identity and social solidarity are then 
easily maintained and strengthened through exposure to ideology (ideology that contrasts the two 
opposing collectives) and through exposure to ideology’s irrational extreme, that is, propaganda. 
      Additionally, slightly differing ideologies may be accommodated within the collective 
consolidating solidarity into wider and wider spheres; this is the meaning of the folk-saying, “Me 
against my brother,” all the way to the implication of, “My brother and all similar to us against 
the external world.” The “otherness” of some individuals or collectives becomes less and less, to 
the point of inclusion, in relation to the perceived threat of an “extreme other.” This reflects 
Abizadeh’s conception of the “strong particularist” view. 
     I suggest that in order to better explain the success of the Solidarity Movement in terms of 
ideological framework it is not sufficient to merely identify the frames. It is necessary to describe 
how Solidarity used frames to build social solidarity through creation of collective identity and 
common purpose. I suggest that we consider Solidarity’s frames as dailogisms (from Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s , The Dialogic Imagination, 1982) – as “language conceived as ideologically 
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saturated” – that so profoundly resonated with the people of Poland that a collective identity and 
common purpose was formed that was strong enough to overcome the difficulties of 
mobilization. 
      By the same token, in dialogical form, an existing ideology (Rude {1980} refers to these as 
“inherent ideologies”), specifically the Soviet ideology of “fraternal proletarian solidarity,” was 
manipulated, used, and/or co-opted by Solidarity to maximize social solidarity and to amplify 
unity of purpose.  
     Thus, to return to Goffman’s original notion of frames as “schemata of interpretation” that are 
“guided doings” of “human agency,” I add that such frames were used with intent to engender 
collective identity as a means to facilitate social solidarity in the trade union, Solidasrnoc. To put 
it another way, the particularist version of collective identity theory can be enhanced by 
attaching to it the power of using ideological framework as a tool for collective identity building, 
the result of which is a strong social solidarity within a collective and against the ‘other’ 
collective. 
     To more clearly understand the workings Solidarity’s ideological framework as a dialogism, it 
is necessary to apply Bakhtin’s concept of the dialogic process to the construction of frames. 
     Bakhtin’s dialogism can be described, in very simplified terms, as the construction of identity 
through the process of dialogue, or perhaps, as the social construction of collective identity 
through dialogic interaction. Where as Hegel’s dialectic amounted to synthesis out of two 
opposing views, Bakhtin’s dialogic does not suppose that one or the other views will be 
abandoned for a synthesis; both views remain intact but in the process of expressing the views 
identities are constructed, clarified, strengthened. (Bakhtin, 1982; Sulashiva, 2007). 
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     This notion is similar to the particularist version of collective identity formation. Bakhtin 
supposes that conflicts over discourses or ideologies between the self and the ‘other’ will not be 
resolved by synthesis or compromise, and in the process of the dialogue collective identities are 
formed. The point here or the implication is that frames can function as dialogisms; frames can 
be the medium through which collective identity is intentionally built and collective identity is a 
prime component of social solidarity. Social solidarity is critical to any social movement 
especially to one like Solidarnosc in which resource mobilization was actively hindered by State 
power and authority.   
     Thus, by combining Goffman’s original notion of frame analysis (which served as an 
interpretative tool) as elaborated on by Bedford and Snow in respect to social movement theory, 
with Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism (as a creator of collective identity) we now have a concept or 
a perspective with which we may analyze some of the actual historic events of the Solidarity 
Movement. As stated in the beginning of this section, this method follows Stinchcombe’s 
strategy of developing a theory that explains historical events rather than attempting to “bend” 
history to fit an existing theory. 
     Another way in which Solidarity used ideological frameworks to its advantage is by linking 
them to national and cultural traditions. This is similar to Snow’s (Snow et al.1986) ‘frame 
alignment and frame bridging.’ “Frame-compatible sentiment pools” are identified, these being, 
“…aggregates of individuals who share common grievances and attributional orientations, but 
who lack the organizational base for expressing their discontents and for acting in pursuit of their 
interests” (Snow et al. 1986: 467). As a mobilization tactic, these pools can be linked by many 
forms of communication depending on the availability of the communications systems; only in 
the recent past, for example, were internet communications available for networking in attempt 
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to locate and link supporters of a social movement. Solidarity used a variety of methods to 
network, bridge existing frames, and thus link to other similar interest groups, labor unions, 
individual supporters, etc. (these will be identified and described in the body of the thesis.) 
Solidarity used this exact, conventional method of frame bridging as described by Snow. 
     However, I contend that Solidarity’s ‘frame bridging’ also went much further, in some cases, 
than simply physically linking supporters; again, I believe that Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism 
more aptly describes Solidarity’s linkage of its frames to Polish national and cultural traditions. 
This kind of linkage went beyond associated ‘interest groups’ to link the entire nation of Poland 
internally as well as to generate international support for Solidarity’s struggle. 
     Perhaps the best way to describe the ideological bridge that Solidarity constructed between 
itself and existing traditions is to quote a passage from a more familiar historical time and place. 
Dorothy Hale used the following passage to open a paper entitled, “Bakhtin In African American 
Literature” (1994):  
 
     “The strident, moral voice of the former slave recounting, exposing, appealing, 
apostrophizing and above all remembering his ordeal in bondage is the single most 
impressive feature of a slave narrative. This voice is striking because of what it relates, 
but even more so because the slave’s acquisition of that voice is quite possibly his only 
permanent achievement once he escapes and casts himself upon a new and larger 
landscape” (Stepto in Hale 1994). 
 
     Hale uses Bakhtinian ideas in relation to African American experiences to demonstrate 
“…social identity as materialized through language” (Hale 1994:447). The words of Pope John 
Paul II and of Solidarity’s leader, Lech Walesa, for example, when linking Solidarity’s goals and 
ideologies to the traditions of Polish Catholicism, to the sacred icon of Our Lady of Czestochowa 
(and to the associated litany, being a long, emotionalized prayer in behalf of the deceived, 
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betrayed, and oppressed) or to The Pope’s personal mission – a mission he felt was his own 
through the supernatural message of Our Lady of Fatima – “the consecration of Russia to my 
Immaculate Heart” – these ideas hold condensed, deeply emotional meaning for Poles, similar to 
“the strident moral voice of the slave remembering” in African American culture as described by 
Hale.  Ideas such as these surpass any sterile, academic understanding or application of “frame 
theory.” They create identity through what Hale, drawing from the work of W.E.B. DuBois, calls 
the “socially constructed consciousness” {similar to Bakhtin’s “ideological consciousness”} 
(Hale 1994: 446 – 450 and Bakhtin 1981: 30). If we look at Solidarity’s linking of its ideologies 
to cultural traditions in terms of Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism we get a more accurate 
understanding of the social implications than simply creating a taxonomy of frame varieties (as 
in Benford and Snow 2000). 
     In, The Dialogic Imagination, (1981) Bakhtin describes how tradition and memory constitute 
a power greater than the “absolute past” – a past that is “…walled off absolutely from all 
subsequent times…” and in such terms, “…memory, and not knowledge {that} serve{s} as the 
source of power for the creative impulse” (Bakhtin 1981: 15). In other words, the idealized, 
emotionalized, remembered past can take on an existence of its own – it may not even be entirely 
historically accurate – that is not the point. The point is the power of this sort of narrative to unite 
those who take part in it. “The epic past, walled off from all subsequent times by an impenetrable 
boundary, is preserved and revealed only in the form of national tradition…The important thing 
is not the factual sources of the epic…the important thing is…its reliance on impersonal and 
sacrosanct tradition, on a commonly held evaluation and point of view…{it} displays a profound 
piety toward the subject described and the language used to describe it, the language of tradition” 
(Bakhtin 1981: 16 – 17).  
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     Tradition held in reverence unites people - I believe that is what Bakhtin is saying. A recent 
American example of this concept would be the image of the Reverend Jesse Jackson fighting 
back tears during Barack Obama’s inauguration address when Obama said, “And because we 
have tasted the bitter swill of civil war and segregation and emerged from this dark chapter 
stronger and more united, we cannot help but believe that the old hatreds shall someday pass” 
(Obama 2009). All Americans, black and white, understood the condensed meaning of this 
statement and regardless of its accuracy (did we really emerge more united or more divided?) it 
is a potent statement that unifies us as Americans, at least at the time and in the context when it 
was spoken. I contend that many statements such as this - that is, statements that appeal to 
national memory, that unite through reverence of tradition - were incorporated into Solidarity’s 
ideological framework. Thus, combining Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism with conventional social 
movement frame analysis gives us the analytical tool needed to explain, in part,  the power of 
Solidarity’s appeal to the Polish people 
 
"Collective Behavior Theories" 
     In explaining the first factor proposed in this paper, I draw on several ideas found within 
certain bodies of grounded theories which may be generally referred to as "collective behavior 
theories."  I place this term in quotations to indicate that it is not a wholesale reference to the 
outdated "emergent behaviors" notions of George Herbert Mead or a complete application of 
Neil Smelser's full-blown "value-added model." Just as complex historical realities cannot all be 
reduced into neat, linear stories without ignoring or omitting ramifications or exceptions that do 
not "fit" a simplified  framework, neither can one body of sociological theory be expected to 
fully explain a phenomena as complex as the Polish Solidarity Movement. Therefore, in addition 
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to the three general bodies of social movement theories previously discussed, I add a fourth 
category and give it the generalized name, "Collective Behavior Theories." 
     For the purposes of this thesis (specifically for explaining factors 1 and 2 as proposed in the 
introduction) I draw loosely on Smelser's (1962) "structural conduciveness" model, on George 
Rude's (1995) notion of "popular ideology" (as opposed to formal ideology) and on a group of 
concepts which may be called "the elements of solidarity," as described in a paper by Randy 
Hodson, Sandy Welsh, Sabine Rieble, Cheryl S. Jamison, and Sean Creighton, all of Indiana 
University (Hodson et al 1993.) Additionally, I will draw on a "positive theory of goals and 
organization" as described in Robert S. Lynd's 1946 paper titled, "Planned Social Solidarity In 
The Soviet Union. 
Structural Conduciveness:  I  use this term to loosely describe the specific structural conditions  
in which Solidarnosc emerged. I use the term in reference to the large number of industrial 
workers in Poland in the 1980s (which were the main constituents of the movement) and in 
reference to certain socio-cultural attributes of these workers. This second reference (to certain 
socio-cultural attributes) blends into the notion of  "elements of solidarity" as described by 
Hodson et al.(1993).  Smelser's term, "culturally defined behavior," (1962: 6) [which he 
attributes to Herbert Blumer] denotes behavior that is considered outside the realm of collective 
behavior, as per Blumer's definition of such, and which is apparently in contrast to Blumer's 
notion of "spontaneously occurring" collective action. However, "culturally defined behavior" 
seems a good term to describe the results of the "elements of solidarity" and  "determinants of 
solidarity" elaborated on by Hodson et al.  
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     In Smelser's Theory Of Collective Behavior (1962: 15 - 21) he describes structural 
conduciveness as one element of the "value-added" process.  According to this theory, when 
certain combinations of elements occur together, the possibility increases that collective 
behaviors will occur. Structural conduciveness simply means that social conditions are present 
that are conducive to the potential for collective behavior. Earlier perspectives, such as those of 
Mead in the 1920's and of Blumer in the 1950s were based on psychological behaviorism; on the 
notion that internal psychological drives or external social coercion resulted in "emergence" of  
collective behavior. Mead and Blumer's ideas seemed little more than a step past biological 
notions of stimuli/response patterns as demonstrated, for instance,  by Pavlov's dogs.  "Panics, 
fads, and fashions," as well as "the craze, the riot, and the revolution," were imagined to 
"spontaneously occur" under the right conditions. Smelser made the distinction that several 
determinants must combine to create conditions favorable for collective action, but even with 
this, no 'guarantee' existed (Smelser 1962; Ritzer 2008.)  Below are listed a simplified version of 
Smelser’s six criteria (1962: 15 - 17) based on his explanations and on elaborations by Sztompka 
(2004): 
 
1. Structural conducivness – things that make or allow collective action possible or more 
probable (such as,  spatial proximity or similar economic and/or political interests, existing 
organizational patterns  ) - the potential for collective action is there, however,  people must be 
aware of some common problem and have the opportunity to act and connect with each other in 
order to solve the problem - such as, by forming a social movement 
 
2. Structural strain – something (inequality, injustice, economic dysfunction) must strain society, 
and existing power holders are unable or unwilling to deal with the problem - consciousness of 
this may lead to perception of  relative deprivation 
 
3. Generalized belief - the general population must have an understanding of what the problem 
is. The problem should be clearly defined and this definition widely agreed upon by potential 
participants. (framing the issues) 
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4. Precipitating factors – something brings events to a climax and action is taken - sometimes a 
specific event , such as a riot, an act of violence,  or a economic trigger  - perhaps a political 
opportunity arises or  a charismatic leader emerges 
 
5. Mobilization for action – people  organized labor, communication, resources in preparation to 
act (resource mobilization) 
 
6. Failure of social control  - how the authorities react (or don’t) - High level of social control by 
the power holders (government,  police, military) obviously  make it more difficult for collective 
action to begin - activists may have to use innovative means in highly controlled situations 
 
 
Elements Of Solidarity And Determinants Of Solidarity: Hodson et al., are referring to general 
social solidarity of groups, not to the labor union, Solidarnosc (Solidarity.) They state that, "the 
foundation of solidarity is shared experience at work and the sense of involvement and 
attachment that arises from these shared experiences" [Goffee 1981] (Hodson et al. 1993: 399.) 
They list several general categories which they call, "determinants of worker solidarity," and 
"elements of solidarity" (described below.) These seem to manifest themselves in "culturally 
defined behaviors," to use Smelser's/Blumer's terminology (the specific culture for the purpose 
of this thesis may be called " industrial culture.") I contend that certain aspects of this culture 
facilitated social solidarity within the constituents of Solidarnosc, who were mainly heavy 
industrial workers - the "industrial proletariat," to use the Marxist term - working in shipyards 
along the Baltic Coast and in steel mills, coke and chemical plants, foundries, mines, etc., across 
Poland. 
      This idea is not that social solidarity "spontaneously emerges" at various times or under 
certain circumstances (as Fantasia 1988 seems to imply) any more than it is that collective action 
"spontaneously emerges." The idea is more along the lines of Smelser, in that certain cultural 
constructs make the potential for social solidarity more likely, and if collective action is 
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undertaken (not a spontaneous event) by a group with strong social solidarity it is more likely 
that positive results will occur ( because social solidarity prevents the group and its goals from 
being broken up by conditions or other actors that are opposed to the group and its goals.) Rudolf 
Heberle (1951) distinguished between spontaneous events (like those covered by Fantasia; 
wildcat strikes, walk-outs) and long-term social movements (which the Solidarity Movement 
was): 
"Short-lived, more or less spontaneous mass actions, such as wildcat strikes or riots, 
while not regarded as social movements in the strict sense of our concept, are nonetheless 
worthy of study because they do occur within the framework of genuine social 
movements; in fact, they are usually among the first symptoms of social unrest, and they 
also form part of the tactical devices of a movement" (Heberle 1951: 7.) 
 
__________________________ 
 
     Below are descriptions of characteristics that Hodson  (et al 1993: 399- 406) cite as general 
facilitators of social solidarity within workplace culture, (determinants of solidarity) or, as 
clarified above, conditions that make the potential for social solidarity more likely; I only discuss 
those that pertain to the analysis of Solidarnosc in this thesis. The first four are elements of 
solidarity, or the behaviors displayed by groups that are considered to be cohesive: 
1. Cohesion, defined by Hodson et al. (399) as "a fundamental precondition for solidarity...In a 
noncohesive group, workers are relatively indifferent to each other. In cohesive groups, 
friendship networks provide an essential mechanism for the development and implementation of 
collective strategies." 
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2. Mutual Defense, refers to the collectivity of the workgroup standing up for individuals within 
it. When conflicts or grievances arise against those that have power, authority, or control over the  
workers (employers, bosses, foreman; or in the case of Solidarnosc, the State/Communist Party)  
a group that displays strong social solidarity will defend itself and individual workers (Hodson et 
al: 399.) 
3. Leadership: Hodson et al. (400) states that,  "Without leadership, solidarity is restricted to 
isolated, noncumulative episodes. The emergence of group leadership evidences a more durable 
basis for collective action (Fantasia 1988: 109). Strong leadership typically does not emerge until 
a group needs to take some collective action...Leadership thus reflects a relatively high level of 
solidarity." 
4. Group Boundaries: This refers to recognition of the work group as a definite entity in 
opposition to or in some way separate from others; for the purpose of this thesis, it refers mainly 
to the demand of the Solidarity Movement to create a union independent from the State. 
Opposition to the threats of management (for example, layoff, pay cuts, shortened hours, 
demands to intensify work output, etc.) can intensify social solidarity through the praxis of 
resistance. Solidarity's resistance to the threats of the State (evidenced  in its highest form by the 
outlawing of Solidarnosc and imposition of martial law) was analogous to management threats 
against workers.  
______________________________ 
 
The next three items are work place characteristics that Hodson et al. cite as being conducive to 
development of social solidarity. I list only those that I apply to analysis of Solidarnosc. Hodson 
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et el. call these "Determinants of Solidarity." I paraphrase descriptions of these below from 
Hodson et al. 1993: 400 - 402, and elaborate on the last item with reference to Scott (1942) and 
Walesa (1987):  
5. Unionization: "Unions are the most commonly identified foundation for solidarity among 
workers. Unions provide both a mechanism for collective action and the countervailing power 
that shelters workers' collective actions from management reprisals" (Hodson et al: 400.) The 
presence of established, unionized workplaces within a community is a positive factor in the 
development of a "culture of solidarity" (to use Fantasia's term from his 1988 book, Cultures of 
Solidarity.) Poland's heavy industrial base (along with nearly all other large scale enterprises) 
was unionized, albeit by state controlled unions. One of Solidarnosc's main demands was 
recognition of itself as a union, independent of the state unions. By virtue of the fact that the 
processes of collective action and collective representation were already in the experiences of 
Solidarnosc's members (again, through the state unions; despite their failings) I contend that this 
constitutes another facilitating factor for the movement. 
6. Stability of the labor force: Hodson et al cites this factor as "...an important precondition for 
solidarity" (400.) By the very nature of its definition, social solidarity is social cohesion within a 
group. Groups of individuals with similar goals, needs, or interests are more likely to form in 
permanent worksites rather than in temporary situations. Workers in permanent industrial sites 
are more likely to demonstrate a higher degree of social solidarity (evidenced by unionism or any 
other collective action) than, for example, migrant farm workers; the structural fact of 
permanence verses temporality allows cohesive groups to form and to eventually evolve into 
formal organizations.  
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7. Dangerous Working Conditions: "...mutual defense and support can be galvanized by physical 
dangers in the workplace as easily as by management threats" (Hodson et al 401 - 402.) As in 
item number four (above), Group Boundaries, in which threats by those in authority over 
workers results in facilitation of social solidarity, a similar phenomenon occurs when workers are 
exposed to the threat of danger on the job. As with soldiers who experience and survive the 
danger of combat, a collective bond unites them. Those who survive hardships in most any 
circumstance will feel a certain cohesion of a "brotherhood" of sorts. An 'artificial' incidence of 
this bond is created through the practice of hazing or initiation rites in fraternal organizations. In 
heavy industrial jobs, as pertains to factors discussed in relation to social cohesion within 
Solidarosc, a plethora of hazardous and/or dangerous situations existed. Workers in such 
conditions literally put their lives in each other's hands on a daily basis through absolute trust in 
fellow workers (for example, in simple "materials handling" processes on industrial sites - 
craning or mechanized movements of large, heavy objects regularly puts laborers' lives in the 
hands of machine operators by virtue of close-quarters conditions.) 
      A certain "comradeliness" develops among mine workers, for example, exposed to both the 
potential dangers of the job (mine collapse, fire, entrapment) and to daily health hazards 
(inhalation of coal dust, for example.) A common negative statement of "comradeliness" among 
West Virginia coal miners is, "We're killing ourselves just to live." This refers to the shared 
understanding of the health hazards involved in mine work along with the shared knowledge of 
few alternatives to such work in remote mining communities. Similar cultural patterns, no doubt, 
existed in mines and other heavy industrial sites in Poland; the factor of remoteness or isolation 
may have been replaced by lack of training in other fields as was the case for many industrial 
workers in the U.S. 
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      The lack of alternatives due to lack of training was exacerbated in socialist nations as 
evidenced in John Scott's book, Beyond The Urals (1942). Scott describes work and schooling in 
the planned socialist town of Magnitogorsk in Stalinist era Russia (he gives a first-hand account 
as a welder working on a foreign visa in Magnitogorsk.) General education and vocational 
training were 100% free to all citizens, however, a single career track was to be chosen and little 
deviation was permitted. This was due to the notion of the trained worker as an "investment" of 
the State and not as a private indulgence through unnecessary schooling; education was to be 
functional, as per chosen field, in conjunction with ideological training which further facilitated 
identity as a Socialist Worker ( Scott 1945: 208 - 244.) Lech Walesa attests to similar practice in 
Poland in describing his training at the "agricultural mechanization school" at Lipno in the late 
1950s and early '60s (Walesa 1987: 36 - 39.) 
Popular Ideology: The above mentioned "indoctrination/academic or vocational training" 
received by all citizens in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet Bloc nations (Poland included) was 
intended, as already stated, to instill within each individual the identity of being a Socialist 
Worker. A common terminology for this is encapsulated by the phrase, "fraternal proletarian 
solidarity," and similarly (mockingly) as "Homo Sovieticus."   These phrases are taken, 
respectively, from Nikita Khrushchev's memoires (1970 and 1974) and from Alexander 
Zinoviev's (1982) book of the same name. Zinoviev's term means literally, "New Soviet Man," 
and in his book he mocks the Stalin regime's effort to artificially create such by use of  social 
programs, propaganda, and slogans. I propose in the introduction of this thesis (factor # 2) that, 
"social solidarity within the Solidarity Movement was facilitated by the existing sociocultural  
construct of "fraternal proletarian solidarity." This idea, I believe, did enter common Polish 
culture and may be described as a form of "popular ideology." 
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     I include here a brief description of George Rude's notion of popular ideology from his 1995 
book, Ideology and Popular Protest: He says that it is a mixture  - not a pure form- of inherent 
and derived ideas. The inherent ideas come from tradition, direct experience, folk-memory, or 
oral tradition. The derived ideas are formal propositions - "scientific socialism," for example. 
Popular ideologies evolve at the intersection of direct experience and formal proposition and 
become embedded within a culture as an accepted worldview. In such circumstances the 
"...derived ideas, in the course of transmission and adoption suffer a transformation...its nature 
will depend on the social needs or the political aims of the classes that are ready to absorb them" 
(Rude 1995: 30.)  
     In short, I propose that the "derived" ideology of fraternal proletarian solidarity intersected the 
direct experience of the Polish working class and facilitated creation of social solidarity. In the 
course of its transmission it was altered, in that cohesion or solidarity of the working class was 
maintained,  but loyalty was not engendered toward the Soviet Union (as was the derived aim.) 
Interview data will later be used to back this contention in discussion of "factor two." 
Positive Theory Of Goals And Organization: This theory comes from an article published in 
The American Journal Of Sociology in 1945 by Robert S. Lynd, titled, "Planned Social 
Solidarity In The Soviet Union." It proposes a number of "aggregative devices in Soviet society" 
aimed at generating and maintaining social solidarity. Many of these aggregative devices (such 
as education based propaganda, 'socialist competitions', cultivation of nationalism, etc.) were in 
common use in The Peoples' Republic Of Poland. They are generalized as being collective 
activities that lead to realization of collective goals and in doing so facilitate social solidarity. 
Lynd generalizes the activities and the goals they are intended to facilitate as the, "positive 
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theory of goals and organization" (1945: 184.) These are elaborated on  in the discussion of 
"factor two"  in reference to the part they played in facilitating Solidarnosc. 
____________________________________ 
  Charismaticism: Finally, I include Max Weber's notion of "the charismatic leader." This 
perspective will be used specifically in explaining the role of Lech Walesa as a facilitating factor 
in Solidarity's success. This will be elaborated on later in conjunction with its use in chapter five. 
I include it under the general category of "collective behavior theories," as, according to Weber, 
it is the followers who empower the charismatic leader; that is, charisma, in Weber's terms, 
comes from mass belief (Weber 1915 [1947]: 359). George Ritzer (2008: 245) summarizes this 
nicely: 
 "To put Weber's position bluntly, if the disciples define a leader as charismatic, then he 
or she is likely to be a charismatic leader irrespective of whether he or she actually 
possesses any outstanding traits. A charismatic leader then can be someone who is quite 
ordinary. What is crucial is the process by which such a leader is set apart from ordinary 
people and treated as if endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least exceptional 
powers or qualities that are not accessible to the ordinary person." 
 
____________________________________________ 
 
     Throughout the discussions of factors one and two, reference will be made to the above, 
earlier  mentioned theoretical perspectives; the final item, charismaticism, will be used in 
explaining factor five. Primary and secondary data sources will be referred to in attempt to 
validate the claims made in all sections. 
 
78 
 
Chapter Five 
Literature Review 
 
     A vast amount of literature is available on the Polish Solidarity Movement and this review is 
by no means complete. English language accounts range from lengthy books that describe or 
analyze the entire movement from various perspectives, to scholarly journal articles that focus on 
a single aspect of the movement, to news magazine stories that feature prominent and influential 
individuals that shaped the movement. The movement can also be  traced in newspaper articles 
as it was thoroughly covered  by Associated Press reports all through the 1980s.  Compilations of 
historic documents translated from Polish to English are also available. These range from the 
complete text of the Gdansk Agreement of  August 31, 1980 to General Wojciech Jaruzelski's 
declaration of martial law on December 13, 1981, to historic letters written by Pope John Paul II  
in support of Solidarity.  
     In addition to formally written materials there exists, mostly still in Polish, a plethora of 
samizdat publications (illegal self-published literature discussed at length in chapter 3) that range 
from strike bulletins, to newsletters, to lengthy articles on a wide range of topics pertaining to the 
movement. Cornell University's Slavic and East European Studies Department has some 3000 
samizdat articles written between 1970 and 1989 which include personal memoirs and 
interviews, copies of underground newspapers, illegal books, and personal letters. Only a handful 
of this invaluable data has been translated to English.  
     This review, however, will focus on attempts at comprehensive historical/sociological 
treatment of the Solidarity Movement.  In  general, most works can be classified under one of 
five themes: 1) journalistic accounts, 2) historical accounts,  3) participant accounts,  4) accounts 
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that focus on one or a few main factors that facilitated the movement, 5) accounts that focus on 
specific individuals or groups that influenced the movement. The section below will briefly 
summarize a few of the important works on the Solidarity Movement, especially in areas 
relevant to the focus of this thesis, and will attempt to  highlight the main contribution to the 
topic in each case: 
_____________________________________ 
     The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, was written by Timothy Garton Ash, and was first 
published in 1983 and updated in 1991, 1999, and 2002. Ash, a British historian, gives a first-
hand,  journalistic account of the movement from its beginnings in the summer of 1980 to the 
declaration of martial law in December 1981. The book also includes an historical background 
and the later editions bring the reader up to date with events that occurred after Ash's initial 
account. The book focuses on the main events that occurred at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk:  
the strikes, negotiations, agreements, formation of the labor union Solidarnosc, and its eventual 
demise under martial law. Much of it is written in the first person as Ash was an observer at the 
shipyard strike and was a witness to the signing of the Gdansk Agreements. The book includes a 
chronology, appendix of Polish abbreviations (for the many political, labor, and government 
groups involved), and is extensively documented as to the sources of its  data.  This is the 
"definitive story" of Solidarity, from which most of the names, events, places, and dates 
discussed in this thesis were initially drawn. Ash's account emphasizes the Polish peoples' 
dissatisfaction with the  illegitimate, dysfunctional, and hypocritical Soviet system that emerged 
in Poland after WWII, as the primary cause for the revolution of the 1980s. 
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     Padraic Kenney's,  A Carnival Of Revolutions: Central Europe 1989, was published in 2002 
and gives an  historical view of the diversity of opposition groups and resistance styles swirling 
around Central Europe in the late 1980s. Kenney is an American historian and made extensive 
use of Polish, Czech, and Ukrainian samizdat citing nearly 100 different samizdat publications, 
as well as extensive interviews with Polish, Czech, Ukrainian, Hungarian, German, Slovenian, 
and Western European informants. Most of the interviews were conducted in the late 1990s.  
     Whereas Ash focused on the mainstream events specifically in Poland (such as the Gdansk 
shipyard strikes, the official meetings between Soidarnosc and the Polish government) , 
Kenney's main focus is on detailing the more eclectic opposition groups throughout Central 
Europe. He describes the workings of artists, musicians, grassroots groups, students, and 
environmental activists in the late 1980s. His thesis is that "a carnival of revolutions" occurred 
across a wide geographic area, which in their totality caused the democratization of Central 
Europe. (Kenney prefers the term "Central Europe" over "Eastern Europe" as his term includes 
the former western republics of the USSR as stated on page 3 of his book. Most other authors use 
the term, "Eastern Europe.") 
     Lech Walesa's  book, A Way Of Hope,  (1987) provides a first-hand account of events in 
Poland from the  1970 massacre of shipyard workers at Gdansk, to the Gdansk Agreements of 
1980, through the years martial law. Obviously, it is written out of the experiences of the main 
leader of Solidarnosc, and  provides a wealth of detailed information about conditions that lead 
to the strikes in Gdansk, the birth of the Solidarity Movement, details of the Gdansk Agreements, 
life under martial law, and details of Walesa's private life.   
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     Whereas the above mentioned accounts of the Solidarity Movement credit a wide array of 
participant groups in facilitating its success, Laba's 1991 book, The Roots of Solidarity, is 
steadfast in its "anti-intellectual thesis," and seeks to credit only "the working-class" with the 
movement's success. Ash credits a combined effort on the part of  workers, the Church, and 
intellectual groups, Walesa credits the same, and  Kenney credits an even more eclectic 
assortment of influences.  
      In agreement with the findings of most researchers, all individuals interviewed in this thesis 
project, four of which had been active participants in the daily workings of the movement, 
attributed many diverse groups with Solidarity's success. Laba's research, however, seems to be 
intent on denying this reality and concerned mainly with polarization.     
     Penn's book, Solidarity's Secret, (2005) details the contribution of women and the production 
of samizdat as prime facilitators in Solidarity's success. Unlike Laba, Penn conducted many 
interviews in Poland with former and current Solidarnosc members, most of them women. Thus 
Penn also gains a unique perspective on the "forced emancipation" of women in Sovietized 
countries. Polish women, according to Penn, identify feminism with certain policies and goals  of 
the Communist Party which were exploitive and humiliating (for example, due to post-WWII 
labor shortages many women had little choice but to take dirty and demeaning jobs in heavy 
industrial works, abortion became a means of birth control, and the ideologically correct notion 
of equality with men - when it came to wages and hours spent on the job - amounted to little 
more than lip service.) 
     Thus, Penn found, Polish women had a cynical conception of the Western term, "feminism" - 
as in their reality it had been a negative thing. However, the dedicated and courageous work of 
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women, especially in the work of maintaining the Solidarity movement through samizdat 
publishing, was as progressive and liberating as any Westernized feminist undertaking. As most 
of the vocal leaders of Solidarnosc  were men, the outlawing of the group under martial law 
meant that many of these men were sent to jail. This left many women activists to maintain the 
movement underground by clandestine publishing. These were "liberated" women, in Western 
terms - independently pursuing societal goals of their own accord. Gender equality was evident 
in the important role these women played, but "official" feminist discourse was not trusted by 
them as it was identified with Soviet intentions to "use" women. This unique and insightful 
perspective makes Penn's book very readable. 
     Maryjane Osa's book, Solidarity And Contention, (2003) also gives a unique focus on the 
movement by showing how prior attempts at organizing opposition against the government in 
Poland left an "organizational residue" that cumulatively facilitated the ultimate success. In each 
failure at resistance, over a long period of time (from the 1950s onward), according to Osa, 
dissenters learned valuable lessons and formed networks of opposition that eventually facilitated 
the final victory. 
     Another unique perspective on the Solidarity Movement is found in Kubik's,  The Power Of 
Symbols Against The Symbols Of Power (1994.) Kubik analyzes the movement from an 
anthropological perspective, concentrating on the role of symbols in the building of political 
power and legitimacy. The book is an elaboration on Kubik's doctoral thesis,  "The Role of 
Symbols In The Legitimation Of Power: Poland, 1976 - 1981." He argues that the Solidarity 
Movement was much too complex to be categorized into a single genre such as a trade union 
movement, a social movement, or a political movement. As an eyewitness to the 1980 events in 
Gdansk, Kubik was taken by what he describes as, "...a gigantic pageant of images and symbolic 
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performances" (1), which  he eventually condensed into the construct of  the, "Solidarity 
Culture" (2). According to Kubik, by considering, holistically, this construct -  supported 
through, expressed in, and legitimated by symbolism - one can best understand the complexities 
of social, political, economic, and cultural arenas that constitute what we call the Solidarity 
Movement.  
    Kubik used a vast amount of data in producing his study . The bibliography section, for 
example,  is 22 pages long, but he also includes interview data, his own direct experiences in 
Gdansk, public accounts of events in Poland connected to the movement, samizdat accounts, and 
a review of an archive of photographs taken during the movement. The result is a very complex 
and detailed study, invaluable to any researcher of the Solidarity Movement. 
     Neal Ascherson's book, The Book Of Lech Walesa, (1982) does not attempt an holistic 
analysis of the movement as does Kubik. Instead, Ascherson uses memoirs, letters, interviews, 
and manuscripts of Polish authors to describe the charismatic leadership of Lech Walesa. 
Through these personal, first-hand accounts, he creates a biography of Walesa, revealing, for 
example,  how Walesa's simple and sometimes chaotic speeches appealed to the crowds, or how 
personal acquaintances of  Walesa perceived him and his self-appointed leadership role in 
Solidarnosc. The basic thesis of this book, as is one contention of this thesis, is that Solidarity 
was greatly facilitated by the charismatic appeal of Walesa. 
     Two books by Gale Stokes were often referred to in writing this thesis: From Stalinism To 
Pluralism: A Documentary History Of Eastern Europe Since 1945,  (1996), and, The Walls 
Came Tumbling Down (1993).  
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     The first, provides copies of historic documents covering events ranging from the 1945 Yalta 
Conference to the 1991 resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev. Stokes also includes memoirs and  
essays written by first-hand observers and participants in the course of events affecting Eastern 
Europe stretching from the end of WWII to the collapse of the Soviet Union. It includes many 
documents directly pertaining to Solidarnosc in Poland, such as a letter written in a Gdansk 
prison by Adam Michnik, a reprint of the Gdansk Agreement,  a transcript of General Wojciech 
Jaruzelski's declaration of martial law, and a speech given by Pope John Paul II in Warsaw. It 
also includes items from Hungary and Czechoslovakia which capture the essence of these 
nations' involvement in the Solidarity Movement. 
     The second book by Stokes takes a detailed look at the collapse of Communism in Eastern 
Europe from  political and ideological perspectives. It begins with the 1968 "Prague Spring" 
events and carries on through the early 1990s and the turmoil in Yugoslavia that resulted from 
democratization. Both of Stokes books provide comprehensive histories of the region and the era 
in which Solidarity emerged and thoroughly discuss  the consequences of the movement. 
     The Polish August, edited by Oliver McDonald, (1981) similar to  Stokes' comprehensive 
documentary history, is a compilation of documents specific only to Poland. Many were taken 
from the  British journal, Labor Focus. McDonald also includes transcripts of interviews with 
Gdansk Shipyard workers, samizdat newspaper articles, shipyard bulletins, and copies of specific 
factory and shipyard agreements made between Solidarnosc and the government representatives 
of these facilities. This book provides very specific details on the contracts themselves and also 
provides background material on the events and circumstances leading up to the agreements, 
mostly through other documents, letters, and reports from negotiators.  McDonald offered this 
compilation as a first-hand account of Polish/English translated material which documents, as he 
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puts it, "one of the greatest events of the Twentieth Century...", in which, "... the people of 
Poland are attempting nothing less than to take full control of their modern industrial 
society...that they built but do not control" (169). 
     Barbara Wejnert's (editor) book, Transition To Democracy In Eastern Europe And Russia, 
2002,  likewise, is a compilation, not of historical documents, but of academic articles on the 
subject. This book moves past the events of the 1980s in Eastern Europe and focuses on the 
overall societal shift to democracy in this region. It includes sections concerning the shift in 
terms of political, economic, and cultural change, and in terms of social problems and policy 
issues. In many cases dysfunction and eventually disillusionment came out of the hopeful 
expectations that Solidarity, and the Solidarity movement in general, had promised. The 
democratic shift in governments, while restoring many human rights and the ability of 
individuals to attempt to make their own destinies in life, also left many people without the 
social safety net of Communism. Thus, greater economic inequality, joblessness, homelessness, 
crime, drug and alcohol abuse, and other societal problems have increased in some parts of the 
former Communist world. The articles in this book detail the problems encountered in the  rapid 
changes that followed Communism's downfall. 
     Finally, Vaclav Havel's lyrical book, The Power Of The Powerless, (1985) gives a 
philosophical and  ideological argument against the Communist system in Eastern Europe, and a 
critique of the dysfunctional political systems that maintained it. In his book, Havel was speaking 
not only to Czechoslovakia but to all activists in Eastern Europe and to all who believed in the 
human rights agenda of the Solidarity Movement. His message was for all who imagined a better 
future to unite in solidarity and to maintain that solidarity until the Leninist/Stalinist ideological 
era was finally put aside. He begins with a reference to Marx, saying that, "a spectre is haunting 
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Eastern Europe...",  not of communism but of dissent against communism. His observations 
proved historically accurate. 
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Chapter Six 
Elaboration On The Proposed Factors 
 
Factor 1)  The emergence of the Polish labor union, Solidarnosc, was facilitated by the 
structural conduciveness of a society based on a heavy industrial economy. 
 
     This paper contends that specific structural qualities of the above mentioned system, in 
conjunction with specific sociocultural attributes of the workers within the system facilitated 
Solidarity's emergence and contributed to the social solidarity necessary to maintain the 
movement through adversity. 
     The theoretical perspectives from the "Collective Behavior" section apply here, specifically, 
structural conduciveness and  culturally defined behaviors. Additionally, the "determinants of 
solidarity" as per Hodson et al. (1993) (cohesion, mutual defense, leadership, group boundaries, 
unionization, stability of the labor force, and dangerous working conditions) are apparent 
throughout the analysis of factor one. 
_____________________________________ 
 
A.  Social solidarity was facilitated by Sheer number of "pre-organized" workers:  Workers at 
heavy industrial sites (steel mills, chemical and coke plants, shipyards, coal mines) formed the 
core of the Solidarity Movement. Laba (1991: 3) states that Solidarity's constituent base was in 
"...the industrial working class [and] its organizational strength in interfactory strike 
committees."  Hundreds of thousands of individuals were thus "pre-organized" by virtue of 
simple, physical aggregation (huge numbers held long-term jobs on-site), by the informal social 
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networks inherent in this situation, through formal networks (for instance, in publication and 
distribution of plant newspapers that later evolved into samizdat publications), and through 
formal membership in "State operated unions." These conditions facilitated social solidarity. 
    A similar example of this concept comes from a 1995 study of the decline of European Social 
Democracy by Jonas Pontusson.  He  theorizes that the social cohesiveness necessary for 
maintaining this system was due in part to the structural phenomena of large concentrations of  
industrial workers which facilitated class consciousness. Pontusson (1995: 499) states, "The 
Marxist tradition suggests that working-class consciousness thrives in large units of production 
and that capitalism paves the way for socialism, not only by turning the vast majority of people 
into proletarians, but by also concentrating proletarians in ever larger units of production."  He 
sees the inverse of this concept as a factor for the decline in collective organization in advanced 
capitalism ( his study being specifically in Sweden and Britain), stating that, "...the  hypothesis 
that private, nonindustrial employment is a source of social democratic weakness can be directly 
related to, and viewed as in part derivative of, the hypothesis that large units of production are a 
source of social democratic strength" (504.) He believes that three causal mechanisms may be at 
work in structural conditions of heavy concentrations of industrial employment. First, the (above 
mentioned) Marxist notion of worker consciousness within large work groups; secondly, in such 
large groups the "relative cost of collective organization" is small; and finally, within such 
groups exists a "relative homogeneity of worker interests" (499.) These concepts aptly fit the 
conditions in Poland's industrial base during the time of Solidarity, and were replicated on an 
enormous scale. 
89 
 
     A brief look at nearly any U.S. newspaper during the 1980-81 and 1988-89 waves of Polish 
unrest will indicate the  huge numbers of  industrial workers involved in collective action.  For 
example: 
Rock Hill (South Carolina) Herald, August 3, 1981. p.18. An  Associated Press article states, 
"Nearly one million workers paralyzed 2000 coal mines, factories, and businesses during a four 
hour strike today in Poland." 
Lodi (California) News Sentinel, December 24, 1981.p.5. A United Press International article 
states that 3000 coal miners are on strike in Poland "holed up 1650 feet underground." 
New York Times, May 5, 1988. section 1A. Times reporter, John Tagliabue, reports 32,000 
workers on strike at the Lenin Steelworks of Nowa Huta in southern Poland. 
The Modesto (California) Bee, August 30, 1988. p4. An Associated Press article states that in the 
Warsaw area "...about 20 enterprises employing 100,000 people were idled," and additionally, in 
at the Stalowa Wola Steel Mill in southeastern Poland  18,000 workers were on strike. 
 
 
     In addition to the sheer numbers of workers involved, informant "JB," who is currently 
associated with the Fundacja Centrum Solidarnosci, provided me with a list of steel mills and 
coke plants which he remembered to be very effective "strike tools" during the 1980s. These 
types of plants represent perfectly the structural conditions that facilitate social solidarity (huge 
concentrations of  industrial workers with a homogeneity of interests) but also constitute what 
may be considered a "super-effective leverage" during strikes. "JB" described the situation as 
follows: 
      Unlike the shipyards on the Baltic Coast which received the most news coverage during the 
Polish strikes (because the negotiations between Solidarity and the Polish government occurred 
at the administrative building inside the Lenin Shipyard) the steel mills and coke plants were 
continuously operating process plants; the shipyards were more along the line of "job shops." A 
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strike at the shipyard simply meant the construction of ships stopped; tools were put away and 
workers left the hulls of ships in whatever stage of construction they happened to be in. The 
unfinished ships suffered very few adverse effects from the delay. However, with a continuous 
operation, such as steel or coke production, a strike could be disastrous in that it is necessary to 
maintain continuous heat in coke ovens and blast furnaces in order that these facilities remain 
intact. The operations of coke and steel plants are symbiotic - they fuel each other and together 
maintain the tremendous heat of the firebrick linings in both operations. Thus, if operators of 
these processes walk out on strike the managers of such facilities must immediately find at least 
a "skeleton crew" of knowledgeable workers to at least "keep the heat on" the ovens and 
furnaces; otherwise, if the process entirely stops, millions of dollars of damage to the facility 
may occur and re-starting the process may take months. 
      Thus, as described to me by informant "JB," the knowledge or the realization of the above 
described scenario by workers in continuously operating plants was an additional source of 
social solidarity. These workers understood how effective  their solidarity was. In other words, 
striking shipyard workers may delay production - striking coke plant and steel mill workers may 
destroy the means of production, in that their walkout leaves a technologically mandatory 
continuous process unattended. "JB" listed the following plants as falling within this category of 
"super-effective" strike leverage due to worker realization of their critical role in maintaining a 
continuous process. He had no exact figures of the number of workers involved but estimated 
that "hundreds of thousands  worked in these plants." 
Koks  Koksu 
Debiensko coke plant:  Czerwionka - Leszczyny 
Radlin coke plant: Radlin 
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Jadwiga coke plant: Zabreze 
Wiktoria coke plant: Walbrzych 
Zdziezowice coke plant: Zdziezowice 
Przyjazn coke plant: Dabrowa Gornicza 
Czestochowa Nova coke plant: Czestochowa 
Carbo Coke: Bytom 
Polski Koks  (location ?) 
Nowa Huta Coke and steel works: Nowa Huta 
Huta Warszawa coke and steel works: Warsaw 
Stalowa Wola coke and steel:  (location ?) 
      
 
    Informant "Z" lived in Walbryzch during the 1980s (as mentioned in the above list, near the 
site of Wiktoria coke plant) and agreed with "JBs" assessment. "Z" pointed out that under 
communism, theoretically, "the means of production" were owned by workers, but in reality, "Z" 
claimed, workers did not care about their factories: 
 
"I was born in coal-town Walbrzych, near the Wroclaw...My mum was working in the 
office in local mine, and there was also important solidarity "nest" over there. In my 
home the people from the underground had their meetings as well. I know 'Das Kapital' 
and 'Communist Manifesto' a little, and maybe idea seem excellent, but in life is 
impossible to do in proper way. Because of human nature, if we have 'no properties' - if 
the things have 'no owners', nobody cares for them! It was like that in Poland.  People 
would not care the damage done to plant during strike." 
 
 
      Informant "JB," a former employee of the Lenin Shipyard at Gdansk, estimated the number 
of shipyard workers in the Gdansk - Sopot - Gydina  tri-city area to have been around 70,000 at 
its peak in the late 1970s or early 1980s. These huge concentrations of industrial workers were a 
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result of Stalinist-era economic planning and Stalinist-era technology lingering on into the 1980s 
without modernization.  The "master economic plan" of all Sovietized economies was based on 
heavy industry with little concern for production of consumer items. In 1946, immediately after 
Communist takeover of Poland, rapid industrialization (and re-industrialization from WWII 
destruction) began in Poland as a strategy not only  for  building the economy but also for 
building socialism.  
     Stalin, as per Lenin, as per Marx, saw the proletariat - the industrial working class - as the 
most likely group to accept the ideology of communism due to their structural position in 
society.  That is, they were urban, usually skilled, en-mass and easily indoctrinated (due to the 
efficiency of communication among masses of urban workers), and without ties to land, 
property, or inheritance. The official Party ideology endorsed a brotherhood between the 
industrial workers of the cities and rural farm workers. Ironically though, Marx is known to have 
commented on "the idiocy of rural life," and Stalin is known to have had great contempt for 
kulaks (the rural middle-class.) Informant "J", who described his grandparents as having been 
kulaks , told me that he believed  all Russians hated rural people,  a legacy, "J" believed, 
(obviously erroneously)  that came from Stalinist propaganda. Thus, the very effective  structural 
conduciveness to communist ideology within the urban/industrial setting  (as theorized by Lenin) 
proved to be structurally conducive also to the ideology of Solidarity. 
     Ash (2002: 13) notes Poland's extreme dependence on heavy industry (which he calls an 
"irrational, lopsided political economy."  Kubik (1994: 22 - 24) describes a "...wave of rapid 
extensive industrialization [that] swept Poland in the early 1950s," funded, in part, by "domestic 
accumulation,"  which was a type of 'forced savings' apparently a kind of 'worker owned' 
investment strategy, minus the expected returns for the individual worker;  'the building of 
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Socialism' was expected to be reward enough for the personal investment. Kubik adds, "The 
investment program was based on arbitrary ideological and political deliberations, not on 
economic calculus" (24). Penn (2005: 24 - 25) adds that "forced emancipation" of women into 
the industrial labor force also occurred; that is, many women were  'recruited' into heavy industry 
out of necessity to re-build the devastated post-WWII economy. Labor was needed and Socialist 
ideology insisted that all citizens must be workers (domestic work did not count), and as an 
'incentive' wages were kept so low that both husband and wife had to work to earn enough to 
survive. 
     Another  reason for the unusually large numbers of workers in heavy industry were the 
outdated technologies of the Polish plants. Being outdated and in many cases falling into a state 
of disrepair, Polish industrial sites were becoming both dangerous (from increased accident 
potential) and  hazardous to health ( from exposure to industrial toxins.) This fact leads directly 
to a second point used to validate factor one: 
 
B.  Dangerous/hazardous conditions in Poland's industrial sector facilitated social cohesion 
through creation of mutual defense and shared identity:  
 
     As per Hudson et al. (1993), "...mutual defense and support can be galvanized by physical 
dangers in the workplace as easily as by management threats” (401 - 402.) Group boundaries and 
group identity are reinforced as individuals struggle together in trying conditions. The following 
will describe circumstances that led to such conditions: 
_________________________________ 
 
 
      Due to the nature of heavy industrial infrastructure it has been common practice to "milk a 
plant for all its worth," so to speak, before it is finally shut down for good (from direct personal 
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experience, this is known to have been a common practice in the U.S. rustbelt  through the 
1980s.) One reason for this is that the building of  large-scale, continuous operating 
steel/coke/chemical complexes,  with rail, river, or sea access  requires massive initial economic 
investment and completion time on such projects is measured in years.  Shut-downs for repairs 
entails loss of production, hence  loss of return on investment. Modernization is even more costly 
than repairs as it means not only loss of production but necessity of re-investment. Therefore, as 
heavy industrial facilities age they often become inefficient due to declining standards of plant 
maintenance (simplified, the thinking is: Why fix it if it will be shut down in a year or two?).  
      Conditions for workers in such plants deteriorate also; safety and health standards often are  
'allowed to slide' along with infrastructure  maintenance. Additionally, plants with older 
technologies required more workers as they were less automated to begin with; in dilapidated 
condition they require still more labor. This was exactly the situation in Poland, the USSR, and 
the U.S. in the 1980s (and in all countries with similar post WWII development patterns);  the 
WWII era heavy industrial base had reached its natural lifespan. During this decade  
disinvestment in heavy industrial infrastructure within the U.S  and reinvestment overseas often 
occurred. In Sovietized nations, unable to access international capital (due to the closed Soviet 
economy), and unwilling to merge with the capitalist world system, no reinvestment occurred. 
Conditions in the antiquated heavy industrial sector simply continued to deteriorate, efficiency 
and product quality continued to drop, and man-hour requirements continued to rise.  The result: 
huge numbers of Poles worked in miserable conditions for ever-shrinking paychecks in 
unprofitable State owned industries; their sheer numbers and their  job/living condition 
dissatisfaction contributed to Solidarity's success (by accepting Solidarity's ideology  as an 
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alternative to State ideology with the hope that Solidarity could make positive changes in their 
life situations.) 
     For example, as evidence of the above described scenario, a 1989 New York Times article 
titled, "Can Poland's Steel Dinosaur Evolve?", describes the conditions at the Lenin Steelworks 
at Nowa Huta:  "We need to modernize desperately,"  a union spokesman says, "We need $450 
million to modernize, and we need foreign investment if we're going to obtain that type of 
money..." The article describes the plant, built in the early 1950s, as "...a fossilized hulk of a 
burdensome Communist economy," where some 32,000 workers struggle to produce the same 
quantity of steel as would 7000 workers in a modernized, Western-designed plant (Greenhouse 
1989.) However, the Lenin Works, was still twice as productive as the Soviet plant at 
Magnitogorsk. Another 1989 New York Times article claims the Magnitogorsk steelworks 
required a staggering 60,000 workers to produce the same  quantity of  steel as would a 
modernized plant with 7,000 workers (Keller, 1989). 
     In his book, A Way Of Hope,  Lech Walesa devotes an entire chapter to describing the 
conditions in the Lenin Shipyard at Gdansk;  following are some excerpts from his description: 
 
"Created in 1946 or 1947 from the merger of three separate companies, Gdansk shipyard 
had become a large-scale enterprise by 1960. Yet it lacked the most elementary 
accommodations for workers, such as proper lockers, changing rooms, or 
lavatories...When I arrived our shipyard looked like a factory filled with men in filthy 
rags, unable to wash themselves or urinate in toilets. To get down to the ground floor 
where toilets were located took at least half an hour, so we just went anywhere. You can't 
imagine how humiliating these working conditions were. "(43 - 44.) 
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     Walesa also describes the dangerous situations created in the yard by rushed production  
schedules; rushed in attempt to make up for breakdowns, lack of materials,  improper tools, and 
ineffective planning and management:  
 
"...arrangements had been made to mobilize almost two thousand men to install the final 
fittings and equipment on a ship, [in attempt to make up for delays ]  two hundred of 
whom were working overtime in the hold. Some had been working for thirty-six hours at 
a stretch on this vessel, which had already been filled with fuel, again, to save time in 
order to meet an overly exacting schedule... While cutting or welding a fuel pipe...fuel 
leaked out, causing an explosion, and because the hatchways in the hull were sealed off, 
the firefighting equipment was unavailable. Though workers attempted to cut through the 
sheet metal with acetylene torches, supplies of acetylene were inadequate for the task. 
Thus, twenty-two men were burned alive in the hold of the Konopnica" (52.) 
 
 
    In March, 2010, Informant "PZ" took the author of this paper into the actual working center of 
the Gdansk Shipyard. Much of the  immense facility now sits idle and some of it has been torn 
down,  as shipbuilding, like many other heavy industries, has generally shifted to Asia. However, 
even in its now very limited capacity, the positioning of  steel ship sections weighing many tons 
by gigantic cranes, the constant rattle of forklifts shifting  materials from place to place, the 
placement of enormous shorings to align ship hulls, the  building of scaffolding several stories 
high as worker access to the ships - all of this activity made it quite obvious that this was a very 
dangerous work environment. "PZ," who began working in this shipyard in 1963 (he is now 
retired) was asked if he had considered his job dangerous. He replied, 
 
  "Yes, it could be dangerous - of course you see how things are moving here (he points 
to a tractor pulling a wobbly load of scaffolding on what looks to be an old farm wagon, 
and to a forklift rattling down a pot-holed road.) And this is nothing! The guys are mostly  
just making repairs! There is only one big ship under construction now - and you see how 
things are moving - imagine, when I was your age, we were building 30 or 40 ships per 
year in this yard! This is a handful of workers - then we had 10,000 in here! 
97 
 
     Over there (he points to an abandoned building) was a big explosion - an accident - 
welding gas exploded. Two men were killed in there. I used to work there with them. So 
yes, you could get killed here." 
 
 
      Several cultural constructs and work situations inherent in heavy industrial settings would 
have facilitated social solidarity (as per Hodson et al.) and thus facilitated success of Solidarnosc. 
These include a shared worker identity through the common experiences of difficulties and 
hardships involved in heavy industrial situations (exacerbated by the inadequate conditions in 
Poland's economy and its deteriorating infrastructure.) Additionally, the necessity of shift work 
(which affects all family members); the necessity to work a scheduled shift on holidays (heavy 
industrial work is usually a continuous process and many Christmas Eves and  Easter Sunday 
Mornings are spent in the plant);  dirty, dangerous, unhealthy working conditions (common to all 
heavy industrial sites);  socialization into "work gangs" or crews; (Often one's life is entrusted to 
fellow work gang members involving dangerous operations. Cooperation and inter-worker 
coordination is required to perform almost all tasks in heavy industrial plants. There is no room 
for "rouge individualism" as such may result in death.);  and collectivization or creation of 
collective identity through safety and cooperation indoctrination (heavy industrial operations 
usually have regular "safety meetings" in which is stressed the importance of  safety through 
cooperative effort, watching out for fellow workers, and collective action in getting jobs done.) 
The above mentioned examples were evidenced through discussions with informant "PZ" and 
are, as discussed later in this chapter, common to U.S. industrial settings as well.   
     An Associated Press  news article titled, "Special Privileges Promised Some Polish Workers: 
Over 2 Million In Dangerous, Taxing Jobs," ( Toledo Blade, January 2nd, 1982, Page 1) 
describes government attempts to pacify industrial workers (as well as other occupations) in such 
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jobs.  A 5% increase in retirement benefits was proposed along with reduction of retirement age 
to 60 for men and 55 for women. Laba (1991: 121) describes the need for better working 
conditions in Polish industry during the Solidarity decade by citing the fact of "...high noise, 
dust, and chemical concentrations and constant danger of fire" in Polish shipyards, and he states 
that this was similar to situations in metal foundries and mines. During the author's visit to the 
Gdansk Shipyard, a friend of informant "PZ" provided an example of these conditions. He 
described the shipyard (when it was operating at full capacity) as producing much noise, welding 
smoke, and paint fumes - all of which even affected the local neighborhoods around the yard. He 
described cleaning the giant hulls of the ships in preparation for painting them as a "miserable, 
sickening job," due to use of huge volumes of oil-based solvent in the cleaning process. 
      Walesa mentions the social conditions in the shipyards: "Human dignity and the chance to be 
fully responsible for one's own life were not available options. We were constantly treated like 
simple day laborers, and force-fed slogans we couldn't relate to" (Walesa 1987: 57.) Thus, the 
deteriorating work place conditions and placation by government promises (as above, the only 
real benefits promised came after retirement - if one survived till then) also contributed to worker 
unity (in a negative sense) by pitting workers against the failed promises of the state. 
      This paper contends  that these common cultural constructs in heavy industrial settings would 
have been facilitating factors to social solidarity. These constructs  of collectivism and shared 
identity through common hardships and struggle stand out sharply in contrast to the 
individualism, personal competition, and general disunity often found today in service work, 
academics, business, and other post-industrial/information age fields.  
________________________________ 
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     The above accounts are meant to demonstrate the massive numbers of workers that were 
involved in the heavy industrial sector in Poland in the 1980s, how these large-scale operations 
came into being, and the dangerous, frustrating  conditions in the antiquated plants.  
     Four  more points, made in the opening of this section, are below elaborated on in conjunction 
with the notion of "pre-organization" and networking in the industrial sector: 
 
 
C.  State operated unions in Polish industry "pre-organized" workers: 
 
 
      State operated unions existed in all heavy industrial plants,  shipyards, and mines in Poland.   
These unions did not have the interests of the workers in mind; they were tools of the Party (as 
described in the Historical Background section of this paper.) In the final Gdansk Agreements of 
August 1980, in which Solidarity was (for a time) legalized, the Party did so with stipulation that 
the State Unions must remain intact alongside Solidarity (see the Gdansk Agreement in 
appendix.)  Laba (1991: 33) aptly describes the ineffectiveness of the State Unions in a 
description of the 1970 Gdansk riots:  In the chaos and disorganization someone shouts, "Where 
are the unions? Why aren't they leading the workers?" Although they did not lead the workers 
against the State, it may be presumed that, like all unions, regular meetings were held, 
publications were distributed, and dues were paid. Thus, to some degree, this process "pre-
organized" worker, at least in the form of social networks that formed in conjunction with the 
workings of the State Unions. 
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D. Factory newspapers "pre-organized" workers: 
     Factory newspapers were another possible source of "pre-organization," uniting workers by a 
common communication network. Due to the sheer numbers of workers in the Polish industrial 
sector these factory newspapers had a huge circulation. Penn (2005) states that several of these 
factory newspapers evolved into the samizdat papers that helped keep Solidarity alive 
underground.  This point will be elaborated on fully in a later section dedicated solely to the role 
of samizdat as a facilitator to Solidarity. 
 
E.  Job permanence  led to generational enculturation of workplace cultures of resistance: 
     This idea relates to the Hodson et al concept of labor force stability as described in the 
theoretical section. 
      There would have been no involvement or understanding of the workplace strike as a tool for 
forcing negotiations under the State Unions of the Polish Communist Party. These unions served 
the Party, similar to the way "Company Unions" serve the interests of business in the U.S.; they 
function to validate and legitimize any proposal that benefits the company in terms of increasing 
profitability.  Personal experience validates this statement  concerning "company unions." The 
author of this paper worked for "Big D Construction," in Salt Lake City, Utah for a few months 
in 2001. "Big D" was just beginning its own "company union" and required all workers to attend 
its own "union classes" which were little more than company loyalty indoctrination sessions.  
Worker grievances in the "company union" were usually "addressed" by firing the aggrieved 
worker;  collective action through strikes, or through formal bargaining was unheard of in the 
"company union" as would have been the case in the State Unions of Poland. These types of 
organizations existed solely to benefit the owners of the means of production. 
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     This paper contends  that an older generation of workers - those who had worked in heavy 
industry before the 1946 Communist Party takeover of Poland - passed on the ideas and 
techniques of workplace collective action to a younger generation which knew only State 
Unionism. The structural longevity and permanence  of heavy industry allowed for this;  that is, 
unlike residential construction, retail or wholesale trade, service jobs, light assembly work, office 
work, or any type of work that is conducted in inexpensive facilities (relative to heavy industrial 
infrastructure) heavy industrial facilities usually remain intact for more than one generation. This 
is due to the excessive cost of initially developing the facility. An example would be the 
comparison of the construction and opening of a department store (such as a new Walmart) that 
happens over a three month period at a cost in the hundreds of thousands of dollars verses the 
construction and startup of a steel mill or chemical plant which may take three to ten years to 
build at a cost in the billions of dollars. The point is that service economies do not generate the 
long-term community and generational commitments that long-term investments in heavy 
industry entail. Thus, multiple generations of workers are usually employed at heavy industrial 
facilities allowing for a continuity of workplace culture that does not occur with the rapid cycles 
of opening/closing in service economies.  
     It was a general practice in many U.S. industrial communities for multiple generations of 
workers to be employed at the same location over decades. Evidence of this similar pattern in 
Poland is found in statements by Lech Walesa in his description of the workings of the Lenin 
Shipyard concerning training of workers. He mentions  the, "...old hands, many of them natives 
of Gdansk, some of whom had worked in the Scichau shipyard, which had been erected by 
German industrialist before the Second World War when Gdansk was known to them as the Free 
City of Danzig" (Walesa 1987: 45.)  These "old hands" would have not only knew their trade 
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well enough to train young workers, they would have also had experience in the capitalist pre-
WWII economy and may have had experience at strikes and collective bargaining (certainly 
more likely than those who entered the workforce post 1946.) 
     Informant "P" said, in Europe, due to much older development patterns  (as compared to 
relatively recent settlement patterns in the U.S.) and due to damage from two world wars, that it 
was common to re- establish industrial works on old sites. He mentioned a nitrate plant in 
Kedzierzyn, (near Opole, where "P" visits family) re-built on the ruins of a pre-WWI industrial 
site. Thus, multi-generational industrial employment may be even more common in Europe than 
in the U.S. (by virtue of longer continuity of industrial development and utilization of several 
generations of local workers to operate the plants.) Therefore pre-Communist era workplace 
bargaining tactics could have been generationally transferred. 
      Historian Padraic Kenney  mentions this generational transference of knowledge  in regard to 
intellectual dissent and hints at the transfer of the above mentioned type of experience. 
Concerning the events, in general, that led to Solidarity's emergence, he says: "...the movements 
whose stories make up this book  [referring to his book on Solidarity] did not spring from 
nowhere; most owed a great deal to the ideas and practices of their elders, even when they tried 
to keep their distance" (Kenney: 2002: 10.) 
     Reiterating, the contention of this section is that long-term operational nature of heavy 
industrial development created a structural condition (multigenerational employment patterns) 
that facilitated generational transfer of a culture of workplace resistance. Such would not have 
occurred in a short cycle service economy. 
 
____________________________________ 
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Comparing Two Key Informants From Ironton, Ohio, and Gdansk, Poland 
 
     As mentioned in the methodological section of this paper, several interviews were conducted 
with former employees of large U.S. industrial complexes, in order to compare constructs 
proposed to contribute to social solidarity in similar situations in Poland. In the process, it 
became apparent that an informant in Ironton and an informant in Gdansk had remarkably 
similar attitudes toward their former workplaces and coworkers. They displayed through their 
comments the attitudes consistent with a proposed "industrial culture."  
     The relatively recent (within the last 25 - 30 years) globalization of capital and the resulting 
de-industrialization of traditional manufacturing areas worldwide has left within de-
industrialized communities a generation of individuals that the author contends  are carriers of a 
culture specific to the now (nearly) extinct heavy industrial sector. It may be that certain 
characteristics of  this "industrial culture" were  facilitating factors in the social solidarity of 
work groups, labor unions, and of the communities in general.  These contentions are based on 
information obtained from open-ended interviews, group discussions, observations, and oral 
histories conducted in Ironton, Ohio and Gdansk, Poland.  The author also bases these 
contentions on 30 years of direct personal experience in the industrial sector, in commercial 
construction work, and in labor union participation. 
     In general, the findings of this small-scale study demonstrate that the constructs in question, 
that is,  social cohesion, group loyalty, union solidarity, dedication to company, craft, or job - 
constructs that the author  relates to the conception of industrial culture as remembered through 
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participation in this sector -  are easily recognizable within the dialogue of  informants from both 
Poland and the U.S.     
     However, these constructs are not uniform in their degree of intensity; that is, some 
informants expressed through their conversations with the author, stories, anecdotes, and 
memories that would indicate a great deal of the above mentioned attributes, and other 
informants expressed much less commitment to these constructs (as evidenced earlier in this 
chapter by comments from informant "Z"). Further research would be necessary to determine 
how widespread are the constructs in question among this population.  
     However, as mentioned above, two informants, one in Ironton and one Gdansk, demonstrated 
remarkably similar attitudes concerning their former workplaces and former co-workers. Their 
degree of commitment to their respective jobs and to their co-workers was so intense that the 
author  believes it comprised a major element of their personal identity. Both men, now elderly 
and retired,  had endured much hardship, brutal working conditions, injustice, and loss during the 
course of their careers. However, these negative incidents and memories were not the focus of 
their present lives; instead, both men remembered their jobs as very positive and fulfilling 
expressions of themselves through their contribution to the greater good of the plant/ship yard 
and to the community/society. Both had been fascinated, for lack of a better word, by the 
elaborate and complex systems of their respective workplaces, in terms of both the physical and 
social organization of the immense industrial complexes in which they had worked.  Their deep 
understanding and appreciation of these processes as a whole was evident in their enthusiastic 
desire to make clear to the interviewer details of their experiences.  
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     Additionally, both informants maintained into retirement close personal connections with 
former co-workers.  This demonstrates, on a very personal level, an example of the proposed 
constructs of group loyalty and social cohesion that are important factors in the success of labor 
unions. These two informants will be discussed in greater detail shortly. 
     Certain social and material characteristics of industrial-based communities and of industrial 
workplaces may also be contributing factors to the proposed constructs of industrial culture. For 
example, both Ironton and Gdansk had very large numbers of residents employed in the 
industrial sector, resulting in similar life histories and workplace experiences for many 
individuals. Workplace conditions and routines were similar in both cities, with dangerous 
working conditions the norm and group solidarity high as a result of this (in certain operations 
individuals literally trusted their lives to fellow workers.) In general, these and other social and 
material factors can be generalized through the "structural conduciveness" paradigm, described 
in the theoretical section of this paper.  
     In the following discussions and comparisons the aim is to demonstrate how these individuals 
are similar and how both display the assumed traits of "industrial culture." Additionally, both 
men displayed a high degree of "worker autonomy," a seemingly contradictory attitude in 
relation to general worker solidarity, as discussed by Hodson et al. 1993. Following are brief  
descriptions and background information of these two informants. Fictitious names are used to 
protect their identity. The author intentionally shifts to first person form in order to better convey 
a more humanistic style apparent in the interviews of these key informants. 
_____________________________ 
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     "Paul" was 85 years old when I interviewed him (February 2010) and was born in Ironton, 
Ohio in 1925. He worked many different jobs within the Allied Chemical Semet-Solvay coke 
plant during his 34 years of employment at the site (1948 - 1982). Paul did not graduate from 
high school but volunteered for the army at age 17 (he lied about his age) and served four years 
during WWII in the Pacific. He proudly showed me a wallet-sized copy of his honorary high 
school diploma from Coal Grove High School given to him in a ceremony in 2002. He lived his 
entire life within a mile of the Allied Chemical plant, at Coal Grove, Ohio (the plant is located at 
the Ironton/Coal Grove city limits; the village of Coal Grove and the city of Ironton blend 
seamlessly into each other along South 3rd street.)  
      When Paul was hired by Allied Chemical in 1948 his pay was 86 cents per hour. Today, he 
considers himself very lucky to have both social security payments and a moderate pension from 
Allied Chemical Company; many of his friends, including all the former workers of the Dayton 
Malleable Iron Foundry, received no retirement benefits what so ever from their company as it 
declared bankruptcy. According to Paul, Allied Chemical Corporation has totally abandoned the 
chemical business but now is called "Allied Signal" and makes specialized engineered materials. 
During our conversation, one of Paul's friends pointed out (from a  rather course and obviously 
colloquial point of view) that,  "Allied Chemical was run by Jews, and they knew how to manage 
money. They got out of the chemical business and started makin' high-tech stuff. That's why we 
got a retirement from 'em. The Malleable (Dayton Malleable Iron Company) just fucked their 
guys- said they were bankrupt, closed her down, and said, "Good Luck! See ya!" All the men 
present agreed with this statement (by nods, and general statements of agreement) and seemed to 
have great respect for the "wisdom" of Allied Chemical as opposed to the "stupidity" of Dayton 
Malleable Iron.  
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     At age 85 Paul is very thin and frail and carries an oxygen bottle on a strap over his shoulder.  
Plastic tubes carry oxygen to his nose and he has to stop talking quite often to catch his breath 
but he obviously loves talking about "the plant." He still drives an old pickup truck and loves to 
drink coffee with his former coworkers at McDonald's.  His comments will be compared to those 
of "Pavel's" later on. 
___________________________________ 
 
     "Pavel" is 67 years old (as of March 2010) and was born in Gdansk in 1943 during WWII. He  
"attended some schools",  worked as a carpenter during his teen-age years, and in 1963, at age 20  
went to work in the Lenin Shipyard (now Stocznia Gadnasksa; Gdansk Shipyard). He started out 
in the shipyard as a carpenter, mainly building scaffolds for ship construction, but also repaired 
buildings, and did general labor. He wanted to learn an industrial trade, "something of use to the 
shipyard," he told me, and so he learned to be an electrician by working with the electricians at 
the yard. He proudly told me that he worked with Lech Walesa, who also was an electrician. 
Pavel showed me pictures of Lech Walesa at a meeting during the negotiations of Solidarnosc 
with the Polish Government. He showed me the old shop where he and Walesa used to work 
within the ship yard along a street named for the electricians. The ship yard was so big that it had 
several streets within it, all named for various trades. "See, you have the street of welders, street 
of painters, street of pipe fitters, etc. It was like a city here. We had our own hospital and 
cafeteria here. We even had our own sports teams!" Pavel was obviously very proud of the old 
ship yard.  
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      He also showed me some old newspapers with articles about strajks (strikes) at the ship yard 
and was very pleased that I recognized the word strajk in Polish and understood the importance 
of strajks as a form of resistance. I told him that my own former union, the Oil, Chemical, and 
Atomic Workers union, had supported Solidarnosc during the 1980s (by financial contributions) 
and he was very pleased to know this. "Many people, many unions, many churches, all over the 
world supported Solidarnosc. We could not have survived without the peoples' help," he said. 
      He also showed me pictures of his wife, now deceased, whom he misses very much. He said 
they were married in 1970, at which time Pavel had worked in the ship yard for 7 years but still 
could not afford to by a suit; "I worked hard every day and I was still poor," he commented. Like 
Paul, from Coal Grove, Pavel lived within walking distance of his place of work and had done so 
all his life. Like Paul, Pavel considered himself lucky to have a small retirement from the ship 
yard, but he is worried that it will end as the ship yard may be totally closed down soon. Another 
informant, the director of the Gdansk local of Solidarnosc, told me that the ship yard  retirees 
have nothing to worry about as the State now supports their pensions, not profits from the ship 
yard. This point, however, did not convince Pavel.  
     Unlike Paul, Pavel seems to be in excellent health. He is a short, gray-haired, jovial character 
with sky blue eyes, who, like Paul, obviously loves to discuss "the yard" and tell stories about 
"strajks" and the struggle of Solidarnosc. Pavel walks very fast for a man 67 years old,  and on a 
cold March day,  he soon took me to meet some of his friends for coffee and cookies at an office 
of the ship yard retirement committee.  
_____________________________ 
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Co-Worker Networks: Inside Stocznia Gdanska 
     In the retirement committee office large portraits of Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI 
were hanging on the wall over the director's desk. Pavel introduced me to several of his friends 
here, all former or current employees of the ship yard. Pavel wanted to be sure that I understood, 
through his and others' very basic and  broken English, and through the proper English/Polish 
translation of Marta (again a fictions name for the sake of privacy) that, "This is my family." 
Pavel made sure, Marta later told me, that she had correctly interpreted this to me; he obviously  
wanted to impress upon me his close connections to the group. Marta speculated that the 
connections were much more than common friendship between old coworkers. Pavel had told 
her that he felt like they were all his family due to what they shared over the Solidarity years, and 
what they went through in defying the police, the military, and the governments of Poland and 
the USSR during the strikes and negotiations of the 1980s. 
       The above scenario is a perfect demonstration of several of the constructs described in the 
theoretical section of this paper: group cohesion, mutual defense,  distinct group boundaries, and 
the process of forming and defending a union. The continued close ties of friendship and trust 
into retirement due to these constructs are indicators of the proposed "industrial culture."  Paul's 
coworker network showed similar attributes in Ironton. 
 
Co-Worker Networks: Allied Chemical Retirees 
     Paul and his coworkers went through several strikes at Allied Chemical over the years. 
Striking workers got only very limited and sporadic financial help from the national level of the 
union during these times. "We might get a tank of gas or a few groceries," he told me. "Mostly 
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we just had to fend for ourselves." But without union solidarity the workers knew they would 
never achieve any of their goals; pay raises, safety concerns, retirement benefits, etc. were 
among the goals of strikes over the years. Workers helped each other as best they could to 
financially endure the strikes as this was their only bargaining tool once company/union 
negotiations came to a standstill. The following story illustrates a similar social cohesion due to 
shared hardships in Ironton as I observed in Gdansk. Paul's friend, Ken, told this story as we all 
discussed how the group made it through long strikes: 
    {Ken}  "One strike was nine months long - I think it was in 1967 - when you get my 
age you can't remember. Me and Tom (another group member) went out and built 
porches, and everything - did remodeling jobs, handyman jobs, odds jobs, to survive. I 
had four kids then - I had to try to make a living." 
{Paul} "Yeah - that was a long strike! And we had several more - maybe three or four 
months long over the years. But we always stuck together and got through 'em. The men 
really stuck together during the strikes. The union gave us a little bit of money - they had 
a little strike fund- it wasn't much at all." 
 
     As in Gdansk, workers who collectively endured financial hardships (and in some cases 
physical danger) often formed social bonds as strong as family networks and maintained these 
networks into retirement. The resulting group solidarity achieved through successfully enduring 
one strike facilitated success and solidarity in future strikes. This was the case in both Ironton, 
and Gdansk. There was no mention of crossing the picket line, of conceding benefits, or of 
abandoning the strikes; these ideas were inconceivable to this generation of workers. The 
common practice was to attempt to "stir up some other kinda work" till the strike was over. At 
times this meant leaving wife and children at home during extremely long strikes, and going out 
of town to take seasonal or temporary work in order to make enough money for house or car 
payments. My informants knew of several cases in which this happened to other workers during 
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very long strikes but this particular group was always able, through networks of friends, to "stir 
up enough work in Lawrence County to make it by." 
 
Physical Danger In Industrial Settings: 
      Hodson et al. (1993) lists "dangerous working conditions" as another "determinant of worker 
solidarity." This is often evidenced by the "pulling together" of a community during a time of 
loss, for instance, during a mine disaster (especially in remote communities when nearly all 
members' families are involved). Both the Ironton coke plant and the Gdansk Shipyard were 
dangerous places to work and in both cases the workers made up very large percentages of the 
local populations. This factor contributed to worker solidarity and was an element of "industrial 
culture." 
     Paul and Pavel gave nearly identical answers to the question, "was your job dangerous?"  
{Paul} "If you wasn't watchin', yeah, it was dangerous. 
{Pavel} "Yes - it could be - see how things are moving here? You had to watch out." 
     The next implication of both men was that not only did each individual "have to watch out" 
for himself but each individual had to watch out for his fellow workers as well. Both informants 
told stories of incidences when this did not happen; when deadly accidents occurred through 
neglect of approved safety practices. Paul told a horrific story of a "young girl" hired in and put 
to work on the coke ovens without (in his opinion) sufficient training. She was killed the first 
week of work, "Burnt up - burnt alive. She stepped on one of the caps on top of three battery 
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[coal charging hole covers atop the coke ovens] and the cap blowed off and it burnt her up  - 
(click - he snaps his fingers) - just like that." 
    Pavel told a story of two men killed in an explosion of welding gas in an area in which he used 
to work: "Over there - (he points to a small brick building in the ship yard) - was a big explosion. 
Two men were killed here that I used to work with. I used to work in there with them - so yes, 
you could get killed here." The implication was that Pavel himself could have been killed in the 
explosion if he had been in the building at the time. He also indicated, through Marta's 
translation, his disapproval of how this accident happened, as, I believe, he felt it occurred 
through neglect of safety rules or ignorance of safety procedures. 
     Several other informants in both Ironton and Gdansk told stories of the dangers involved in 
their jobs. Cooperation, awareness, trust, and group enforcement of  norms (in this case the 
norms are safety rules and "watching out" for fellow workers) are all common constructs 
concerning work in dangerous conditions. These constructs are probably universally observable 
in other "industrial cultures." 
 
Worker Autonomy And Job Satisfaction In Ironton and In Gdansk:  
     Worker autonomy seems a contradictory construct to worker solidarity and the collectivist 
notions associated with "industrial culture." However,  Hodson et al. (1993) found that worker 
autonomy had no negative effects on worker solidarity. Hodson reports the contradictory 
opinions of  other labor researchers (401), such as Rankin (1990) who views worker participation 
programs "as subtle control strategies which undermine worker solidarity and manipulate 
workers' minds and hearts so they pursue management goals even at the cost of their own jobs 
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(59). On the other hand, Hodson also reports (401) that Walton and Hackman (1986) argued that 
workers experience increased solidarity under more participatory workplace environments.  
      Paul and Paval seemed to express a great deal of both worker autonomy and worker 
solidarity. I believe that worker autonomy contributes a great deal to job satisfaction, ability to 
network, to move about, and in the process, to communicate with other workers. Hodson (1993) 
found that "mobility or freedom of movement" contributes to worker solidarity; thus, autonomy 
and mobility may be connected and together may facilitate worker solidarity and job satisfaction. 
Some explanation and excerpts from interview transcripts will clarify this notion: 
______________________________________ 
     Both the Allied Chemical plant and the Gdansk Shipyard were huge facilities sprawling over 
many acres and containing 1000s of workers. Primary industrial facilities, that is heavy industrial 
sites,  such as steel mills, chemical plants, foundries, coke plants, and ship yards by no means 
resemble the reductionist notion of assembly lines manned by mindless, unskilled, miserable 
drones, practically chained to their workstations,  as popularized  by  high school textbooks, TV 
documentaries, dramas, or even sitcoms; heavy industrial sites more resemble small, contained 
cities with a plethora of various tradespersons performing highly skilled tasks over large spatial 
areas. Freedom of mobility is necessary, within the general section of the plant or yard, and often 
such industries had cafeterias, hospitals, or meeting halls (for company sponsored meetings, such 
as safety meetings). The Gdansk site was so large that a "fleet" of company bicycles - aging, 
rusting, single speed, bikes of all makes, colors, and conditions - was available to employees 
within the ship yard. Work sites may have been located nearly a mile from ship yard entrance 
gates. The bikes were simply communal property that allowed for more rapid travel within the 
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ship yard, and were still in use when I toured the yard, despite its reduced capacity. Thus, 
mobility over very large areas was common as was contact with a wide range of different 
employees, of different trades. Such mobility, no doubt, led to opportunities for networking and 
communication and made the work site a much less boring place than that of assembly line 
workers. The mobility and communication also fostered the spread of ideas - in the case of 
Stocznia Gdanska, the ideas of Solidarnosc were made available to 1000s of workers within the 
yard.  
      Workers were also encouraged by management to learn various jobs within the plant and 
usually had specifications in union contracts that allowed for "bidding" on various jobs. The 
Allied Chemical Plant was represented by the OCAW and the Gdansk ship yard was organized 
by a state-sponsored, Communist  trade union before Solidarnosc emerged. In the Allied 
Chemical plant,  "bidding," however, did not refer to a bid on a pay scale - the scale for all jobs 
was predetermined for the duration of the contract. "Bidding" simply meant the employee was 
requesting an opportunity to fill a job opening within the plant. Training was provided on-site 
and highly skilled jobs were heavily "bid on." Employees usually won a bid simply by seniority; 
thus, new employees may start out as laborers and, over time, "bid up" to skilled jobs, such as 
welders, electricians, or plant systems operators. 
    The above background is meant to set the stage for comments by Paul and Pavel that 
demonstrate the high degree of worker autonomy, job satisfaction, interest, and personal 
fulfillment they experienced at their respective worksites. As mentioned in the introduction of 
this paper, I believe the personal identities of both Paul and Pavel were greatly defined by their 
participation in the Allied Chemical Plant and the Gdansk Ship Yard respectively.  
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          Paul loved "the plant," as he and his friends called it. "I worked about all the jobs up 
there," he told me, "shift repair, flue tender, machine operations - the last 12 years I run the 
switch engine moving coal cars around - that was a good job - it got me off the ovens!" He 
emphasized  that the jobs and the plant operations were learned; taught by someone who already 
knew the job. "You stood right by them and helped, watched, learned - and they kept you from 
gettin' hurt - from causing a fire or explosion or something." The training lasted a minimum of 
six weeks and often much longer with more "sensitive" jobs, like the job of flue tender. This job, 
Paul reported, amounted to keeping a balance on the backpressure of highly explosive coke oven 
gas on the batteries of ovens; there was no room for error and no second chance in judgments - 
"Otherwise you could blow up the whole battery and kill everyone working on it." No doubt, 
during the long training process of jobs like this, were transmitted not only specialized technical 
knowledge but also attitudes that I contend constituted the "industrial culture." 
     Paul took great pride in understanding the workings of the plant as a system. The coke plant 
was connected to other local plants by pipelines that carried excess coke oven gas produced as a 
by-product of the coking process for use in other industries. For example, the Allied Chemical 
Nitrogen Division fertilizer plant at South Point, Ohio was supplied with coke oven gas as were 
Armco Steel, Dayton Malleable Iron, and "the brick yard." During one of the interviews, Paul 
got into an argument with his friend, "Wells," over knowledge concerning the destination of coke 
oven gas: 
{Wells} "They never sent no gas to the brickyard from the Solvay.  That old brickyard 
didn't need no gas. It run off natural gas." 
 
{Paul} "The hell it did!  I sent the gas to the brickyard - I turned the valve that sent it 
there - I remember doin' it. That brickyard took a lot of our gas. Don't tell me I don't 
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remember. I've forgot more about the plant than you ever did know - ya dumbass - stupid 
fuck.  I know what I did in that plant and how it all was run!" 
 
     Likewise, Pavel took great pride in the ship yard - in its history concerning Solidarity, in the 
scale of the operations, and in the workmanship of his craft. For instance, he told the following 
story, I believe, to illustrate the ingenuity of Poles over Russians and to relate to me the amount 
of pride in craftsmanship taken at the ship yard: 
"We built all kinds of ships here - military ships, commercial ships, fishing ships. The 
best ships we built went to Germany. After the 1980 strikes the Russians made it hard for 
our yard. We needed parts for the ships from Germany. We could no longer get them. 
They said, "everything you need will come from Russia now." But it was slow to arrive 
and often the wrong stuff or bad, defective parts came. We had to try to fix them before 
we could use them, or figure out a way to make them work. But we did it! They (the 
Soviet Union) were mad at us over the strikes. They wanted to make it as hard for us as 
they could. But we could still our build ships!" 
 
    Pavel seemed to delight in telling to me and Marta the stories of Solidarity, his involvement in 
the movement, and showing to us the exact locations in the ship yard where important events 
occurred. For example, he showed us the place where Lech Walesa "jumped the fence," during 
the earliest days of the movement, and assumed leadership of the movement. Walesa had been 
fired from the Gdansk yard earlier for organizing strikes. As the ship yard director tried to calm 
down a group of workers angered over the firing of a coworker just weeks short of retirement, 
Lech Walesa jumped the fence into the yard, climbed up onto an excavator parked nearby, and 
unofficially took control of the event and all following events. Pavel insisted that I take several 
pictures of this site, as the fence (actually a wall),  may be soon torn down. This incident, and 
many similar ones, demonstrate the pride that Pavel took in the history of Stocznia Gdanska.  
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     In summary, the above discussion and descriptions were meant to demonstrate the degree of 
pride and satisfaction both Pavel and Paul took in their overall places of employment and in their 
jobs. They both had a great degree of autonomy in that they were able to do several different jobs 
within the facilities, were able to travel about within the facilities (Pavel told stories of even 
visiting nearby ship yards on company business when he was promoted to a foreman), took great 
pride in knowledge,  craftsmanship, and histories of their workplaces, and apparently derived 
great satisfaction from the personal relationships formed among coworkers - relationships lasting 
well into retirement years. These constructs, I contend, are part of the proposed "industrial 
culture" and contribute to worker solidarity within that culture. Job satisfaction and autonomy do 
not detract from worker loyalty to fellow-worker or to union causes. In fact, a final comparison 
of worker/management relations demonstrates this: 
     Despite many strikes during the course of their employment at Allied Chemical, Paul and his 
friends considered the plant management to be fair and in some cases to give very good 
treatment to workers. A distinct line was drawn between union and management personnel, but, 
in general, there was no "us against them" mentality. Strikes occurred, contracts were negotiated 
and settled, and life went on; deep polarization and "revenge tactics" were not part of the 
company culture or the union culture at Allied Chemical. Paul's friend, Wells, told this story: 
"They (Allied Chemical) were good to the men most of the time. If we worked over or 
were on a call out - you know - we might be there for 16 hours straight - yeah, they'd let 
us take a nap somewhere. They'd say, "Take a little nap somewhere. As long as I know 
where you're at - I'll call ya if we need ya." Yeah, we got along OK, most of the time. 
And the foremen would jump in and help ya if we got behind. It's not like that now at 
most plants, buddy! Its dog eat dog - every man for himself!" 
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     Pavel commented also on relatively good worker/management relations, ironically, even 
though Solidarnosc was in a long-term battle with the Communist Party of Poland and the 
State/Party was, theoretically, management for the ship yard. Still, personal relationships and 
loyalties must have played an important role in mitigating many conflicts. For example, Pavel 
was arrested during martial law for passing out illegal samizdat newspapers in support of the 
outlawed Solidarnosc. He was put in jail for 6 months and after his release the ship yard told him 
he no longer had a job there due to absenteeism. "But they knew I was in jail - they knew I was 
passing out papers for the union and against them too. Eventually I was re-hired because the 
bosses knew me and knew I was a good worker and they actually helped me get back in!" 
    Obviously, not all industrial workers or workplaces are similar to Paul/Allied Chemical and 
Pavel/Stocznia Gdanska. These individuals/workplaces are perfect examples of the proposed 
"industrial culture" in two very distant locations. However, my informants from the Dayton 
Malleable Iron Foundry, just adjacent to Allied Chemical Semet-Solvay, enjoyed no such good 
worker/management relations and told no stories of generosity or cooperation from management. 
In general, these former employees were very bitter against "The Malleable," and used many 
profanities in describing the work place and its management. Obviously too, was the fact that 
these workers did not receive a retirement from Dayton Malleable Iron; all benefits, insurance, 
pension, severance pay - everything was cancelled with little warning. Thus, under such 
conditions, no fair assessment of "industrial culture" could be made for the Dayton Malleable 
Iron site 
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Factor 2)  Social solidarity within the movement was facilitated by the existing 
sociocultural  construct of "fraternal proletarian solidarity," as cultivated by the USSR. 
Solidarnosc became an alternative object of  fraternal loyalty. 
     This section describes the notion of a collectivist culture (as opposed to a culture of 
individualism), as intentionally cultivated by the Soviet Union within its borders and within its 
sphere of influence. Generically, this construct may be referred to as "fraternal proletarian 
solidarity," (as discussed in the introduction and historical chapters of this thesis) or as "planned 
social solidarity." This was accomplished by a number of "aggregative devices," to use Lynd's  
phrase from his paper, "Planned Social Solidarity In The Soviet Union" (1945). The Peoples' 
Republic Of Poland was subject to this same effort for some forty years through mass 
indoctrination (State controlled mass media) and through the State directed school curriculum 
(evidence for this is detailed in this section, below). The ultimate aim of creating fraternal 
proletarian solidarity was creation of a population united in goals and ideology, this being the 
building of a classless society under the "dictatorship of the proletariat." A truly collectivist 
oriented  society was created in Poland; however its loyalty was not to the USSR (although, in 
legal terms, the constitution of the Polish Peoples' Republic, according to Ash (2002: 20), 
claimed Poland's "unshakeable fraternal bonds with the Soviet Union.")  
     This paper contends that the cultural construct of fraternal proletarian solidarity was a 
facilitating factor for Solidarnosc as workers with a highly developed sense of collectivism are 
obviously much more likely to participate in collective action events, as opposed, for example, to 
modern American workers steeped in an individualist culture that glorifies self and views 
collectivism as dependency, weakness, or lack of self-initiative. This section contends that  
Solidarnosc  co-opted this existing collectivist construct and used it to their benefit.  Over time 
then, loyalty to Solidarnosc became an "alternative form" of  fraternal proletarian solidarity.  
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       This is not implying that overt loyalty or allegiance to the USSR was somehow directly 
"switched" toward Poland - no such loyalty ever existed. Solidarnosc simply tapped into an 
existing strongly collectivist-oriented cultural construct and offered itself as the object of 
fraternal loyalty in place of the Communist State. 
       The most general "frame" (as per the notion of issue framing in social movement theory 
terms) of the Polish Solidarity Movement was that Solidarnosc was an alternative to the 
dysfunctional State-operated unions to which virtually all Polish workers belonged.  Over and 
over,  in interviews conducted for this paper, the benign slogan, "ewolucja nie rewolucja" 
(evolution not revolution) was used by interviewees to describe the intentions of Solidarnosc. 
The very first point in the 21 points of The Gdansk Agreement takes this same position, clearly 
stating that Polish workers will have a choice - an alternative -  of remaining in the old State 
unions or joining Solidarnosc. The Agreement even claims to anticipate cooperation between the 
two unions: "...Workers will continue to have the right to join the old trade unions and we are 
looking at the possibility of the two union structures co-operating" (MacDonald 1981: 102; 
translated copy of Gdansk Agreements). 
     Thus, Solidarnosc was attempting to  "broaden the range of options" for Polish workers; it 
was framed as a "non-threatening option" or alternative object of fraternal loyalty. Of course, this 
was complete heresy in a Soviet-modeled state;  it was actually the beginning of pluralism in a 
single-party system (as the State-controlled unions were direct extensions of the Communist 
Party and Solidarnosc was billed as "an alternative').  However, this attempt at "evolution" to 
pluralism was a much wiser and safer choice than revolution; attempts at violent revolution 
within Eastern Bloc nations had ended with Soviet military intervention. By framing itself as an 
"alternative" and not as a "replacement" to the authority of the state-sponsored unions, 
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Solidarnosc could attempt to justify itself as an equally deserving object of fraternal loyalty. 
Using examples taken from historical accounts, journal articles, and news items that demonstrate 
"creation of fraternal proletarian solidarity" in Poland, and with addition of data from personal 
interviews and personal communications, the sections below will support this claim. 
     First, several items will be mentioned that indicate a strong collectivist orientation among 
members of the Solidarity Movement and later several specific items will be described that 
demonstrate intentional creation of this attitude. No claim is made that "collectivist attitudes" 
could be measured. Evidence is given that describes a prevalence of this attitude in Polish society 
as well as examples of the direct cultivation of this attitude and these factors can only be 
compared, in qualitative terms - not quantitative, to societies which have had no such influence. 
To reiterate, the overall point of this section is that "fraternal proletarian solidarity" was a 
facilitating factor to the success of the Solidarity Movement. 
________________________________ 
 
A.  Politically, Solidarnosc was a socialist-oriented group: This is not at all to say that 
Solidarity advocated Soviet-style socialism; Solidarity was seeking "the middle way," so to 
speak, a social democracy as opposed to single-party, authoritarianism with a command 
economy. In fact, Ash (2002: 235) says that for most Poles "...the  word 'socialism' was utterly 
discredited by what the Soviet Union and their authorities since 1945 had done in its name." 
Still, Ash insists, (speaking of an economic program proposed by Solidarity) "...the majority [of 
Poles were] was still for 'social ownership' of the means of production. But they restored to this 
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socialist principle a literal meaning: 'social ownership,' they said, means 'ownership by society,' 
not ownership by the socialist state (236 - 237.) 
       Additionally,  Ash states, "Since the 1950s Polish sociologists had found a large and 
growing majority of their respondents against free enterprise in medium and heavy industry" 
(236). Poles had fully accepted the notion of socialized enterprise and were aware of its potential 
benefits (by means of funding social programs). However, they were also aware that the Soviet 
version of this, as it operated in Poland, was more exploitive than it was beneficial. Many Poles 
believed their country to be a sort of economically "exploited periphery" of the USSR ( to use 
Wallenstein's terminology here for clarification only) as  described in  the historical background 
section of this thesis. Poles favored socialist benefits and socialist enterprise, as described in a 
1980 Time Magazine article titled, "We Want A Decent Life," but were fed up with shortages of 
basic material goods which they believed were in short supply because the Soviet Union 
expropriated them: 
 
 "...the state provided the usual panoply of Communist benefits: guaranteed jobs, free 
medical care, factory-sponsored vacations. But this was not enough. Poles were tired of 
standing in endless lines: for meat, flour, sugar, and other staples...tired of shoddy, 
overpriced goods...tired of waiting eight to ten years for an apartment, and almost half 
that long for a car that cost 20 months' wages. As one striking worker put it last August, 
"We don't want to run the government. We just want a decent life." (Smith 1980.) 
 
     Lech Walesa describes the desire of Poles to 'have the best of both worlds,' that is, to retain a 
collectivist culture and a strong welfare state but to be free of the hypocritical Soviet version of 
socialism: 
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"For the majority of people, socialism boils down to things we are accustomed to, which 
we pay no more attention to than the blood circulating in our veins: social benefits, 
hospitals, schools, and so on - the essentials. But of course, there must be money  for 
these things and honesty must be the rule. What we have stressed in order to make 
socialism acceptable is that all that is best in the economy and in the domain of social 
welfare is socialist, even if it was part of the socialism we have known up till now (and 
which, frankly speaking, was merely bogus socialism)" (Walesa 1987: 172 - 173.) 
 
     Informant "JB," who is currently associated with the Fundacja Centrum Solidarnosci in 
Gdansk, (a group which promotes the ideology of the Solidarity Movement and which consists 
of a collection of labor union which fragmented from Solidarnosc in the 1990s) is well versed in 
the political rhetoric of Solidarity. He is personally acquainted with Lech Walesa, as both 
worked together in the Lenin Shipyards for many years. He made this personal comment about 
Walesa in regards to the exact political orientation of Solidarnosc: 
 
"Social democracy was what we wanted - Walesa wanted the union to be a social party. 
He called it socialism not communism. He said, "yes - socialism - OK - but not the bad 
points of the regime. Still, we did not want to provoke attacks on the regime - we wanted 
to use the good points of socialism. The State should take care of families, provide 
medical care, pay for time off if you are sick, provide for you if there is no employment - 
yes - we wanted these things!" 
 
 
B. Collectivist orientation and "communist sympathy" were apparent  in many individuals 
who most strongly supported Solidarnosc:   
Penn (2005) notes that some of the most effective and dedicated samizdat authors actually grew 
up as part of Poland's communist elite, or "red bourgeoisie." Their education and idealism were 
assets to their work for Solidarity. Some realized that they were part of a "privileged class in an 
allegedly classless society" (Penn 2005: 115). Their own social position, they realized, was 
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analogous to the hypocrisy of the Soviet version of communism. They did not seek to create a 
competitive, capitalist system in Poland but to make a Polish version of "socialism with a human 
face," as Hungary had attempted in the 1950s.  
     Penn relates the experiences of three women that she interviewed, all of which fit this 
description. All three were daughters of high-ranking party bureaucrats and all three became 
heavily involved in samizdat publishing. The point here, as with the previous discussion 
concerning Solidarity's socialist agenda, is to demonstrate the collectivist orientation that 40 
years of Soviet propaganda instilled in the population. Penn's informants relate the following, 
similar life-stories. Statements of all three informants are compiled below: 
"We belonged to a communist elite, which allowed us to feel protected and secure in our 
thinking...We were reformers, not opposers.  We were leftists...We were conditioned to 
be 'true believers.' We were idealist youth, raised on utopian notions of the collective 
good...We grew critical of Stalinism but remained committed to communism...Our 
parents had sacrificed material and spiritual needs in the name of the future. By the 
1960s, when we looked ahead into the future, we thought that 'true socialism' could 
unfold and basic freedoms would be restored" (Penn 2005: 116 - 117.) 
 
     Although the actual number of former "red bourgeoisie" members actively involved in the 
Solidarity movement was probably small, their effect was great; they used their knowledge of 
political ideology effectively and carried on samizdat publishing during the martial law period. 
Their influence on the working class by means of their publications was no doubt considerable.  
     Informant "AF," who now operates a business in Gdansk, appeared to have  an appreciation 
for the "Communist style management training" of his school days, which still apparently serves 
him well today. He was an active member in Solidarnosc and is a good example of those with 
both obvious "socialist style" schooling and a collectivist attitude mixed with the pluralist 
tendencies of the Solidarity Movement. Two quotes from my interview with him reveal this: 
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"We had "State Economy" as a class in school. It was about the Marxist-Leninist style of 
management and the Socialist style of state. Then I went to management seminars later - I 
understand how business works - how economy works...business must operate same in 
capitalist or socialist countries - it must make money." 
 
     I then asked "AF" directly about my notion of  a societal or cultural  "collectivist orientation" 
as possibly being a facilitator to the unity of purpose that was evident in the Solidarity 
Movement; he responded: 
"Well, I will show you something. Over a gate to the old downtown of Gdansk is written 
this: 'With unity small states join together and become great. Without unity, great nations 
dissolve.' I think this gate was made in the 1600s - so, yes - I think we are "collectivists!" 
(laughs) 
______________________________ 
     Again, to reiterate, I contend  that  existing collectivist cultural constructs (as those mentioned 
above) facilitated Solidarnosc's ability to achieve and maintain social solidarity.  The remainder 
of items in this section are given as examples of how this fraternal proletarian solidarity was 
generated. Some  Polish examples  are exact duplications of those that  Lynd (1945) deemed 
"aggregative devices in Soviet society."  
 
C.  Fraternal proletarian solidarity was generated through Poland's educational system: 
      A plethora of examples exist supporting this claim. From elementary school, secondary 
school,  through college and post-graduate school, a socialist orientation was the only accepted 
academic perspective in Poland between 1945 and the mid 1980s. Until Stalin's death in 1953 
and the beginnings of the "Khrushchev thaw" and de-Stalinization a few years later, "vulgar 
Marxism" dominated all Polish academic institutions and was used "...for the sake of purely 
expedient considerations, and applied in a purely instrumental fashion to support and legitimize 
the autocratic and bureaucratic regime..."(Kwasniewicz 1994: 27.) Kwasniewicz describes the 
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situation as being in an "ideological straightjacket," (31) in that job advancement  in academic 
circles, or even continued employment, depended on professing a strict Marxist-Leninist-
Stalinist orientation. 
     Lukasz Kaminski notes that the "ideological supervision over education" actually resulted in 
historical revisionism with "party historians" rewriting history; "The number of researchers who 
were ready to fulfill every single wish of the communist party was very large. They did not 
flinch from any lie or abuse" (Kaminski 2009: 1 - 4.) Still, Kubik (1994: 28) reports a shortage of 
"ideologically reliable teachers" by the early 1970s. It is clear from such accounts that 
individuals who taught for a living in the Peoples' Republic of Poland  - from elementary school 
to college level - were under close ideological scrutiny by their supervisors.  
     Kubik (1994: 28) describes the manipulation of  Poland's educational system during the 
Gierek administration of the 1970s as follows: 
 "A special commission of twenty-four experts on education, led by a prominent 
sociologist loyal to the authorities, Jan Szczepanski, prepared a report that recommended 
the introduction of a uniform ten-year curriculum in all elementary schools... propagation 
of the official ideology became an important element in the curriculum...Historical 
material, for example, was selected to illustrate exclusively the Marxist point of view..." 
 
     Ash (2002: 30) mentions the effects of  what he terms a "socialist education" and claims that 
it instilled such a sense of egalitarianism in a generation of workers that the mounting 
inequalities of the 1970s were perceived as deeply offensive to most Poles. This awareness also 
fueled anger toward the Communist Party. Poles indoctrinated to believe in a 'classless society' 
and to work for the good of the collective were becoming more and more frustrated as they stood 
in lines to buy bread while Party bureaucrats apparently had access to all available consumer 
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items. Informant "J" told me that during his time in Poland special stores existed in Warsaw and 
other major cities that sold practically any item one might find in a U.S. supermarket; the only 
'catch' was that one had to have a Communist Party card to shop there.  
     An Associated Press article of July 20, 1973 describes an intensification effort in Polish 
elementary schools. The article carried by the Pittsburg Post Gazette (and many other AP papers)  
says that plans were underway to extend school hours to 6:00 or 7:00 pm. The Primate of the 
Polish Catholic Church, Stefan Wyszynski, was reported to be denouncing the government 
proposal as he believed it was an attempt to  isolate children from traditional Catholic schooling. 
The Church conducted its own classes for elementary age children  in the late afternoon, he said, 
and the extended public school time would prevent children from attending church sponsored 
classes.  
     The above item is an example of the alternative schooling that many Poles received in 
addition to public schooling. In the section in this thesis on the role of samizdat in facilitating 
Solidarity, other alternative forms of education will be discussed. 
     The above described incidences of socialist indoctrination through education are exactly in-
line with Lynd's (1945) discussion of "planned social solidarity." On page 188 he describes the 
special emphasis the Communist Party placed on education in all its domain. Literacy under 
Marxist-Leninist inspired socialism, Lynd claims, was not defined by simply a population that 
reads a daily newspaper, but by "...a population universally engaged in study." This tradition was 
used in a very positive manner, obviously, as an educated population is a benefit to any nation. 
However, it was also used as a tool of indoctrination toward fraternal proletarian solidarity, 
which, ultimately, this section contends, facilitated Solidarity in its social cohesion.  
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D. Fraternal proletarian solidarity was generated by direct propaganda and "re-education":  
     In order to influence the general population (those not enrolled in some type of school) the 
Communist Party of all Sovietized nations spent a great deal of time, effort, and money in mass-
media propaganda. The aim of this, as in general public schooling and college courses, was 
creation of a collectivist attitude and loyalty to the socialist cause. For older citizens this was 
known as "re-education."  This paper contends that this kind of  propaganda was so prevalent for 
so many years that it in effect socialized Polish citizens with a collectivist attitude that facilitated 
the cohesion of Solidarnosc. 
     Lynd (1945) describes the "approved practices" or common practices of ideological 
indoctrination that were applied in the Soviet Union and several authors (such as, Coste 1951; 
Havel 1985; and Kovaly 1989) describe the dissemination of  Soviet propaganda in Eastern 
Europe in very similar terms. Kubik's book, The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of 
Power, (1994) describes in detail the attempt to re-make Polish culture in the Soviet image 
through symbolic propaganda. Following is Lynd's description and some examples of application 
of this technique. 
     Lynd describes "re-education by propaganda as follows" : 
 
" Use everywhere and on all occasions of pictures of Stalin, Lenin, and to a lesser extent, 
three or four other leaders, all Communist party members. This is reminiscent of icon 
worship." 
"Use of quotations from Marx, Lenin, Stalin in the authoritative  ipse dixit sense to 
confirm the rightness of Soviet policies...it is difficult to find a single important statement 
on any subject that does not contain a reference to some statement by "Comrade Lenin." 
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"Re-education by propaganda and participation: media of communications are closely 
controlled by the Party and carry a tremendous volume of propaganda...an elaborate 
network of "local correspondents" ...is continually developed by the press" (Lynd 1945: 
191- 193.) 
 
     Lynd elaborates that these "local correspondents" are  paid if their news stories align with 
official Party ideology or are referred to "the appropriate commissariat" if otherwise. 
     The aim of all this, Lynd states, is to create a society that is, "...organized to do big things in 
the public interest and to secure wide, active co-operation in doing these things, and it aims to 
enlist everybody and to find concrete roles for everybody. In other words, there is a very positive 
structure for social aggregation" (193.) This is the "positive theory of goals and organization" as 
used by Lynd, in a nutshell; "aggregative devices" are constantly used to create social solidarity 
and are reinforced, in praxis form, by utilizing "the masses" to build socialism. This refers not 
only to  ideological building socialism but to physically building the infrastructure of socialist 
communities (true praxis, that is, "practical action.") For example, Lynd describes "mass 
activities" such as "volunteer subway building, road building, city reconstruction, etc., in free 
rest-day time" (192.) This is said to be in honor of Lenin's notion of volunteering on week-ends 
to do the  manual work of "building socialism in one country." (Ash 2002: 324, cites a Polish 
joke on this subject: "Rabbi, can one build socialism in one country? "Yes, my son, but one must 
live in another." This reflects the general feeling of Poles in the 1980s that the USSR was 
exploiting them economically.)  
     Likewise, Coste (1951) in his article, "Propaganda To Eastern Europe," clarifies that younger 
people were more susceptible to Soviet propaganda (which he calls, "the most systematic and 
tenacious conditioning ever known" [624]) but that anyone who actually experiences the reality 
of its enforcement by the Soviet military has a different picture altogether. This is, again, the 
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dual notion (as with Penn, above) that Marxist ideology in Eastern Europe resulted in 
strengthening social cohesion within Sovietized nations but was ineffective in generating loyalty 
to the USSR. Coste (642) states that one idea is "...constantly hammered into their minds" [into 
the minds of the people in Soviet dominated nations], and that is, "the victory of the Soviet and 
communism is inevitable." Yet, communist propaganda and communist achievements, he states, 
had  won very few Eastern Europeans over to the ideology (Coste was writing in 1951.) By the 
1980s, especially in Poland, not even the propagandists believed the propaganda; in fact, the 
resistance to the excessive propaganda, was perhaps yet another factor in strengthening social 
solidarity in favor of Solidarnisc. 
     Vaclav Havel writes very eloquently about the power of Marxist-inspired propaganda in his 
book, The Power of the Powerless (1985.) He acknowledges that the Soviet system, albeit a 
"dictatorship of a political bureaucracy," as he calls it, was originally founded on principles with 
great meaning and great potential (he specifies: "I am thinking of the proletarian and socialist 
movements of the nineteenth century" [25].) The ideology of this system, Havel says, 
 "...in its elaborateness and completeness, is almost a secularized religion. It offers a 
ready answer to any question whatsoever; it can scarcely be accepted only in part, and 
accepting it has profound implications for human life...In an era when...people are being 
uprooted, and alienated and are losing their sense of what this world means, this ideology 
inevitably has a certain hypnotic charm. To wandering humankind it offers an 
immediately available home; all one has to do is to accept it, and suddenly everything 
becomes clear once more, life takes on new meaning, and all mysteries, unanswered 
questions, anxieties, and loneliness vanish" (Havel 1985: 25.)  
 
     Of course, Havel goes on to describe the negative consequences associated with this ideology, 
its "monstrous corruption" by Joseph Stalin, and the hypocrisy of the Soviet bureaucracy. The 
point is that this ideology was very effective and very convincing to millions of people in the 
Soviet Union and in the Soviet Bloc, at least in its potential as a unifying force for the working 
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class; it did, as Khrushchev stated, create "fraternal proletarian solidarity." The great irony is that 
the leaders of the democratic movements in Eastern Europe, such as Havel and Walesa, 
personified the collectivist attitude of socialist ideology in their plea for social solidarity in 
overcoming a socialist system that had went terribly wrong. They used fraternal proletarian 
solidarity as a base to build their social movements on. 
 
E. Fraternal proletarian solidarity provided an identity base for "konkretny activists" : 
     In his book, A Carnival of Revolutions, Padric Kenney describes the internal pluralism of 
Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and the work of the "konkretney activists" in organizing 
opposition to the various Communist governments in the Soviet Bloc. Solidarnosc was not alone 
in the struggle for social and political change. A variety of groups with varying agendas (such as, 
environmental activists, anti-nuclear activists, peace activists) and different nationalities were 
inspired by the Polish Movement and made their own contributions toward change. Keeney calls 
these groups konkretney activists:  
"Konkretney meant focused on reality: on everyday problems and on realistic, effective 
means of overcoming, or at least exposing them. Konkretney meant someone who knew 
how to organize a demonstration, or to use the media, and who could implement ideas 
effectively. The opposite...would be someone who enjoyed analyzing the communist 
system or the opposition and believed in the power of a devastating critique. Truth - 
about the workings of the communist system or the promise of, say, liberalism - was for 
such activists a prerequisite to opposition. It had became clear,  though, by the mid-1980s 
that the time of the "truth tellers" had passed, giving way to what I call the konkretney 
generation" (Kenney 2002: 13.) 
 
     Of course, the konkretney generation was in debt to an earlier generation of activists who 
could only battle the communist system ideologically; this tradition even went back to Russian 
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samizdat writers in the 1930s (to be discussed in detail in the section of this thesis on samizdat.) 
The konkretney generation was taking advantage of a political opportunity created, in part, by all 
other forms of activism that had went before it. The point here, for this thesis, is that a common 
identity - again, a fraternal proletarian solidarity- across borders and across generations united 
the huge numbers of supporters in all of Eastern Europe for the Solidarity Movement and for 
Kenney's "carnival" of revolutions. 
     Additionally, this section contends, the millions of people united in opposition to the Soviet 
Union - united by the fraternal proletarian solidarity the Soviet Union intentionally created - 
were also united by a "popular ideology," to use George Rude's term. 
     As described in the theoretical section of this thesis, in the "collective behaviors" section, 
Rude's idea of popular ideology applies to the evolved ideologies of the Solidarity movement. 
That is, Solidarity was, ideologically, built on collectivist ideas and on collective action (as were 
the strategies of Keeney's konkretney activists.) The ideology emerged from the intersection of 
direct experience and formal proposition (from life in the Peoples' Republic of Poland under 
"scientific socialism.") Just as Rude  states, "...derived ideas, in the course of transmission and 
adoption suffer a transformation...its nature will depend on the social needs or the political needs 
of the classes that are ready to absorb them" (Rude 1995: 30.) The praxis of the konkretney 
generation was built on the ideological dissent of earlier activists, just as Solidarity's ideology 
was built on the original ideology of socialism as a collective liberation of humankind (as per 
Havel, above, in his clarification to the "proletarian and socialist movements of the nineteenth 
century.") Thus, fraternal proletarian solidarity not only facilitated Solidarnosc in creating a pre-
existing social solidarity, it also contributed to identity formation and ideological similarities 
across national borders and across generations. It was expressed in a unity of purpose that could 
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have never evolved in a plural, individual-oriented society such as the U.S. Ironically, a socialist, 
collectivist ideology facilitated the downfall of a Communist government. 
 
F. Fraternal Proletarian Solidarity Provided A Unifying Worker Identity: 
       Informant "AF" was very critical of the former Communist government in Poland (as 
evidenced throughout this paper by his negative comments) which he equated with the 
Communist government in the Soviet Union. He felt the Polish government had simply been an 
extension of Moscow, and that the post-WWII regime had been nothing short of an occupation 
by a foreign power. I asked "AF" about his feelings toward the Russian people in general. One 
may assume, from the historical record of conflict, wartime atrocities,  mistrust between the two 
countries, and from the obvious exploitation of Poland by Russia throughout the post-WWII era, 
that there would be a general animosity toward Russians. "AF's" surprising answer, I believe, 
was an indication of the effectiveness of the creation of fraternal proletarian solidarity even 
across national boundaries.  His answer also reflects a cultural identity closely tied to a personal 
identity as a worker (however, other informants did voice active hostility not only toward the 
Soviet system but also toward Russian people in general):  
 
"Well, hostility toward Russia was just toward the government. Of course terrible things  
- from history - Katyn, Warsaw - but this was Stalin who did these things. And after 
WWII he set up Communist party here. The Russian people - the Polish people - you 
know, we are Slavic. You know the saying, "the Slavic Soul"...what it means? We are 
brothers - we are working people - we have suffered together -  only their government 
was using us. Of all things  I am - good or bad, right or wrong - I am Slavic - I am a 
working man. " 
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     Kotkin (1997: 150) mentions the "centrality of labor in personal identity" as an attitude 
purposely cultivated within "the socialist city," or "the Soviet city." Kotkin notes that this 
particular city type, though difficult to specify exactly, was exemplified in planned industrial 
cities, with an objective of "...maximum socialization of everyday life" (116.)  "AF's" comments 
certainly reflect the intended fraternalism and his life-experiences in the industrial 
neighborhoods of Gdansk may be the source of his attitudes. 
      Gdansk's infrastructure was planned and built, not only for "maximum socialization of 
everyday life," but for maximum efficiency of armies of industrial workers. Worker housing was 
built, quite literally, up to the perimeter walls of the shipyards. Pedestrian bridges 16 foot wide  
carried masses of workers across railroad right-of-ways to the industrial facilities built along the 
Baltic Coast. "Superblocks" of Soviet-era apartment buildings, roughly built of poured concrete -  
gray, still unpainted, and streaked black in the dirty snow by coal dust from a nearby power plant  
(the coal-fired plant being located within the city limits) were still occupied in 2010.  In this 
black and white world, only clotheslines of frozen laundry on apartment balconies added color. 
Informant "AF" told me the apartments have no washer and dryer facilities and laundry is done 
in the kitchen sink. The buildings do not have parking lots as industrial workers living in the 
superblocks were transported to the coast by mass rail transportation. In short, the coastal area of 
Gdansk exemplified the "planned socialist city," and in such material conditions the ideological 
notion of fraternal proletarian solidarity was intentionally cultivated and workers' personal 
identity revolved around this construct. This identity, I contend, was a facilitating factor in the 
success of Solidarity. 
     In relation to "AF"s comments, above, Informant "Z" likewise expressed contempt not only 
for Russia but also for Germany. Still, "Z" , like "AF" criticized only these nation's governments, 
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not the citizens, and like "AF" noted how Poles and Russians "understand each other," from 
common experiences: 
"...Russia had always imperialistic 'appetite' and it never will change. For country like 
Poland is still very dangerous. Especially with our second 'lovely' neighbors 
Germany...both treat Poland like second category - like less of a nation. We must be wise 
with our politic with these two! But we have good relations with the ordinary people - I 
think so, yes - Russian people - we know them - we understand them. Only politic is 
awkward." 
 
G.  Fraternal proletarian solidarity was inadvertently intensified by equality of conditions: 
     Unlike the economic segmentation in advanced capitalist societies, in which a huge pay 
gradation and very dissimilar living conditions coexist (as in the U.S. with compensation ranging 
from minimum wage to millions of dollars per year), in The Polish Peoples' Republic nearly 
everyone (except high-ranking Party members)  was frustrated by low pay, poor working 
conditions, and shortages of basic consumer goods. Thus, the huge industrial working class (and 
nearly all other workers) were united by their "common poverty" and by their opposition to the 
government which they blamed for their poverty. The capitalist idea (often a myth used to justify 
inequality and/or as an incentive to motivate harder work) that better economic conditions 
existed for those who worked hardest, were most skilled or talented - as supposedly evidenced by 
great differentiations of conditions in capitalist nations - did not pertain to Poland; Poles were 
basically all poor and no amount of self-initiative was going to elevate their condition, as 
evidenced to them by the general poverty of the country as a whole. Informant "B" commented 
on this: 
"We were supposed to be classless, but it was building of strong classes - a small elite 
class and everybody else. The Party people had all they wanted - the rest of the people 
got by - sometimes, I don't know how they lived. Everyone was in the same package. 
University professors made same salary as plumber or laborer. All in economic trouble. 
This hurt the Party - the people saw it was all lies. Because they (the common people) 
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were all together in this. My pay was so small that I had to sew clothing at nights to make 
a living - and work all day too. 
 
Interviewer asks: "So the idea of classless society - it must have backfired on the Party?"  
 
"Thinking back, a lot of things backfired on the party - yes it did! Making everyone equal 
allowed everyone to unite with each other. I remember, factory workers going to 
mandatory 'cultural events' - made by the Party - to teach their ways. But some of the 
events - what they saw in a movie or play, or were taught in a class - well, this they used 
to fight against the Party! (Laughs) 
 
 
      Thus, the creation of a "classless society," a general Marxist-Leninist goal, in effect backfired 
against those who had sought to create it (the Party) as the common poverty of the large working 
class was a major source of frustration that led to the protests, riots, strikes, and eventually to the 
demands of the Gdansk Agreement.  Poland, as a whole, became a "class in itself and a class for 
itself,"  to use the Marxist terminology. This seldom happens in a plural society as too many 
competing ideological claims and economic classes constantly interact. For example,  in the U.S. 
(currently),  local trade unions are lucky  if they can achieve a regional social solidarity (as in the 
territorialism of U.S. construction unions); national unity would be unthinkable as structural 
conditions and general worker attitudes do not facilitate it as they did in Poland in the 1980s. 
Social solidarity among the working masses was  inadvertent intensified through the general, 
nationwide disillusionment with the Communist Party, and  the State sponsored unions; 
ironically, the intention had been to generate loyalty and solidarity toward the State. 
       Eventually, as Solidarnosc became well organized, the government of the Peoples' Republic 
of Poland may have became the 'official' opposition.  In December, 1981, Solidarnosc was 
outlawed and Poland came under martial law; this further ensured "equality of conditions," albeit 
in a very negative form. During this time, the Polish government may have even been considered 
an oppositional movement, in that it not only opposed Solidarnosc, legally and ideologically, but 
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it actively worked to discredit it.  Solidarnosc members, even under martial law, made rather 
innovative protests against the Polish government. This scenario seems to support the notion of 
an ongoing movement and a counter movement.  Both informants "PZ" and "JB" described this: 
 
PZ: "The news - the State ran the news, you know -  tried for years to make like Walesa 
was a gang leader or trouble maker. He was the one stirring up the strikes. The strikes 
were why the country was in financial trouble. They tried to tell us  - of course, we knew 
this was wrong. It was a stupid thing to do. That only made us more against the 
government. We knew the strikes were against the Communist system and they were not 
the cause of the problems. When they did things like this it just made the union 
stronger...Finally, they put Poland under military orders..." 
 
Interviewer says, "This was martial law? The time under martial law - Right?" 
 
PZ: "Yes. And all Solidarnosc was outlawed - people jailed. And if you protest the police 
sprayed you with a colored water - bright blue. It stained your coat, your clothes - you 
cannot get if off. If people ran away - before arrest - they may find you from that blue 
stain. You could not buy new clothes everyday - no new coat. If police saw you, they 
would arrest you later.  
     But we remembered those arrested. We lit a candle every evening and put it in the 
window. Then other people did this. It was to show solidarity - resistance against martial 
law - to encourage each other and to keep Solidarnosc alive." 
 
 
 
Factor 3)   The  Solidarity Movement was facilitated and maintained (particularly during 
its outlawed period when Poland was under martial law) by persistent and intentional use 
of "samizdat" or "bibula" (illegal, self-published communications) as well as by other 
nonconventional means of communication. 
 
     This section describes the role of samizdat publishing (illegal, self-publishing), curriers, 
messengers, and "bill-stickers," (activists who posted organizational announcements) and "flying 
universities" (underground schools) in facilitating the success of the Polish Solidarity Movement. 
It also contends that samizdat publishing evolved, over time, in technological complexity but 
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devolved in ideational content.  Early versions were often hand-copied,  philosophical or 
ideological critiques of the Soviet system, the content thereof comprehensible only to academics. 
Activists of the Solidarity Movement created much more utilitarian versions -  a  "samizdat of 
the People," so to speak. They effectively used this medium as a practical resource mobilization 
tool, whereas the early versions were simply dissent through abstractions or theoretical 
arguments.      
      In a 1988 paper, The Solidarity Movement In Relation To Society And The State: 
Communication As An Issue Of Social Movement, Kuczynski and Nowak  (128 - 129) draw on 
Touraine (1965, 1973, 1974, 1981) in arguing that societal change is more than benign 
adaptation but involves an intentional creative process. For effect, Kuczynski and Nowak 
mention the introduction of Touraine's 1981, The Voice and the Eye: The Analysis of a Social 
Movement, which begins with the Marxian phrase, "Men Make Their Own History."  As 
Kuczynski and Nowak observe, Touraine leaves out the well-known second part, that men 
cannot make history as they please or under circumstances of their own choosing, (Marx in 
Calhoun et al. 2007) signaling to us that history can be made intentionally, and as Kuczynski and 
Nowak argue, is done so, in the modern era, through class conflict expressed "... mainly through 
the actions of social movements "(130.) 
       The intended historical change as expressed through the overall aim of  the Solidarity 
Movement was the restoration of human rights and democratic government in Poland.  This 
process (officially) began with the Gdansk Agreement of August 31, 1980, which called for the 
establishment of trade unions independent of State control, guaranteed freedom of expression 
and of publication, and union access to the mass media outlets as to inform the general public of 
the organization's demands (Ash 2002).  The method of Solidarity - the intentional creative 
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process by historical actors- to use Touraine's terminology, was to change history/society by 
building, first, an ideological alternative to the Soviet system - a system that had dominated 
communication, education, and the  economy in Poland since the end of WWII.  Solidarity's 
goal, as several interviewees commented, was "evolution not revolution" (ewolucja nie 
rewolucja); creation of a "critical mass" of followers, in true solidarity, in peaceful opposition to 
the State. Thus, as Kuczynski and Nowak argue, "...Solidarity's key issue was to influence 
communication process" (128). They add that it was "...a social movement of public opinion 
independent of the state," and that, "...the most valuable heritage of Solidarity remains the 
independent circulation of ideas connected with underground public opinion..."(142).  This 
section describes how these ideas were circulated and how the ideas and their dissemination 
facilitated Solidarity's success. 
 
____________________________________________ 
 
     The mobilization of resources for any social movement depends on efficient and effective 
communications. From the complexities of issue framing to the mundane task of coordinating a 
strike, rally, or meeting at a scheduled time and place, modern communication systems and the 
right to use such systems are often taken for granted in liberal democracies. In the Polish 
Peoples' Republic of the 1980s, all public forms of communication were controlled by the State, 
under the direction of the "Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza", the Polish United Workers' 
Party;  this was the Polish communist party, which, "indissolubly linked" Poland and the USSR 
in December 1948 (Dziewanowski 1976: 214). In effect, "The Party" and "The State" in Poland 
were the same entity, ideologically and politically linked to Moscow.  As all open dissent against 
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the Party and its ideology was suppressed, the networking, organizing, and communications 
necessary for mobilization of labor, time, and material resources was extremely hindered.  As the 
State controlled communications, obviously, there was little possibility of using conventional 
communications with the intent to generate collective action against the State. 
     Additionally, in the 1980s, current personal technological conveniences (such as cell phone 
networks, email, computer printing, etc.) were non-existent in Poland, constituting an additional 
hindrance to mobilization (relative to current use of such technology.)  Thus, activists of the 
Polish Solidarity Movement were forced to devise  unconventional and innovative methods of 
communication in order to effectively coordinate the activities of their movement.  
 
General Description of Samizdat and Variations On The Theme 
     Samizdat is a Russian word that literally means "self-published," and in context, implies also, 
"in opposition" to official publications. Both informants "J" and "P" believed the word to be 
"made up," that is, a play on the word, "gosizdat," which "P" described as, "...a Soviet 
publication  promoting the Communist way." From the simple hand-copying of documents, the 
practice evolved over time in technique, style, content, and in mode of transmission.  
     In purest form samizdat referred to actual printed documents -  illegal for lack of State 
approval -  the possession of which constituted a crime in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc 
nations.  Informant "P," had spent six months in jail in 1983 for distributing samizdat in the form 
of informational bulletins at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk (now called Gdansk Shipyard, or 
Stocznia Gdanska). "P" carried the bulletins in his lunch box and passed them out to coworkers. 
He considered himself lucky, as some individuals, according to "P," spent up to three years in 
jail for this. The crime of  circulating samizdat was not limited to direct distribution by Solidarity 
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activists.  Wawro (1995) mentions a Wroclaw librarian imprisoned for lending uncensored 
materials. Informant "O" remarked that the punishment varied;  "...it was very dangerous, 
samizdat. You could have a stay in prison or in the "crazy house" after getting these books!" 
       By the late 1980s the samizdat idea had broadened to include "open" rebellion, that is, if one 
could read between the lines, so to speak. For example, informant "M" described, 
 "...cultural festivals - music festivals - and during Solidarity everyone was going who 
was a musician or was not  a musician! (laughs)... through music even, they expressed the 
need for freedom - music, which is another media from print - another means of 
expression. Also through art, through satire, through theater - theater was very important 
- yes, making fun of what was happening! It was like 'in between the lines,' you could 
read what was the truth. Between the lines was the content. The theaters were very 
popular. The people were going just to have education - to have the truth!" 
 
      Kenney (2002: 11) mentions this same phenomena: 
 
"Music outside the accepted mainstream existed in a literal underground: it spread by 
word of mouth and spawned samizdat publications and informal associations. Punk 
music, which was the most articulate in Poland and Slovenia, was the most powerful 
example. Underground music was like the church: it was not a form of opposition in itself 
but was a milieu where some people could discover opposition, and a resource (of 
contacts, and of strategies) for that opposition." 
 
     Informant  "J" mentioned  illegally recorded music (as opposed to live music festivals), 
known as "magnitizdat" ( samizdat in the form of magnetically recorded cassette tapes ) and 
translated  the lyrics of one such song called, "Music Brought Us Together," ( музыка нас 
связала).  This was, according to "J,"  a popular, though "outlawed," song in Russia during the 
late 1980s (where "J" was working at the time) which was considered "too rebellious" by State 
censors. The lyrics, however,  describe nothing more than a young person rebelling against 
parents and fleeing to be with friends to listen to music. This example demonstrates the extreme 
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form of censorship and official social conservatism common in the Soviet Union and the Eastern 
Bloc nations in this period. 
      It also demonstrates the popularity of circumventing such censorship, which had, according 
to informant "J,"  "...become rather silly...it was like a joke...how stupid was this to ban a teen-
age pop song!" Informant "O" remarked that Western music was not officially banned or illegal, 
but that it was very difficult to get (hence the popularity of "fringe" Russian bands).  Outlawed 
and "fringe" music became popular as home-made cassette copies of them were circulated from 
friend to friend.  Early samizdat texts were often hand copied and circulated in this same manner.  
Penn (2005: 165 - 166) describes "the principle of fives," a sort of 'samizdat-chain-letter,' in 
which five copies of an illegal manuscript were expected to be made by a reader, then passed to 
five friends, who would do the same. Penn states that this practice was probably learned by the 
Solidarity network from former anti-Nazi resistance participants (166). 
      "J" also mentioned, "detizdat," which implied a form of children's storybook intended, like 
gosizdat, to promote Communism. Informant "M" said  that such indoctrination  began for all 
Polish school children in the second grade, along with compulsory Russian language classes. 
Other informants described high school classes in Marxist/Leninism and business management 
classes in "State Economy."  Collectively then,  samizdat, implied dissent or opposition to this 
kind of official ideological indoctrination as well as general dissent against the State and  its 
censorship. 
      Finally, Kenney (2002: 9) mentions yet another form: tamizdat,  literature published "over 
there," in emigration. This would refer, for example, to the later works of such authors as 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, as published in exile.  
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     Philosophically speaking,  the above described versions of,  "-izdat," (that is, publishing; 
izdatel'stvo means roughly "publishing house," in Russian, as per translation by informant "J") 
appear to be a means of doing "ideological battle," in a society in which the State feels the 
compulsion to control "truth." For example, in describing the  post-WWII Polish public school 
curriculum, Informant "M" said that history was literally re-written to portray the Red Army as a 
savior and liberator of Poland. "M" described how the public school history books glorified 
Russia's role as "liberator" but neglected to mention a number of atrocities committed by the 
Soviets, such as the Katyn massacres, mass deportations, imprisonments, ("M"s grandfather died 
in a Soviet prison) and the intentional "stalling" of the Red Army at the Vistula River while 
German troops nearly burned Warsaw to the ground. Informant "M" said, 
"In the textbooks I never learned of this. The whole history, literature, had to be re-
written after the war by people who were brought to Poland from Moscow. They were 
trained in Moscow how to do this. They redesigned information in the textbooks."  
            Interviewer asks "M":  "You mean they rewrote the school textbooks?" 
"Oh, yes! They re-wrote the history books! They re-wrote everything!"  
 
     This practice was so common, in the USSR proper and in all of its "sphere of influence,"  that 
it had a name: lakirovka, which Tokes (1975: 7) defines as "the official meddling with the facts." 
Taubman (2003: 474) mentions that Pravda reporters sometimes even filed their reports before 
events actually occurred, and would scramble to change noticeable details, such as weather 
conditions, in attempt to maintain the illusion of real reporting.  
     Apparently the practice of lakirovka, and its effect on daily news reporting, was commonly 
know by citizens. Informant "J" spoke about enduring  many shortages, "But we were never 
short of toilet paper - Pravda was sold every day!" (Pravda, of course being the Russian 
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newspaper whose name translates ironically as, "truth.") "And Trybuna Luda", ( jokingly 
referred to as the "Polish Pravda", actually translated as "The Peoples Tribune"), "J" commented,  
"was a very good paper - very good to start fires with!" 
     Informant "A" commented on the State's  attempt at total control of information, from school 
curriculum to radio and TV content: 
"There was a minister of education responsible for sovietizing of Polish education and 
culture. Everything had to fit the Communist ideology - if history did not fit they just 
changed it! Yes, they were trying to change our way of thinking  - either by fear or by 
propaganda in schools and on TV. And you could not see a movie or hear music or radio 
or TV from Western Europe  - they kept it blocked. You see that big hill where the cross 
is on? (he points to a hill overlooking Gdansk, called Gradowa Wzgorze) There was 
tower up there that blocked all radio and TV - all you get is what that tower sends - 
nothing else!" 
 
     The point here is that citizens of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were isolated from the 
outside world and from objective realities by blatant manipulation of all forms of 
communication. Even the most mundane printed items had to pass official State inspection. For 
example, Kubic (1994: 42) states that, "In the 1970s in Poland every printed text (including bus 
tickets) had to be approved by the Glowny Urzad Kontroli Prasy Publikacji i Widowisk (Main 
Office for the Control of the Press, Publications, and Public Performances)." Thus, in such a 
restricted society, where literally all printed material was subject to State inspection for approval, 
several alternative forms of communication arose and became important organizational tools for 
the Solidarity Movement.  
Technological Evolution Of Samizdat Publishing 
     From hand-written manuscripts reproduced a single copy at time (from Czarist days through 
the 1950s, according to Saunders, 1974 and Tokes, 1975) to the carbon-copies of the 1960s, 
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("...when samizdat came pouring out like a spring flood...", as noted by Alexander Solzhenitsyn 
1974: 252) the practice eventually progressed to small-scale print shops which turned out a few 
hundred copies of simple pamphlets or bulletins. Eventually, large-scale printing operations were 
set up.  Large presses were often hidden, as "M" recalled, in church basements.  Informant "A" 
said that small, antique hand-operated presses were often hidden in city  apartments, in barns in 
rural areas, and in the attics of both rural and urban homes.  Informant "P" said that several 
small-scale printing shops were operated in conjunction with the network of shipyards along the 
Baltic Coast. "P" said the presses used home-made ink made from laundry detergent and black 
paint taken from the shipyards. These produced informational and organizational literature for 
Solidarnosc, as well as strike bulletins and the reports on negotiations of the Gdansk 
Agreements. "P" said they also produced "samizdat how-to brochures", which told how to make 
ink, obtain large amounts of paper on the "black market" (much paper mysteriously went 
missing), and how to connect with other printers through existing social networks. 
       Like Solzhenitsyn, Wawro (1995) notes a similar "spring flood" of samizdat (she calls it a 
"veritable explosion") during and after the December 1981 imposition of martial law. Wawro 
notes the paper "Z Dnia Na Dzien" (From Day To Day), "...began publication the morning after 
martial law was imposed and was put out three times per week until 1990. The average edition of 
"From Day To Day" was four pages long, with 40,000 copies printed" (Wawro 1995:2).  
     Likewise, Penn notes that the underground newspaper, Tygodnik Mazowsze, (Regional 
Weekly) has a circulation of up to 80,000 copies and was, 
"...by far the largest circulation of all the underground newspapers and, according to all 
accounts, was the most important and popular among them. Thousands of hands created 
each issue, with typewriters, public phones, hand-delivered messages, and private 
apartments replacing the computers, office phones, telexes, and office space that had 
been confiscated in police raids. Twenty-two pages of conventional type were squeezed 
into four legal-sized pages. Dense and portable, like the underground itself, Tygodnik 
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Mazowsze offered Poles a concrete example of what uncensored news looked like" (Penn 
2005: 149). 
 
 
      A Time magazine article from December, 1977 (Starkowski),  three years before the Gdansk 
Agreements and the founding of Solidarnosc, listed six well known Polish samizdat publications: 
Opinia (Opinion) and Robotnik (The Worker) were working-class newspapers, Zapis (Record) 
was a literary quarterly popular among intellectuals, Bratniak (Fraternity) was printed by 
university students, Postep (Progress) was a magazine about the problems of Poland's farmers, 
and Puls (Pulse) dealt with censorship in the Polish movie industry. With each publication 
having circulation in thousands, and with Robotnik, in the tens-of-thousands, such large-scale 
operations could not have  gone unnoticed by government officials. Starkowski says that, 
 
 "Thus far the government has been reluctant to crack down heavily on the samizdat 
publications for fear of stirring up even more popular unrest and making martyrs of the 
underground writers. Polish officials dismiss the dissident writing as insignificant, but 
they regard its proliferation with dismay" (2). 
 
 
     However, only a few years after the above mentioned article was published, Polish officials' 
opinion of samizdat publishing was much more serious. They realized that the large-scale 
newspapers, such as Robotnik, were powerful communication and organization tools at the 
disposal of Solidarity.  They were practical too; Ash (2002: 20- 21) reports that Nowa, an illegal 
large-scale publishing house in Warsaw, was distributing "...a pocket-sized handbook giving 
instructions for dealing with the secret police." Wawro (1995:2) also mentions seeing copies of 
the book in Wroclaw and translates its title as, "Citizen and Secret Service."  "It contained laws 
guaranteeing civil rights extracted from the official Polish codes, as well as advice on proper 
behavior in encounters with police and secret police" (Wawro 1995: 2).  
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     Thus, in an effort to control Solidarity's communication and mobilization through samizdat, 
the Polish government began a major crackdown. When Martial Law was declared in Poland in 
December, 1981, not only the leaders of Solidarnosc were rounded up and imprisoned, but many 
known samizdat publishers were also arrested. Penn (2005: 101) says that the hope was "...for 
Solidarity to slip into silenced obscurity."  
      It did not, and samizdat publication continued and even increased its circulation (as 
mentioned above, Wawro cites a "veritable explosion" incited by martial law). Networks were 
broadened and new participants emerged to fill the places of those imprisoned. Penn's 2005 
book, "Solidarity's Secret," focuses on the fact that samizdat newspaper publishing was done 
almost entirely by women after the major crackdown and arrest of nearly all male participants. It 
was maintained, according to Penn, with the willful, determined aim of simply preserving the 
movement; of  intentionally not allowing Solidarity to slip into obscurity as the State had wished. 
     Thus, the intentional effort of those involved with samizdat and the technological 
advancements (from hand copying to full-scale publishing ) in the production of samizdat were  
facilitating factors to the success of Solidarity. This reflects Tourain's thesis mentioned at the 
opening of this paper: "men (in this case women) make their own history," through willful, 
intentional, creative acts. Social movements are one such act, and are prime drivers of societal 
change. 
 
 Ideational  De-evolution Of Samizdat Content  
     This de-evolution involves the content becoming less philosophical and abstract and 
becoming more utilitarian. The Polish Solidarity Movement, in effect, co-opted the Soviet 
version of dissent through literature, altered the traditional "lofty intellectual style" (as evidenced 
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by the English translations of samizdat by  Tokes [1975] and Saunders [1974] ) and made 
samizdat the "Peoples' version" of protest literature. As mentioned above, this even included 
"how-to" books, in this case, how-to deal with arrest by secret police. 
     No claim is made as to an organized content analysis of a specific body of samizdat.  
However, in conducting a very limited study of samizdat materials, a trend was noticed, as 
mentioned earlier. In content, that is, in ideational form, samizdat "de-evolved" from complex 
philosophical commentaries and Marxist-inspired critiques of the State, to simple, sometimes 
even humorous, utilitarian communications. 
      In this study, access to the huge body of samizdat literature was limited to English 
translations and to Polish informants' general descriptions of samizdat content. Informant "P," for 
example, a former employee of the Lenin Shipyard, showed many old "strajk biuletyns, (strike 
bulletins) and shipyard newspapers and described the content.  Translated compilations of Soviet 
samizdat, such as those by Tokes (1975) and Saunders (1974) were reviewed, as were "popular" 
samizdat books (several by Alexander Solzhenitsyn), MacDonald's (1981) compilation of Polish 
samizdat, essays by Poland's Adam Michnik, and many excerpts in various books and articles on 
the Solidarity Movement, nearly all of which have some reference to or excerpt from a samizdat 
publication.  Kenney's Carnival Of Revolution (2002), for example, is based (to a great degree, 
along with other sources) on a huge body of Polish, Czech, Ukrainian, and GDR samizdat 
publications, interpretations of which add to my overall understanding of the evolution of 
samizdat content. Both notions, technological evolution and ideational "de-evolution", are  
relevant as further facilitating factors toward the overall success of the Solidarity Movement. 
     As a general starting point, Saunders (1974:7) traces the origin of circulating written, 
clandestine documents in opposition to political authority (in the Russian tradition) back to the 
149 
 
time of Czarist censorship. He mentions the following items as being "privately circulated, 
usually in manuscript form: nonconformist poetry and fiction, memoirs, historical documents, 
protest statements, trial records, etc." Penn (2005: 8) substitutes the word, bibula, for the 
Russian, samizdat, citing that "...bibula had the advantage of being a Polish word."  Penn's 
sources may have used the term, bibula, in an attempt to deny or negate the Russian origin of the 
term/practice. However, informant, "M", a native of Poland and activist in the Solidarity 
Movement, did not associate bibula with samizdat; "We called it samizdat," "M" said, when 
directly asked to distinguish between the two terms. On the other hand, informant "O", also a 
native of Poland, insisted, like Penn's sources, in using the term bibula.  For consistency, this 
paper generally uses the term, samizdat. It appears that the two words are interchangeable in 
meaning, but one has "Russian overtones," which perhaps do not appeal to some Poles. 
     Although the idea of producing and distributing written documents opposing political 
authority is not unique to Soviet Bloc nations,  (for instance, underground oppositional material 
was distributed in many Nazi occupied European nations; and, technically speaking, oppositional 
documents printed during the American Revolution, such as "The Virginia Resolves," and anti-
Stamp Act tracts, could be considered "American samizdat")  there is a direct historical tradition 
of the practice in Eastern Europe which Kenney (2002: 10) describes as the language of 
"dissident intellectuals," and Oleszczuk (1982: 544) calls, "...the first tendrils of international 
cooperation by the dissidents of the area..." Oleszczuk continues (545), "There has even been a 
suggestion by Sakharov for the development of a joint human rights program on the part of the 
dissidents in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union."  
     Oleszczuk's definition of samizdat as, "...political thought of intellectuals who try to grasp the 
essentials of their countries' circumstances in order to change them" (527), is case in point; up 
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until the early '80s samizdat was generally the work of intellectuals and was written in academic 
style, or occasionally (as in the case of Solzhenitsyn's famous, One Day In The Life Of Ivan 
Denisovich) in novelistic form. Solidarity altered the samizdat tradition by producing newspapers 
and informational bulletins with the objective of informing working class people of issues 
directly affecting them (the people) and called on the people to act, in solidarity, to address these 
issues. The "intellectual versions" of samizdat had approached Soviet dominance, exploitation, 
and censorship from a  purely abstract position. 
      For example, Oleszczuk (1982: 528) describes the position taken by samizdat writers in the 
English translations by Rudolf Tokes (Tokes published a collection of samizdat writings in 1975) 
as "...posit[ing} as the basic cause of dissent the irreconcilability of Marxist egalitarianism with 
the reality of increasing social stratification." By contrast, informant "M," if  Oleszcuk's  
academic terminology is applied, 'posited the basic cause of dissent, ' to be material realities of 
everyday life, such as the fact that: 
 
"The people were starving in the cities. There was nothing on the shelves (in grocery 
stores) but tea and macaroni - that's all! Everything was gone - empty shelves!...I mean 
even like shoes, clothes, too - nothing for us!" 
 
Interviewer asks "M" if he thought that all the food and consumer goods were being 
expropriated by the Soviet Union: 
 
"I don't think - I know! I know it was! In those days was discovered the trains full of 
Polish goods - meat, butter, potatoes, other products - going east. To Russia. It was put 
into the trains, on trains was the label, "paint! 
 
 Interviewer asks, "Paint?  What do you mean?" 
 
"Like paint for houses - house paint. They want people to think the train had in it paint. 
But some railroad workers stopped the train - for some reason - and one of the cars was 
opened up, and they realized it was full of food! That lead to strikes when the people start 
to know about this." 
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     The point is, the samizdat papers in Poland published stories such as "M"s that had direct 
meaning to the people, not vague Marxist-based critiques of ideological issues, as the 
"intellectual versions" of samizdat had done. Solidarity-backed newspapers used the samizdat 
tradition to engender direct public support for its cause by acting as a genuine newspaper, not as 
a "Polish Pravda," and not as space for academic dissertation on the problems with Marxist 
doctrine. 
      Still, the content of the samizdat shipyard bulletins, for example,  produced by Solidarnosc 
was not strictly on the level of a "trade union consciousness," to use Lenin's term. Informant "P," 
who was jailed for distributing  samizdat produced by Solidarnosc commented:  
 
"This was not just about wages. This was about our freedom. It was about the whole 
nation - not just shipyard workers. This was about big changes - the demands of the 
Agreements - the Agreements of Gdansk...well, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, 
the right to strike, right to have independent trade unions free from the control of the 
State - No, not simple demands for more pay only. We wanted a better way of life in 
Poland!" 
 
 
Source of Polish Samizdat Tradition  
     This paper contends that Solidarity was the first group (in the Soviet dominated world) to 
shift the samizdat tradition from an intellectual content to a news and organizational content, and 
thus make use of samizdat as a resource mobilization tool. However, the earliest samizdat writers 
of both Poland and Russia were of the "intelligentsia" class. But to note the transformation of 
samizdat from a purely academic tradition to a form of mass communication (in effect, not only 
resource mobilization but also issue framing) is not at all to lessen the intellectual tradition of 
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those who published it; quite the contrary, this "de-evolution" was an intentional project for a 
specific purpose: the survival of Solidarity. 
       Rawin (1968) demonstrates the ideological merger between a newer, post WWII 
technological intelligentsia emerging out of the Polish working class with the traditional 'elitist' 
intelligentsia. This merger was a channel or conduit of thought that eventually linked the earlier, 
more ideological versions of samizdat thinking with the practical, concrete content supporting 
the issues of Solidarity. 
     Rawin explains that the term "intelligentsia" originated in Russia and, "...it was under Russian 
influence that the term, and the concept, came into use in Poland...", but the Western usage 
equating this term with 'intellectualism' or 'professionalism', "...does not seem to reflect its East 
European significance" (335). Rawin claims this term implies origins in aristocracy or gentry 
along with high educational status. It would imply, in its original usage, members of a highly 
educated, landed elite, perhaps more analogous, in Western terms, to a highly educated version 
of Antebellum gentry. Both informants "J" and "M" described this group of 'landed gentry'  as 
"kulaks," or upper-class, rural families ("J" used the term in reference to rural Russia and "M" in 
reference to rural Poland.) Lewin (1994: 122) describes Russian kulaks (rather negatively in 
literature he reviewed) as, "...village extortioners, the "skinners alive," those who "eat up the 
commune..." or as, "peasant entrepreneurs." As this group came into decline due to Stalinist 
collectivization of agriculture in Russia and Ukraine (starting in the 1930s) and by a shift toward 
industrialization and urbanization in Poland, "...a new strata of professionals and non-manual 
workers recruited from the impoverished gentry" [kulaks impoverished by forced collectivization 
and/or the trend to urbanization]  "were forced to leave their ancestral homes and to move to the 
city in search of employment. The core of the intelligentsia was provided by what later came to 
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be known as the 'creative intelligentsia' - writers, journalists, artists, scientists, and educators" 
(Rawin 1968: 357). However, after WWII the Communist Party (more specifically, Joseph 
Stalin) became increasingly worried that this class, formerly "well-to-do," now posed a threat to 
political solidarity. Being educated and articulate, this group had potential to disseminate its 
cause against socialism (if such an agenda actually existed or was a figment of Stalin's paranoia). 
      Thus, in Poland, after 1945, the older, traditional intelligentsia, at work in managerial jobs, 
education, and other professions was "phased out" and replaced by "...a new 'working class 
intelligentsia' - a managerial elite that would  be committed to the Marxist outlook (Rawin 364). 
This often meant that the Polish working class had an advantage, as those with "proletarian 
roots," as opposed to "kulaks," were thought by the Party to be more worthy and loyal. Informant 
"M" said that such individuals were even "spotted" a few extra points on college entrance exams. 
Early on, this policy resulted in situations in which a person with a high school education and a 
year or two of college ended up as a plant manager and another (from a kulak background) with 
an advanced engineering degree was demoted to a laborer. Obviously, this caused outrage on the 
part of the old intelligentsia and in many cases animosities existed for years against members of 
the newly  emerging "technological intelligentsia."  
     Over time, the new and the old versions of Polish intelligentsia merged combining the best 
elements of both. Rawin claims that the old version - humanistic, of 'noble origin,' with 
intellectual roots in Enlightenment philosophy "...did not disappear entirely or lose its attraction, 
but next to it appeared the model of the 'new intelligentsia' - the expert manager, usually seen as 
a first generation professional"(Rawin 1968: 368). The merger of these two groups was 
facilitated by an apparent need on the part of the younger technical intelligentsia to validate itself 
in relation to traditional status of the older traditional intelligentsia. Rawin states that, "...the 
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technical intelligentsia identifies with the traditional intelligentsia; it is from this identification, 
rather than from their occupational function, that the technical experts derive validation of their 
status " (372). Apparently this was a cultural construct carried over into post-war years despite 
communist 'modernization' of education (that is, addition of Marxist indoctrination classes at all 
levels of schooling.) 
      Thus, the post WWII Polish "intelligentsia" (intelligentja), was a "hybrid" of sorts, steeped in 
communist rhetoric yet tempered by affinity for, and an association with, the old-school 
intellectuals. This new generation (which would ultimately be the Solidarity generation) 
discarded the elitist attitude of exclusionism but retained a respect for and an interest in higher 
levels of philosophical learning attained by the traditional intelligentsia. They combined real-
world, technological problem solving - the order of the day in modern Polish universities under 
communism - with an admiration, interest, and curiosity in the intellectual world of their 
predecessors. They were the first highly educated working class generation in Poland. The result: 
this generation bridged the gap between the abstractions of traditional academic samizdat writing 
and utilitarian usage of the same; they understood samizdat as a means of furthering a concrete 
cause but they also understood the ideational significance of their work. 
     This group comprised much of the KOR (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow: Workers' Defense 
Committee) which  informant "M" description as,   
 
"...intellectuals and academics...who were working underground and helped the students 
publish (samizdat) newspapers. It was through this network (KOR) that communication 
and legal action was organized...many were lawyers, not in the party system (not 
involved with the Communist Party) and some were mad at the Party system - not 
promoted  - they couldn't be a judge or something. "  
 
 
155 
 
       This group understood the Solidarity Movement was about much more than wage increases, 
strikes, and better working conditions. They supported workers and their grievances, but also 
saw the "big picture" of much needed, long-term, societal change. When the interviewer asked 
informant "M," for example, how Solidarnosc survived despite being legally outlawed, its 
leaders jailed, the nation put under martial law, whereas during the 1980s American labor unions 
were collapsing within  a liberal democracy, "M" said: 
 
"It was not just a labor union. It was about the idea of change, political and economic 
change for the future - for the next generation - it was a vision for the future - for our 
children. Not just economic goals - not just short term goals. It had much higher goals 
and this is what held people together." 
     "We were thinking about the future - to redesign society - the whole structure. The 
Soviet Union had tried to redesign but they did it wrong! They wanted to re-shape culture 
- and they did! But it went back against them!" 
 
     Thus, the "de-evolution" of samizdat content was, as explained in the above section, an 
intentional act by a well educated generation that used the underground media as a tool for 
resource mobilization. This generation understood the deeper intellectual versions of samizdat - 
the orthodox Marxist arguments against the Leninist/Stalinist system they had grown up in - but 
they chose to bring these arguments down to concrete terms and use samizdat to fight for the 
survival of Solidarity. They even used humor in their effort. A final example as given by Keeney 
(2002: 221) will close this section. It is taken from a samizdat flyer distributed to draw support 
for striking shipyard workers at Gdansk: 
 
"Next to a large drawing of a masturbating elephant (and the slogan "Don't think only 
about yourself!") was this appeal, almost apologetically bridging two cultures:" 
 
"If you are not at this moment drunk, stoned on grass or television, or exhausted from 
love, then listen up: The Gdansk shipyard and a few other factories are on strike. You 
should give a shit, because WE - your beloved, ever-faithful, loyal friends from WIP - are 
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among those helping out. Victory in this zadyma will also be our victory...From the first 
day of the strike, there has been a support group at St Brygida's Church. Show up there. 
And if that place, or the idea of working in a group doesn't work for you, then paint walls 
[with graffiti], shout by the ship yard, vibrate, dance, or play the harmonica - but do it for 
the STRIKERS!" 
 
 
 
 
 Curriers, Messengers, "Bill-Stickers," And Other Alternative Means Of Communication 
 
 
    In their analysis of the Polish Solidarity Movement, Kuczynski and Nowak (1988) argue that, 
"...Solidarity's key issue was to influence communication processes" (128), and they offer this 
remark (along with two other main points) to support their thesis: 
 
"In the mid-1980s, the most valuable heritage of Solidarity remains the independent 
circulation of ideas connected with underground public opinion that is being nourished 
intellectually by a group with a narrowly defined ethos" (143.) 
 
 
     They are referring, obviously, to the underground publishers, but much communication was 
also carried out by word-of-mouth;  that is, by direct face-to-face interaction between Solidarity 
members as a means to coordinate events supporting Solidarity (strikes, demonstrations, 
protests) and to gather information as content for the underground papers. There were two main 
reasons for this: first, (especially relevant after martial law was declared in December, 1981) 
communications against the State and in support of Solidarity were illegal (punishable by jail 
time), and secondly, practically no form of telecommunications existed in 1980s Poland. There 
was no World Wide Web or cell phones, and desktop "computers" (the few available) were little 
more than word processors with no "sending ability." In fact, telephones were rare. Informant 
"M" said: 
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     "We had no communications. I mean zero communications during martial law. You 
couldn't travel to other cities. And there were no phones. People didn't have phones 
anyway. You might wait 25 years to have a phone in the house. And you'd never get it 
anyway - only the political people got phones. So you couldn't call anybody, you couldn't 
communicate - there were no computers." 
 
    " So, the only communication was just visiting. And during Solidarity they appointed 
special messengers - curriers - they were the ones working to make communications. It 
was the same with labor unions and student unions. They were walking, the curriers - or 
travel by train, to say that you will strike this day. That's how they got it out! The 
students actually copied this from the labor unions. As soon as the guys went on strike, 
because of Anna Walentynowicz - you know, she was the first one fired at Gdansk 
Shipyard - they started this - started the messengers."  
 
     "And you were able to pull the strikes, like the students did, on a particular day, time - 
so that all schools or all factories just stopped!  They shut them all down! And without 
communications [without technological communication] the word was spread by these 
people- the messengers - the messengers who traveled." 
 
     " The messengers worked in 1989 to bring democracy to other countries - that's how 
they met with Havel in the mountains. In their backpack were carrying the illegal 
newspapers, exchanging somewhere in the forest during talks." 
 
     Interviewer asks, "You mean during the Round Table talks? That's how the 
Czechoslovakians - Vaclav Havel - that's how they learned the news?" 
 
     "Yes, that's how news traveled in those days!" (laughs)  
 
 
     As mentioned above by informant "M,"  university students and workers alike were forming 
alternatives to State-sponsored organizations in the early 1980s.  Informant "M" had been an 
active participant in an independent student association.  Like workers, students in pre-1989 
Poland had State-sponsored unions. However, the aim of these unions was to support Communist 
Party ideology in both the workplace and in schools.  "M" remarked that both university student 
curriers and labor union curriers were indispensible to communication, because the official  mass 
media gave no coverage at all to the Solidarity Movement (Informant "JB" said that the media 
did, but  all coverage was very negative). "M" said that communication between universities and 
158 
 
labor groups in different cities was carried out by curriers but "M" also mentioned that "bill-
stickers" aided local communications. 
        "Bill-stickers" were students that simply posted signs or papers all over their towns 
containing slogans or information about Solidarity or its associated groups. The content of these 
signs may have been as simple as the date, time, and place for a march, strike,  or rally, or a 
simple slogan that informed the general public of the movement's agenda.  This was a risky job, 
as even posting such a sign could result in jail time if the bill-sticker was caught by police. 
However, it was essential for mobilization and organization, because, as "M" pointed out, all 
communications concerning the Solidarity Movement were alternatives to the official channels.  
   According to Baur and Gleicher (1953), in their article based on the Harvard Project On The 
Soviet Social System (extensive open-ended interviews with over 300 Soviet refugees) 
alternative communication in Soviet-controlled nations existed as "...an informal, unofficial oral 
communications side by side with the controlled, official media" (298), and, after citing much 
evidence to prove their point, the authors, "...feel warranted in making our earlier statement that 
unofficial word-of-mouth communication must be considered a major channel for the 
transmission of news in the Soviet Union" (300). Apparently little had changed in Soviet 
dominated Poland and other Eastern European nations over the thirty years from Baur and 
Gleicher's study until the time of informant "M"s 1980s era experience; the surest form of news, 
at least the trusted form of news, was still word of mouth communications. 
      Baur and Gleicher state that word-of-mouth communications offer to citizens living in 
censored regimes not only an alternative network but a form of release (by side-stepping 
"official" and expected  political positions) as well as a sounding board for gauging others 
opinions; in this manner, new and trusted person-to-person networks are formed. No doubt, this 
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level of trust (Bauer and Gleicher, for example,  state that even "telling a joke with the wrong 
political implications" could result in a labor camp sentence [298] ) engendered a form of social 
solidarity in itself; Solidarity's messengers would have experienced this same sort of bonding due 
to the risks they were taking in passing information under martial law. 
     Graffiti was another alternative method of communication. One informant pointed out that 
twenty years after Solidarity gained official recognition and legalization, Solidarnosc graffiti is 
still visible on buildings and walls in Gdansk.  The author of this paper saw small-scale examples 
of this at ground level but was more impressed by a gigantic string of letters, each perhaps five 
feet tall, in which "Solidarnosc" was scrawled across the gable-end of a huge building inside the 
Gdansk Shipyard. The gable faces the city of Gdansk  (as opposed to the Baltic Sea) and is 
visible for a great distance.   
     Informant "JB" mentioned still another unique form of communication. He said that after the 
signing of the Gdansk Agreements (August 31, 1980) until the enactment of martial law 
(December 13, 1981)  - that is, during the first legalization of Solidarnosc, the union was so 
coordinated that city-wide strikes could be called by the ringing of church bells. A specific time 
and date for a strike was decided upon by Solidarnosc leaders, this was relayed to the various 
churches in the "tri-cities" (Gdansk, Sopot, and Gdynia, which are located along the Baltic coast) 
church bells were rung at the decided time - and all industrial work came to a halt. This was no 
small work-stoppage; "JB" estimated  there were some 70,000  shipyard and industrial workers 
in the tri-city region at this time. This method was used in many other Polish cities as well, and 
according to "JB," Lech Walesa had once commented that Solidarnosc could literally shut 
Poland down at will, simply by the ringing of church bells.  
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     "JB" and "PZ" also described  two other unique forms of what  might be called "symbolic 
communication" during the time of martial law:  the placing of lit candles in windows of homes 
as remembrance of those arrested for activism in the Solidarity Movement, and "passive protest" 
against State sponsored news broadcasts by mass boycott. The dialogue below clarifies these 
notions: 
 
 
PZ: "... Solidarnosc was outlawed - people jailed. And if you protest the police sprayed 
you with a colored water - bright blue. It stained your coat, your clothes - you cannot get 
if off. If people ran away - before arrest - they may find you from that blue stain. You 
could not buy new clothes everyday - no new coat. If police saw you, they would arrest 
you later."  
    " But we remembered those arrested. We lit a candle every evening and put it in the 
window. Then other people did this. It was to show solidarity - resistance against martial 
law - to encourage each other and to keep Solidarnosc alive." 
 
 
JB: "Yes, they always talked shit about Walesa, about the union, on the news! They 
wanted to blame us for everything. During martial law there was 8:00PM  evening news  
- well, 20:00, military time - yes! Main news of Communist Party - that's all it was! We 
were allowed to be on the streets till 9:00PM. Was curfew, 9:00PM till 6:00AM. But, to 
show protest, we would all go out and walk the streets from 8 till 9 to show we did not 
like the news they tried to give us. Yes, we were protesting against them that way! OK - 
its 8:00PM - let's go out for walk - even if its freezing and snow to your ass deep (he 
holds his hands almost to his waist to demonstrate) - we take walk! (much laughter) 
 
 
  "Flying Universities" 
      Informant "M" described  the so-called  "Flying Universities" (uniwersytet latajacy) as 
informal, private gatherings - study groups or discussion groups  - that met with intentions of 
preserving Polish national traditions, Polish history, and, at times, even the Polish language. 
They were "flying," in that their location changed very often.  "M" said that they were revived in 
the late 1970s  in response to the earliest attempts to organize trade unions, but had been part of 
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Polish heritage for at least a century. "M" speculated that these groups first emerged under 
Russian, German, or Austrian partition of Poland prior to WWI. 
     Keen and Mucha (1994) mention a general tradition in 19th century Slavic countries similar 
to "M"s description of the Polish version. They use the term Maticas (2005: 5) which were 
private organizations devoted to cultural studies, folk traditions, education, and publishing. 
According to Keen and Mucha, the Maticas were formed as alternatives to mainstream 
universities in Eastern European countries as universities did not consider culture and traditions 
as true scholarship. A general societal tendency of 19th century Eastern Europe as noted by Keen 
and Mucha was,"...a delayed sense of national identity (and) a persistent sense of religious 
identity" (2.) Both versions - "flying universities" and "Maticas" - were apparently instrumental 
in creating and maintaining this cultural and religious identity.  During the Solidarity Movement 
these groups also acted as hubs of communication and organization. As the "flying universities"  
helped maintain the cultural identity of Poland, Solidarity linked itself to this identity as a means 
of facilitating its legitimacy. 
     Both Ash (2002: 21) and Walesa (1987: 118) mention these groups as (apparently) secular 
organizations, meeting in private apartments (Ash says the meetings had a formal name, 
Towarzystow Kursow Naukowych - "Society of Academic Courses.") Informant "M", however, 
immediately associated "flying universities" with the Church. Below is a long quote from 
informant "M" that provides a holistic picture of overall communications in Poland during 
Solidarity, as well as some background information on the notion of "flying universities." To 
"M" the Church was the center of communications; the center of traditional Poland and the 
refuge where new Poland was to be born out of the struggle for Solidarity: 
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     "People were going to churches for the "flying universities" - underground schools - 
teaching the true history of Poland. During the partition time when there was no Polish 
language they had classes in Polish language. So Church was instrumental many times in 
the history of Poland."  
  
     Interviewer asks, "You mean Polish language was outlawed at one time?" 
 
     "Oh yes! More than once - because you have to learn occupants language - which 
were Russia, Austria, Germany- And they didn't want the people to speak Polish 
anymore. They want to change the peoples' cultures, and what culture was kept was 
religious culture." 
 
     Interviewer says, "You mean this was long ago - not during Solidarity?" 
 
     "During the partition time, when Poland didn't exist at all as independent country - this 
was before first world war." 
    "But it was always the Church that kept us alive - kept alive language, folk beliefs, folk 
art. And the language - well, Mass was always in Latin, but the teaching and religious 
classes were in Polish." 
    "The dissident press was there too [inside some churches]. When I was a student we 
had meetings, sometimes I went, it was like evening Mass. But it was underground, in the 
basement - special teachings, of students in the true way - true history again. Which we 
couldn't have otherwise. And also, it let us know what was going on in Poland, what the 
workers were doing." 
     "All of the knowledge was passed - not -  through mass media because that was 
censored - not - through phones, because they didn't exist - it was all through the Church 
- through "flying universities," teaching after mass, students meeting to produce illegal 
newspapers - samizdat. Yes, that is how Solidarity was kept alive!" 
 
 
     Informant "PN" seemed to believe that the "flying universities" had been  "agitation groups" 
rather than places that maintained Polish traditions. "PN" said: 
 
"The priests were the only ones who could criticize the Party and get away with it. Some 
priests even wanted violent actions - some were radical and wanted revolution. In one 
town they got the people so stirred up that the police had to restore order. I think these 
groups were doing more to stir up anger than teaching Polish culture!"  
 
 
    Informant "JB's" opinion of "flying universities" was more in line with that of "M." He 
believed they had been very positive contributions to maintaining Polish tradition and he 
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especially emphasized the role they played in facilitating communications. However, he 
associated the groups with Solidarnosc - the labor union - rather than with the church. "JB" 
commented: 
"Many people were interested in this during Solidarity time. Meetings could not get all 
the people in the building - everyone came. Solidarity leaders were not paid anything 
then - all were volunteers. If they had a day off, they worked for the union." 
 
Interviewer  asks "JB," "You mean Solidarnosc conducted the meetings? The uniwersytet 
latajacy?  
Informant "AF" clarified the point to "JB," to be sure he understood interviewer's attempt 
to say "flying universities" in Polish. 
 
"Yes," "JB" replied, Solidarnosc had meetings of information for the people. There they 
talked about the movement, the Church, the union - what ever needed to keep alive the 
struggle. During martial law this was especially dangerous. People were took to jail for  
this." 
 
     Although  "JB" apparently understood  the "flying universities" as extensions of Solidarnosc, 
and tools of the union's organizing scheme, he made an interesting comment that partially 
attributes the movement's success to Poland's collective national character. "JB" said: 
 
"This could not have happened anywhere else (speaking of the Solidarity Movement in 
general). Why it happened right here in Poland ? How we managed to do it? Well, I'll tell 
you.  Generations of Polish have had to fight. To fight against different governments - 
different nations who want to take over our country. It couldn't have happened in Russia 
or Germany - it is not their history to fight against the government -  but to follow it! 
(much laughter from "JB" and "AF.") 
 
 
 
     The informants apparently had different perceptions of the notion of "flying universities."  
Regardless of the exact nature of the groups, it is apparent that they facilitated the success of 
Solidarity by providing direct communication and networking necessary for mobilizing the 
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movement and  by perpetuating Polish cultural traditions. Additionally,  as "JB"s comments 
demonstrate above, they also may have also helped to create a Polish national identity.  As 
Solidarity aligned its frames with Polish culture, these groups worked to maintain knowledge of 
this culture, and helped create a Polish identity that served to unite Solidarity activists and to pull 
others into their social networks. 
 
Summary 
     To reiterate,  this section contends that the above mentioned communications methods -  by 
messengers, curriers, and bill-stickers, by samizdat publishing, through "flying universities," and 
other innovative means -  were essential to the success of Solidarity as they allowed for the  
mobilization of resources through the transfer of information necessary for organizing collective 
action.  They also acted as trusted sources of  news in contrast to official (State censored) 
sources. These unconventional methods of communication countered the State's "monopoly on 
truth" and played a very significant part in Solidarity's success. The interview data excerpts 
provide a direct description from movement participants, and are valuable and unique 
contributions to the oral history of the Polish Solidarity Movement, and its use of innovative 
communications within a repressive regime. Each method was a form of "creative action," to use 
Touraine's term, as movement participants "made their own history." These actions are listed 
below. The list is limited to actions directly discussed by informants interviewed for this paper; 
probably many other unique and creative actions were used by Solidarity activists: 
 
*   Creative use of samizdat publications (not restricted to dissent through ideological argument) 
as practical resource mobilization and communication tools  
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*  Practical use of samizdat in "how-to" format (books on "how- to" handle arrest by secret 
police, "how-to" do printing at home) 
 
*   Material creativity out of necessity (use of home-made ink in illegal printing, reviving antique 
printing presses, carbon-copy by manual typewriter,  personally distributing samizdat from 
workers' lunch boxes, passing organizational messages and news through face-to-face 
communication) 
 
* Creation of independent student unions 
 
*  Creatively distributing alternative ideas and outlawed communications through "bill stickers" 
and couriers 
 
*  Creative use of music, drama, and art (including graffiti) as resource mobilization tools 
(contacts and networking occurred at "oppositional" concerts and  plays during "the carnival of 
revolution" [Kenney's term; 2002]; no doubt, issue framing also occurred through these outlets)  
 
*  Creatively circumventing oppositional authority as a form of protest (spreading outlawed 
music by magnitizidat, protesting State-sponsored news broadcasts by "taking a walk" during 
broadcast time, lighting candles in remembrance of  jailed activists)  
 
*  Innovative mass communications methods (such as ringing church bells at a specific time to 
signal a strike) 
 
*  Offering alternative education through "flying universities" and all that this entails 
(preservation of culture, history, and language, networking opportunity for activists, material 
support for activists and their oppositional agenda) 
 
 
Factor 4) Solidarity was able to overcome severe limits to resource mobilization by use of 
super-effective  cultural/ ideological framing. 
 
      As discussed in the Introduction of this thesis, Solidarity was forced to rely on 
unconventional methods of resource mobilization due to the many limitations it faced in the 
Poland of the 1980s. This paper contends that by aligning the movement's agenda with 
established cultural and ideological constructs, the difficulty of resource mobilization under an 
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oppressive regime was greatly facilitated. As one informant put it, "We didn't really have to do 
that much organizing; Solidarity organized itself, because the people were ready for it." The 
following sections will demonstrate the effectiveness of linking a social movement to deeply 
held and emotionally charged beliefs:   
A.  Solidarity linked its ideology and its intention with that of the Polish Catholic Church: 
     More precisely, Solidarity linked itself to Pope John Paul II and John Paul crafted his 
message to facilitate success for Solidarity. It can be argued that the ideology of the Solidarity 
Movement as a whole and of Solidarnosc as a labor union was the ideology of Pope John Paul II, 
and the agenda of both the Pope and of the movement were the same. Woodward (2005: 38 - 39) 
remarks on the power and legitimacy the Pope brought to the movement: 
"He (Pope John Paul II, Karol Wojtyla) saw...that a unified Catholic Church, with its 
deep roots in Polish history and culture, was the only institution that stood up to a 
totalitarian state. Yuri Andropov, head of the Soviet secret police - the KGB - was right 
when he warned Polish leaders in 1979 that they had made a big mistake in allowing the 
Polish pope to return to his homeland. Wojtyla's concept of "solidarity" became the 
banner under which the Polish workers rallied and eventually wrested power from 
communist overlords. By awaking the latent "Pan-Slavism" of Eastern Europe, "this Slav 
pope," as he called himself, boldly challenged the legitimacy of communist 
governments." 
 
    The encyclicals of September 14, 1981, Laborem Exercens (On Human Work), and of June 2, 
1985, Slavorum Apostoli, (The Apostles Of The Slavs) are in effect elaborations on two general 
themes preached by the Pope and pursued by Solidarity. A website of The United States 
Conference Of Catholic Bishops (www.nccbuscc.org/pope/writings/html) gives the full text of 
these encyclicals in English. 
      In his book, A Way Of Hope, Lech Walesa mentions that he was present in Rome, on his first 
visit to meet with the Pope, when the Laborem Exercens was being written. Walesa says he 
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spoke with Pope John Paul concerning his (the Pope's) backing of Solidarity which the Pope 
declared to be, "...a common impulse to promote the moral good of society" (164.) Their 
discussion shaped Solidarity's ideology and agenda, and Walesa directly states, "I can say, 
therefore, that I was present at the birth of this document (the Laborem Exercens) which points 
the way to some long-term solutions to the difficult problem of labor" (165.) 
     First, are the  themes which  include "the dignity of labor," and  "the priority of labor over 
capital," (regardless if the capital is owned by the State or privately owned) as detailed in the 27 
chapters of the Laborem Exercens, and include chapters titled: Worker Solidarity, Work and 
Personal Dignity, The Priority of Labor, and The Importance of Unions. A reading of these 
reveals an obvious aim at the injustices of the Communist Party in Poland (though given in 
generic terms) but does so in what can be considered "Marxist language;" the Pope was 
condemning the hypocrisy of a socioeconomic system which claimed to be liberating but was 
not. For example, in chapter 14 of Laborem Exercens, under the  subtitle, "III. Conflict Between 
Labor and Capitol In The Present Phase of History  14. Work and Ownership," Pope John Paul 
II writes:  
"...merely converting the means of production into State property in the collectivist 
system is by no means equivalent to "socializing" that property....They cease to be the 
property of a certain social group, namely the private owners, and become the property of 
organized society, coming under the administration and direct control of another group of 
people, namely those who, though not owning them, from the fact of exercising power in 
society manage them on the level of the whole national or the local economy." 
 
     And in the same encyclical, under the subtitle, "II. Work and Man  8.Worker Solidarity," he 
discusses impoverishment due to "proletarianization" (using that exact Marxist terminology in 
his writing): 
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"...the condition of social groups... and conditions of living are undergoing what is in 
effect proletarianization.  ...the "poor" appear under various forms...in many cases they 
appear as a result of the violation of the dignity of human work: either because the 
opportunities for human work are limited as a result of the scourge of unemployment, or 
because a low value is put on work, and the rights that flow from it, especially the right to 
a just wage and to the personal security of the worker and his or her family." 
 
     Luxmoore (2005: 14A) notes the Pope's use of Marxist theory to disclaim the Leninist version 
of Marxism, saying that,  
 "...Father Wojtyla had become unusual among Polish priests in managing to combine his 
classical Thomist training with a detailed reading of Marxism....By 1989, the wheel had 
turned full circle from 1848, when Karl Marx and Frederic Engels first identified the 
papacy in "The Communist Manifesto" as a "power of the Old Europe." In their day, 
opposing the church had been justified as a means of ridding humanity from bondage. In 
Eastern Europe, communism had transformed the Church into a symbol of human dignity 
and liberty." 
 
     Pope John Paul also used  less formal and 'non-Marxist' essays and sermons to indirectly  
disclaim the Communist Party during the years leading up to the re-legalization of Solidarity. 
Theoretical Marxism contained  utopian ideas of creating a perfect and egalitarian society on 
earth. As mentioned by Kovaly (1997: 55) the ultimate aim of communism was often implied in 
propaganda literature of the post- WWII era as,  "bringing the Kingdom of Heaven to earth." 
'True believers' thought this possible by human effort and the idea is mentioned  in a 2005 
documentary by David Hoffman, Sputnik Mania, (www.thehoffmancollection.com)  featuring 
Sergei Khrushchev, the son of Nikita Khrushchev. He is quoted as saying, "People must be 
equal. Rich must share wealth with poor and then we will build a society where everybody will 
have their share. So it was the same that Jesus Christ told 2000 years ago and he was crucified 
for this belief." Pope John Paul challenged the secular visions of utopia as demonstrated in the 
following excerpt from a 1980 message, "On Christian Vocation." 
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"When people think that they possess the secret of a perfect social organization which 
makes evil impossible, they also think that they can use any means, including violence 
and deceit, in order to bring that organization into being. Politics then becomes a secular 
religion that operates under the illusion of creating paradise in this world; but no political 
society - which possesses its own autonomy and laws - can ever be confused with the 
Kingdom of God." (Pope John Paul II in Durepos 2003:195.)  
 
     This statement may be interpreted as a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the Communist 
Party in relation to the Church, and obviously is a reference to Party-backed 'means to an end' 
that often resulted in violence. On May 13, 1981, a Turkish sniper shot Pope John Paul II three 
times as he was greeting a crowd of some 10,000 people in Vatican Square (Tanner 1981.) 
'Conspiracy theorists' still speculate that the assassination attempt was ordered by the Soviet 
Union in retaliation for the Pope's outspoken stance against communism. This stems in part from 
a statement the Pope made as he was being rushed to a hospital immediately after the shooting. 
In an article by Henry Tanner in a special edition to The New York Times (May 14, 1981), the 
Pope was quoted as saying, "How could they do it?", implying that he believed more people 
were involved than the gunman. The event martyred the Pope and his efforts to confront 
Communism, and as discussed in the next section, added 'supernatural legitimacy' to the cause of 
Solidarity.  
     Secondly, the other broad theme of the Pope was  unification of Eastern Europe, or "Pan-
Slavism," as detailed in Slavorum Apostoli. The Pope's encyclical goes into great historical detail 
in attempt to tie together those of "...Hellenic culture and Byzantine training," with  all those who  
"are Slavs at heart" (Slavorum Apostoli IV. "They Planted The Church of God"), and makes 
constant mention of the contributions of Saint Cyril, who evangelized Russia (and created the 
Cyrillic alphabet.) His (overt)  aim seems to be to unite Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman 
Catholicism as well as those of Jewish faith, and apparently Russians as well, on the grounds of a 
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shared regional and historic culture; the (not so) covert aim, as the 1985 release of this encyclical 
coincided with the beginnings of perestroika and glasnost,  may have been an attempt  at 
facilitating social solidarity across national and religious lines in anticipation of  relaxing Soviet 
political and economic domination under Mikhail Gorbachev. The Pope summarizes by quoting 
Saint Paul from the New Testament in claiming that, "...there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is 
neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus" 
(Slavorum Apostoli  III." Heralds of The Gospel".)  
     Luxmoore claims the Pope went  farther than "Pan-Slavism," and in a 1987 message in 
France, called for a, "Europe united from the Atlantic to the Urals." Luxmoore says the Pope 
"denounced the logic of Blocs and compared the Eastern and Western versions of Christianity as 
"lungs of a single body" (2005: 14A.) 
    Ash describes the same theme in a papal message nearly a decade earlier when John Paul II 
first returned to Poland (June, 1979), and gives a lyrical description of how he, "...expounded his 
personal vision under the blazing sun..." (to a ) "...vast congregation on the meadows of his 
beloved Krakow" (2002: 31.) Ash continues: 
"...he progressed across the country, addressing hundreds of thousands in Warsaw's 
Victory Square, in Gniezno, the cradle of Polish Catholicism, before the Shrine of the 
Black Madonna at Czestochowa, inside Auschwitz...In beautiful, sonorous Polish, so 
unlike the calcified official language of communist Poland, he spoke of the 'fruitful 
synthesis' between love of country and love of Christ. At Auschwitz, he gave his 
compatriots a further lesson in the meaning of patriotism, recalling, with reverence, the 
wartime sacrifice of the Jews and Russians, two people whom few Poles had learned to 
love....He spoke of the special mission of the Slav Pope to reassert the spiritual unity of 
Christian Europe, east and west, across all political frontiers" (2002:31). 
 
     These two themes, the dignity of labor, spelled out in the Laborem Exercens, and the unity of 
Europe, as detailed in the Slavorum Apostoli, became (unofficially) the condensed ideology of 
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the Solidarity Movement.  The influence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe through 
governments controlled by the Communist Party  stood in the way of realization of these goals. 
Changing this situation was not feasible by violent revolution - history had proven this. It was 
accomplished by means of long-term, peaceful, "evolution, not revolution," as quoted  by several 
interviewees, and done so with respect to the Social Gospel of the Catholic Church. The 
legitimacy accounted  to Solidarnosc  by the Pope's 1979 visit to Poland and by his messages and 
encyclicals was enormous. Lech Walesa commented on this: 
"At the moment when the Pope (John Paul II) was elected, I think I had at most 20 people 
that were around me and supported me - and there were 40 million Polish people in the 
country. However...a year after (the Pope's) visit to Poland I had 10 million supporters, 
and suddenly we had so many people willing to join the movement. I compare this to the 
miracle of the multiplication of bread in the desert" (Walesa as quoted by Luxmoore 
[2005:15A]  from a 2004 speech in Kansas City.) 
 
      However, the linkage of Solidarnosc to the Church, that is, in social movement theory terms - 
the 'alignment of their frames' - was more profound, this paper contends, than just the conscious 
aspects of the beautiful orations of Pope John Paul or the working-class fumbling of Lech 
Walesa's  impromptu speeches. The author believes that in this linkage, the activists of Solidarity 
tapped into an unconscious cultural element that greatly facilitated their agenda. This is based  on 
observations made during visits to Gdansk (as described below in a short personal observation) 
and on specific interview data obtained during the visit (described in the next section of this 
chapter.)  The following excerpt from the author's field notes attempts to capture this theme, as 
does the remainder of this chapter, which deliberately shifts to first person form for effect: 
     "Sitting in the Church of St. Mary in the heart of Gdansk -  an immense gothic cathedral with 
high vaulted ceilings, massive columns, and soaring stained glass windows, the floor paved with 
the tombs of prominent Poles going back over 1000 years - one becomes aware of the ancient 
power of the institution of the Church. This is not evident in U.S. churches.  It is the physical 
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embodiment of a continuity of power and authority that remains constant over changing political 
regimes. In an ancient church, with the skulls and bones of the Saints displayed in macabre 
artwork -  the structure itself and all it contains - is a manifestation of an ancient power that 
predates Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. Sitting in the wintertime cold of a huge, unheated, medieval 
church, still active with the prayers of the faithful and the lighting of votive candles - in this 
context, it is easy to understand why the Communist governments were so intimidated by this 
institution. As I watched old people come in off the street, bow to their knees on the stone floor, 
and pray at the altar of the Black Madonna, their breath visible in the cold dampness, I realized 
the 'new religion' of State Socialism had held little legitimacy or validity to these people in 
contrast to their traditions and emotional connections with Catholicism." 
 
 This observation was substantiated by the interview data used in the next section:  
B.  Solidarity aligned its frames with existing cultural constructs: 
     The most important of these was Solidarity's association with the icon of the Black Madonna 
of Czestochowa. I saw copies of this image on the gates of the Gdansk Shipyard in 2010 along 
with a makeshift altar, freshly cut flowers, and votive candles - evidence of  still active devotion 
on the site of the signing of the Gdansk Agreements some twenty years later. Informant "JB" told 
me, "Walesa didn't carry the Polish flag around during Solidarity times - we seldom used flag. 
We used something else. He had a pin of Our Lady of Czestochowa that he wore always on his 
jacket. Polish people know what this means!" Ascherson (1982: 8) mentions that the first time he 
ever saw Lech Walesa, "...he was scribbling autographs and scattering little colored cards of the 
Madonna of Czestochowa." Walesa constantly identified himself and the cause of Solidarity with 
this icon. 
     No other image has such condensed meaning for Poles. According to Fr. Andrezj 
Waszczenko, of Nativity Of The Blessed Virgin Mary Church, Cestohowa, Texas (established in 
1873 by Polish immigrants to Texas from Czestochowa) the icon is said to have been painted by 
Saint Luke on the surface of a table top built by Jesus Christ. Many convoluted legends tell how 
the image ended up in Poland but scholars believe it arrived there in the mid 1300s. Two legends 
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explain why the Madonna's face is black: exposure to centuries of smoky votive candles, or that 
the icon was saved from a burning church. Two cuts across the face of the Madonna are said to 
have been made by the sword during an invasion on the city of Constantinople (when the image 
was kept there.) The attacking soldier is said to have fallen over dead after the second blow. 
Many other miraculous stories are associated with the image, most of which detail how cities 
were saved in battle or people were healed from sickness through dedication to the image. Pope 
John Paul II made several pilgrimages to Czestochowa during the 1980s to pray before the icon.  
     The Black Madonna is a symbol of Polish identity, that,  like the ancient church I observed in 
Gdansk,  pre-dates any secular attempts to define Poland. Solidarnosc identified itself with this 
icon by use of it at masses held at the gates of  the Gdansk Shipyard, by use of the image in 
informational bulletins, by the carrying of the image at marches and demonstrations, and by Lech 
Walesa's constant wearing of a lapel pin of the icon. By association with the condensed meaning 
of the icon, Solidarity legitimated itself and asserted its authority far above and beyond that of 
the government of the Peoples' Republic of Poland, and for that matter, above any previous 
secular national identity (pre-Communist Poland.) Comments by informant "B" demonstrate the 
degree of reverence many Poles have for Our Lady Of Czestochowa and the belief in a great 
power associated with it: 
"Walesa always had the Black Madonna pinned on him here ("B" indicates over the 
heart.) Pope John Paul came many times to see Walesa, and many times to pray before 
Black Madonna. Czestochowa - yes - it is very special place for me - for us all. Before I 
came to U.S. friends were saying, "You should go to Czestochowa before you leave the 
country, because you don't know if ever you will be back" (to Poland.) So I did. And it 
changed - it changed my life - step by step."   ("B" pauses, overcome momentarily by 
emotion.) 
 "It never happened overnight - not right away. But was set in motion by the visit." 
"During Communist times, the movement - the Church movement - was so strong that 
people were walking - and today they are still walking - from all over Poland on foot to 
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Czestochowa. Pilgrimages - it changes you. It is a spiritual thing that is very difficult to 
describe."  
("B" now relates a story of a small phenomena observed at Czestochowa; of how 
photographs taken there at nearly dusk appeared to be in full daylight when the prints 
were developed.) 
" It is these special places that kept Poland alive in religion during times when no Poland 
existed - when during partition, before first world war - during time Communists tried to 
outlaw religion - it was kept alive  - very alive - at places like this and always in the 
Polish people. This is, of course, why Walesa used the icon. The people were ready for 
Solidarnosc, and the Church supported Walesa - there was little convincing needed!" 
 
   C. Solidarity endorsed a 'supernatural agenda.' 
 
     Pope John Paul II, Lech Walesa, and many common Polish people (and many Catholics the 
world over)  believed that a series of certain events and prophesies were connected and that they 
were of supernatural origin. The idea stems from the Fatima Prophesies. The validity of the 
prophesies and events as being of supernatural origin is entirely irrelevant. The important issue is 
that so many Poles believed in the 'supernatural agenda' of the Pope, Walesa, and the ultimate 
success of the Solidarity Movement. I contend that Solidarnosc framed its agenda (partially) in 
'supernatural terms', and by this generated a belief among the Polish people of the inevitable 
triumph of the movement over the Communist regime, not only in Poland but in Russia. This 
section will explain the prophesies and use interview data to support the beliefs. Informants 
"AF," and "JB," were fully versed on the details of the prophesies, and informant "B" had heard 
of them but was not fully aware of all the details. Informant "PZ" knew of the prophesies but 
refused to discuss them with me. Additionally, this section will include an eyewitness account of 
one of the "miracles" as told to me by one of  my own family members. 
____________________________ 
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     The beliefs stem from a message reported to be given by an apparition of  The Blessed Virgin 
Mary at Fatima, Portugal. According to an article in the publication, Soul: The Official 
Publication of The Blue Army of Our Lady of Fatima (vol. 56, no. 1, 2005: 1 - 12) the apparition 
appeared to three children in six different sessions between May and October of 1917. The 
messages were on  three main topics: 1 -  a vision of Hell (which contains horrific descriptions 
that to some are interpreted as destruction of civilization by atomic warfare; 2 -  prophecies that 
predicted the start of WWII and the martyring of a future pope  (interpreted as the 1981 
assassination attempt on John Paul II); and,   3 -  the consecration of Russia to the Immaculate 
Heart of Mary. 
     The messages were reportedly told  by the three children to a local priest. They were said to 
contained dialogue and descriptions far beyond the verbal and intellectual ability of small 
children, thus prompting the priest to believe the claims by  the children as to the supernatural 
origins of the messages. Eventually the messages were written down and were delivered to Pope 
Pius XI. Some of the messages were apparently very abstract,  symbolic and elaborate, the 
interpretations of which are still debated. Other parts are quite literal. Some parts of the 
prophesies are said to still be withheld from public knowledge, the content being guarded by the 
Catholic Church, as they are speculated to contain details of a future Apocalypse.  Below are 
excerpts from the Fatima Prophecies, relevant to this discussion, taken from the above mentioned 
source, page 3:  
"...you have seen Hell where the souls of poor sinners go. To save them, God wishes to 
establish in the world devotion to my Immaculate Heart. If what I say to you is done, 
many souls will be saved and there will be peace. The war is going to end; but if people 
do not cease offending God, a worse one will break out during the pontificate of Pius XI. 
When you see a night illuminated by an unknown light, know that this is the great sign 
given to you by God that he is about to punish the world for its crimes, by means of war, 
famine, and persecutions of the Church and of the Holy Father." 
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    "To prevent this, I shall come to ask for the consecration of Russia to my Immaculate 
Heart, and the Communion of Reparation on the First Saturdays. If my requests are 
heeded, Russia will be converted, and there will be peace; If not, she will spread her 
errors throughout the world, causing wars and persecution of the Church. The good will 
be martyred, the Holy Father will have much to suffer, various nations will be 
annihilated. In the end, my Immaculate Heart will triumph. The Holy Father will 
consecrate Russia to me, and she will be converted, and a period of peace will be granted 
to the world..." 
 
     Just after the last of the apparitions, in October, 1917, the Bolshevik Party, lead by Vladimir 
Lenin, took control of Russia. The first world war ended, and in 1922 the Soviet Union was 
formed, with atheism as its official stand on religion. These events were interpreted by believers 
to be the forerunners of the "night illuminated by an unknown light," which would be a sign of a 
soon-coming war greater than WWI.  This night came on January 25, 1938. What actually 
occurred was a rare appearance of the Northern Lights, the Aurora Borealis, in the lower 
latitudes.  The event was observed across Europe and North America. The New York Times 
reported the event on January 26, 1938, Late City Edition, page 25. The story begins as follows: 
Aurora Borealis Startles Europe, People Flee In Fear, Call Firemen, Britons Thought 
Windsor Castle Ablaze: 
     Special Cable To The New York Times. London, Jan. 25 - "From 6:30 to 8:30 P.M. 
the people of London watched two magnificent arcs rising in the east and west from 
which radiated pulsating beams like searchlights in dark red, greenish blue, and 
purple...From an airplane the display looked like a shimmering curtain of fire..." 
 
      Several similar reports are given as related stories on the same page in the Times, directly 
under the London cable. These include reports from Grenoble, France, and Toronto, Ontario. The 
most southerly report is from Hamilton, Bermuda. The lights were apparently visible in different 
degrees of intensity and at different local times throughout a 24 hour period around January 25th. 
The Chicago Daily Tribune (January 26, 1938: p. 4) ran a story titled: "Aurora Borealis Glows In 
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Widest Area Since 1709," and  reported the lights visible as far south as Texas. Millions of 
people saw the lights and many had no idea what was their cause. The report from Grenoble, 
France states that local authorities were swamped with calls asking if the display was, "...a fire, 
war, or the end of the world."  The phenomena is sometimes referred to as the "Fatima Storm" 
(www.solarstorm.org/SS1938.html).  
     As mentioned earlier in this section, four of my informants were knowledgeable of this 
occurrence, and discussion with them revealed that they had heard stories relating this event to 
the Fatima Prophecies. On September 1st, 1939, Germany invaded Poland, starting the second 
world war, 19 months after the "night illuminated by an unknown light." Informant "AF" took 
me to the exact spot, the Westerplatte Peninsula, where the Wisla River meets the Baltic Sea at 
Gdansk. A huge stone monument is built on a forested island there, to mark the invasion of 
Poland and as a memorial to all who died in the war. The monument is of the hilt of a sword, the 
blade being rammed into the ground; this represents an end to war. Here, "AF" said this about 
the Fatima Prophecies: 
"Yes, I know about this. Here is where in 1939 Germany invaded Poland and the war 
began. Pope John Paul had a divine mission. He was part of this prophesy, I think. I know 
about the 'light stories.' Many people here believe this. Walesa believed in this - he saw 
himself and the Pope as making the prophecy come true. And it did, you know! The Pope 
made it happen - he dedicated himself to the cause - he gave himself to the cause. Yes, 
we used to pray for the conversion of Russia...that is what we were taught to do. It 
happened!"  
 
     I was told the 'light story,' as "AF" referred to it, as a very young boy, by my mother.  She had 
saw the "night illuminated by an unknown light," as a small girl, and till her dying day believed 
the event to be supernatural.  She told me the story at a shrine to Our Lady of Fatima, near 
Haverhill, Ohio, (approximately 5 miles west of Ironton, Ohio on Old U.S. 52, or "Gallia Pike") 
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where local legend has it that the Blessed Virgin Mary appeared in the form of an apparition 
bathed in a blue light around the time of the 1938 Aurora event (in an open field; the shrine was 
built later, in the 1950s). The family story goes as follows: My grandfather was at the time 
working as a  repairman for the N & W railroad in northern Ohio. He and several other men were 
called-up in the night by N & W to repair tracks damaged by a minor derailment. Around 2:00 
AM the men saw what was described by my mother as, "looking like the sun was getting ready 
to come up in the middle of the night." The story goes that the sky became blood red, so 
illuminated that you could see outside like dawn or dusk. My grandfather and the other workers 
were so frightened that they abandoned their rail repair job, went home, awoke their families, 
opened the local church, and the community was called to mass; they believed Christ was 
returning and his coming was illuminating the sky.  
     After this event - and after those who witnessed it learned it to be a natural occurrence of  the 
Northern Lights - priests or religious scholars with knowledge of the Fatima Prophesies, quite 
possibly, 'connected the dots,' so to speak, and deemed this, "the night illuminated by an 
unknown light." Again, the point here is not the legitimacy of the events as being supernatural, 
but that believers were made by this event the world over. Solidarity used this established belief 
as part of a very effective framing construct that gave its agenda 'supernatural validity.'  Perhaps 
years actually passed before the facts were strung together to make a coherent chain that entered 
common Catholic traditions through mass publications. For example, as late as 2005 an article in 
the Fatima publication mentioned earlier (vol. 56, no.1: 14 - 16) written by Bonnie Brewer 
Cavanaugh viewed the events of the 1980s and early 1990s in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union as the literal culmination of the Fatima Prophesies. Cavanaugh wrote: 
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"On march 25, 1984, Pope John Paul II and the bishops of the Church consecrated Russia 
and the world to the Immaculate Heart of Mary. Soon after, the Iron Curtain fell and 
Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev traveled to Rome to meet with the Holy Father. The 
Immaculate Heart of Our lady had triumphed..."  
 
     The May, 13th, 1981 assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II further reinforced belief in 
the Fatima Prophesies. Believers associated this event with the phrase in the prophecy which 
states, "the Holy Father will have much to suffer." John Paul himself apparently took the event to 
be a fulfillment of the prophecies. In a book of his personal reflections, he was quoted as saying: 
"Could I forget that the event in St. Peter's Square took place on the day and at the hour 
when the first appearance of the Mother of Christ to the poor little peasants has been 
remembered for over sixty years at Fatima, Portugal? For in everything that happened to 
me on that day, I felt the extraordinary motherly protection and care which turned out to 
be stronger than the deadly bullet" (Pope John Paul  2005: 184.)  ref {Memory and 
Identity} 
 
 
    I related my own family story concerning, "the night illuminated by an unknown light," and its 
relation to prophetic events, to informant "JB," and he commented as follows: 
"Oh yes, I know this story! The lights were supposed to mean war was coming. And war 
actually started - this made it seem real - yes? Then later - was it '82 or '83 - when the 
Pope was shot?" 
  "I think it was actually 1981," I replied. 
"Well, this made it in the minds of believers - those devoted to Fatima - that all this was 
true. The Pope was suffering as in the prophesies - yes? And John Paul was convinced 
and so was Lech Walesa - that they 'had a mission!' (laughs) Well, if they believed, then 
we believed! You know, he (Walesa) always when talking to crowds said, 'our mission', 
'our task,' 'our divine goal'...stuff like that! "We can not fail if we keep the faith," he 
would say. He spoke in church - right across the street -  St. Brygidy Church, across from 
Stocznia Gadanska. We met there all the time (referring to the workers from the 
shipyard). And the people, you would think, were hearing the Pope speak! 
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     Walesa often took on a religious tone in his speeches and  used the phrasing mentioned above 
by "JB" in his writing as well. In one particular essay, "From Romanticism To Realism: Our 
Struggle In The Years 1980 - 1982," he specifically uses the term, "supernatural circumstances," 
(as per the English translation) to describe the events leading up to the August 31, 1980 signing 
of the Gdansk Agreements: 
"I had December 1970 strongly etched in my heart and memory. I prayed after those 
events that I would be given a chance once more to fight the battle. I already understood 
then that one had to use different methods. It was not enough to go out in the streets and 
demand one's rights. We needed a more effective means to employ against the totalitarian 
system. And with God's help, which came at an opportune moment, and because of 
supernatural circumstances, (my italics) August yielded such a harvest" (Walesa in 
Paczkowski and Byrne 2007: 1). 
 
He then proceeds to use a very dramatic Biblical analogy (from the Book Of John, in which 
God's word becomes flesh through the birth of Jesus into this world) to situate Pope John Paul II 
into the same 'supernatural' field with himself and Solidarnosc: 
"I would like to call to your attention one thing that was inconceivable in those days. A 
Pole became pope, came to Poland, and his word became flesh. "Solidarity" was born. 
And its power lay in the fact that for the first time in the post-war years all social groups 
gathered together under one banner..." (Walesa in Paczkowski and Byrne 2007: 2) 
 
     Apparently this sentiment was widespread during the 1980s. Penn (2005:7) states that, "Poles 
commonly said that the miracle of Wojtyla's election is what inspired the miracle of Solidarity." 
     One final example from the writings of Lech Walesa pulls together several items previously 
mentioned: devotion to the Black Madonna of Czestochowa, supernatural agenda, and a  Poland 
unified by tradition and culture in collective effort. The excerpt below typifies the association of 
highly regarded cultural constructs with Lech Walesa's agenda, placing both in a supernatural 
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context. Contrasting the stress and  tediousness of correctly wording political issues with the 
release of visiting the Jasna Gora Monastery at Czestochowa, Lech Walesa wrote: 
"During the course of my travels, there were other moments in utter contrast with those 
political meetings: at Jasna Gora, for example, where I made my profession of faith to the 
Holy Mother of Czestochowa. In the midst of upheavals, unable to obtain satisfaction on 
numerous points, but persisting nonetheless, in our common aim, we had to understand 
ourselves better, to remain confident, and to look for help from forces beyond ourselves. 
The Primate himself had said: "The heart of Poland beats there." So, if that was the heart 
of Poland, I had to go to it, to become one with that heart; I wanted the whole country to 
beat in time to its heartbeat" (Walesa 1987:173.)    
 
Factor 5)  Solidarity's success was due in part to the charismatic leadership of Lech 
Walesa: 
     Twenty years after the historic events in Eastern Europe that culminated in the dismantling of 
the USSR, journalist Tom Brokaw said this about Lech Walesa: "You couldn't have created in 
anyway a better working class hero than Lech Walesa. They once described him as a shipyard 
electrician who short-circuited the Soviet Union" (Brokaw 2009.) In the 1980s Lech Walesa 
became this "working class hero" not only in Gdansk but worldwide. U.S. labor unions 
vigorously supported Walesa and the Solidarity Movement , as did, ironically, conservative 
politicians such as Ronald Reagan; the unions saw Walesa as a living embodiment of worker 
solidarity in the face of oppression - Neoliberals saw Walesa in their own image, as a fighter for  
capitalism in a battle  against what Reagan had termed, "The Evil Empire."  Neither perspective 
was wholly accurate. Yet, herein lies the perfect example of the Weberian version of a 
charismatic leader: people saw in Lech Walesa something extraordinary and in doing so they 
empowered him with charismatic authority and supernatural leadership ability. 
       This paper contends that the charismatic power and authority instilled in Lech Walesa by his 
followers greatly facilitated the Solidarity Movement in its ability to mobilize resources and 
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labor. In quite simple terms, Poles believed in Walesa and the Solidarity Movement to such a 
degree that they were willing to risk the possibilities of police brutality, arrest, jail time, and even 
a military invasion by the Soviet Union, in order to see the goals of the movement fulfilled. 
Many American labor union members, Polish-American Catholic church groups, and various 
political groups so believed in Walesa's agenda that they donated large sums of money to the 
cause. From personal memory, OCAW Local 3 - 523, Ashland, Kentucky, for example, took up 
several "offerings" for Solidarity, likening it to a religious cause.  It is also apparent that Walesa 
actively encouraged belief in a supernatural agenda attached to Solidarity (as described in "factor 
four" of this paper) which further enhanced his own charisma and helped generate and maintain 
faith in the movement despite great odds.  
     The sections that follow will first very briefly describe the notion of  the "charismatic leader," 
as per Max Weber.  Next, interview data will provide a first-hand account of personal 
perceptions of Lech Walesa by two of his former co-workers at the Lenin Shipyard, and by other 
individuals living in Poland during the events of the 1980s. Finally, secondary sources will be 
quoted to further elaborate on Walesa's charismaticism. 
      There are no quantitative measures of charisma. Like the constructs of social solidarity or 
class consciousness, charisma is a fluid variable that can "emerge" (or that can be endowed by 
followers on to a leader) in certain social situations and rapidly vanish in other situations (as in 
the several examples described by Fantasia, 1988.) Thus, the author believes, the simple 
descriptions given by informants and by other sources that demonstrate the charismatic appeal of 
Lech Walesa during the height of the Solidarity Movement will serve as the best validation for 
this contention. 
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_____________________________________ 
    Weber and Charisma:  In his book, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 
(1915; Parsons' translation 1947)  Max Weber mentions several general types of charismatic 
individuals, such as "the berserker," " the shaman," and "the prophet" (359). However, his main 
concern is not in typology. "What is important alone," Weber says, "is how the individual is 
actually regarded by those subject to charismatic authority, by his 'followers' or disciples" (359).  
The followers empower the charismatic leader by their belief in his exceptional abilities, 
sometimes first demonstrated, according to Weber, by a 'miracle,' or a 'sign.'  Yet, Weber alludes 
that this type of charismatic  - the type dependent on a sign or miracle - may actually end up 
being a false prophet; he mentions Joseph Smith, for example, the prophet of Mormonism, and 
speculates that Smith may have been, "...a very sophisticated type of deliberate swindler" (359). 
However, genuine charisma, Weber concludes, is not derived from supernatural acts or signs, 
but, "The basis lies rather in the  conception that it is the duty of those who have been called to a 
charismatic mission to recognize its quality and act accordingly. Psychologically this 
'recognition' is a matter of complete personal devotion to the possessor of the quality, arising out 
of enthusiasm, or of despair and hope" (359).  Or as George Ritzer (2008: 245) nicely 
summarizes: 
"To put Weber's position bluntly, if the disciples define a leader as charismatic, then he or 
she is likely to be a charismatic leader irrespective of whether he or she actually 
possesses any outstanding traits. A charismatic leader then can be someone who is quite 
ordinary. What is crucial is the process by which such a leader is set apart from ordinary 
people and treated as if endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least exceptional 
powers or qualities that are not accessible to the ordinary person." 
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     Lech Walesa was indeed a very 'ordinary' charismatic leader;  this paper contends that his 
simple, working-class style and true working-class background added yet another layer of appeal 
to his followers in that they (millions of working-class Poles and workers around the world) 
could so personally identify with him. Additionally, as Walesa  aligned himself with The Black 
Madonna of Czestochowa, as discussed in "factor four" of this paper, he was in effect drawing to 
himself 'supernatural powers' that legitimized the charisma already attributed to him.  As Weber 
put it in his book, The Sociology of Religion, "Whoever possesses the requisite charisma for 
employing the proper means" (he is referring to the proper means to coerce spiritual power)  "is 
stronger even than the god, whom he can compel to do his will" (Weber 1922; Parsons' 
translation 1956). 
     Walesa,  featured on the cover of Time (December 29, 1980) wearing his enameled pin of The 
Black Madonna, drawing from her always, apparently, a great measure of  'spiritual coercion,' 
can still be seen in 2010 on YouTube, wearing the same iconic pin and now pitching the city of 
Gdansk as a prime travel destination (www.youtube.gdansk4u). He is still playing "the prophet," 
extolling the advantages of doing business in Gdansk, while reminding potential visitors that 
their pilgrimage will afford them the opportunity "...to see a thousand  years of Christianity, the 
roots of Europe, and the culture of many nations - Hurry up! And come to Gdansk!", he says 
(www.youtube.gdansk4u). Lech Walesa is still in the business of compelling others to 
supernatural duty. 
___________________________________________ 
     Interview Data: Informants "PZ" and "JB," as mentioned in the historical background 
section of this paper, were personal acquaintances with Lech Walesa. As mentioned, "PZ" took 
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great pride in telling me his story of how he witnessed Lech Walesa "take over" as Solidarity's 
leader (fully described in the historical background). "PZ" was adamant that I take pictures of the 
exact spot where this occurred - several pictures even - as he apparently revered the spot as 
nearly sacred ( the spot is along a now overgrown and graffiti-scarred  perimeter fence of the 
Gdansk Shipyard). "PZ" also proudly showed me pictures of himself and Walesa at the Gdansk 
Agreement negotiations; again, his attitude was of both  pride and reverence. I believe these are 
all indications of the charismaticism "PZ" still associates with Walesa and Solidarnosc. "PZ" told 
me the location of Lech Walesa's office in the Old Town section of Gdansk (Biuro Lecha Walesy 
in Zielona Brama, The Green Gate into Ulica Dluga, the main street of the old medieval section) 
and suggested that if I was very patient I might "catch a glimpse of Walesa going in or out of his 
office."  "PZ"s advice seemed more in line with instructions for catching a glimpse of a rock star, 
a yeti, or Christ walking on water.  I began to wonder if such a glimpse might blind me, as  was 
thought would be the case if one looked directly at the Pharaoh of Egypt. "PZ" demonstrated 
more reverence for Walesa than any other informant. 
     "JB" was more of a realist in his opinion of Walesa than "PZ." As mentioned in "factor four," 
"JB" understood the reverence that people had for Walesa, as evidenced by his comments about 
Walesa speaking in St. Brygidy Church, in which he compares this to a visit from the Pope 
(chapter 4 list page # here later. ) Still, "JB" did not think Walesa had been indispensible to the 
movement; he commented, "Without Walesa Solidarity would have been possible but it would 
have been born in a different way - maybe more of the 'revolution way' than the 'evolution way." 
His comments  stressed the moderating effect that Walesa had on the solidarity movement. "JB" 
and "PZ," both witnesses to military and police violence at the Gdansk Shipyard during the 
course of the movement, were keenly aware that to push the movement too fast would have 
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resulted in use of  deadly force by Soviet troops. "Walesa did not stir up anger - that was not our 
way,"  "JB" told me,  "He mostly talked to the people as brothers and sisters - they believed him 
because he was a shipyard worker - a common worker, like them - and they listened to him." 
     Informant "PN" commented on Walesa also. "PN"  apparently believed that Walesa was 
simply a spokesman for a larger cause.  "PN" said: 
"People identified with Walesa - he was one of the people. But there were other people 
behind him - "the brains." He wasn't that brilliant - but the people loved him." 
 
"PN"s remarks were not a reference to  "internet conspiracy theorists," who speculate on 
potential ties between Walesa and the CIA. "PN" clarified that he believed the KOR (discussed 
in "factor three") was "the brains" behind Walesa. "PN" was the least impressed of all my 
informants with Walesa.  
     Informant "B"s opinion was more in line with "JB."  "B" commented as follows: 
"Solidarity was not all about Walesa being the leader, no. It wasn't like Gandhi in India - 
no, Walesa was not the movement itself - it would have gone on without him. I think the 
desire of workers and the whole society of finally getting out of this Communist 
occupation -  this was perceived as Soviet occupation - nothing more! This desire was so 
strong, it made no difference. He was a good leader, Walesa, very good, very genuine to 
all the workers, very accommodating to everybody...but I think the movement would 
have goon on eventually anyway. Because the strikes were started by someone who says,   
"OK - We won't give up - let's stay - let's strike." Yes, it took someone like that - Walesa 
was there - he was already unemployed, and he became the leader because he was at that 
place at that time. But - no doubt - if different leader  - then different movement! 
Different results, different history!" 
 
    Informant "B" also commented on Lech Walesa's humane behavior toward his former 
opponents after he became president of Poland in December,1990. "B" said that after 
democratization in some other Eastern European countries, many old Communist Party bosses 
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were marginalized and some were even jailed. But Walesa believed, per the comments of "B " 
"...that everybody has freedom and everyone has rights  - and rightly so. Maybe some of them 
(former Communist leaders) made mistakes - maybe some were accused wrongly. He did not try 
to get revenge - he wanted to make move forward." 
 
      Informant "AF"s  comments on Lech Walesa were similar to "B"s. He believed the 
movement would have gone on with or without Walesa. But like the others, he commented on 
how personable Walesa was and how easily the working class identified with him. "AF" also 
commented that Walesa spoke, "very plain and not that good."  This is a less harsh judgment 
than  Ash,  (2002: 137) who said that Walesa's  "...speech is impossible to reproduce, disjointed, 
full of slang, wildly ungrammatical, at times almost nonsensical."  
     "AF" also remembered Walesa's calmness and reassurance. This apparently gave "AF" hope 
for the future for the first time. "AF" had mentioned that during the 1970s he simply could not 
imagine any way of life different than what he was experiencing - that is, poverty, hopelessness, 
and no alternatives. Solidarity gave "AF" hope, as it did millions who for the first time in their 
lives imagined for themselves and for their families a different future. 
     Some other informants and contacts in Gdansk were too young to remember the details of the 
Solidarity Movement, but three young people I talked with concerning the movement spoke  
very respectfully of Lech Walesa and commented that they often heard stories from their parents 
of those days. One young person pointed out to me that it is still possible to see Solidarnosc 
graffiti on many buildings in Gdansk some 20 years later. Another pointed out to me a wall on 
which Gdansk art school students are memorializing Solidarity by painting a mural. From my 
short experience in Gdansk, I believe it would be difficult to find an individual with a negative 
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attitude toward Walesa and Solidarnosc. The charisma of Walesa is becoming "routinized," to 
use Weber's term, not in the continuation of a political office but in projects such as the shipyard 
murals, which convey to another generation the significance of the Solidarity Movement. 
____________________________________________ 
Secondary Sources:  Many examples that demonstrate Walesa's charismaticism are found in 
news articles and in books that recount his speeches, comments, or other's impressions of him. 
Use of such examples is meant as further evidence of Walesa's ability to generate belief in 
Solidarity's  'mission.'  Again, Walesa often used terms such as, "our mission,"  "our task," or 
"our divine goal,"  (as per informant "JB" quoted in "factor 4" page 179)  which by Weber's 
description of charismatic leadership, is an implication of duty toward the charismatic's 
followers. Additionally, this section will demonstrate that Walesa's speaking style (whether 
intentionally contrived or naturally occurring) was such that he drew his followers to him in such 
a humble, almost naive manner, that few doubted his sincerity and many identified with his 
humanity. 
      An example from Ash (2002: 71) illustrates this. Ash quotes Walesa's  extemporaneous 
comments of August 31, 1980, as he addresses the crowd of workers at the Lenin Shipyard upon 
finalizing the Gdansk Agreement. His reference (below) to September 1st is a reminder that 
Germany invaded Poland on this date in 1939. He is invoking personal connection, patriotism, 
victory, and further duty in a few short, simple sentences:   
"Kochani! [a word meaning literally, "beloved"] We return to work on 1 September. We 
all know what that day reminds us of, of what we think ...of the fatherland...of the family 
which is called Poland...We got all we could in the present situation. And we will achieve 
the rest, because we now have the most important thing: Our in-de-pen-dent self-
governing trade unions. This is our guarantee for the future...I declare the strike ended." 
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          The front cover of Kubik's 1994 book, The Power Of Symbols Against The Symbols of 
Power, shows Walesa's first official  photograph as leader of Solidarity at the above mentioned 
conclusion of the 1980 strike. Unlike most victorious leaders who in the rush of their triumph 
might choose to pose with some degree of prideful arrogance - upraised fists, the flash of "V" for 
victory, or even a broad grin -   the iconic photograph shows Walesa somberly standing under a 
crucifix holding three red roses in his hand. He is dressed in a simple black jacket, and a sweater, 
with no tie. Kubik says that Walesa chose this scene for his first official portrait (stated in an 
unnumbered photo caption in center section of Kubik's book.) This choice, and the photograph it 
generated, I believe, are very symbolic of the charismatic call to duty Walesa often invoked in 
his speeches. In presenting himself as a simple man of faith and humility, rather than a gloating 
victor, he began coalescing his devotion from his followers; it was nine years from the time the 
photograph was made till Solidarnosc was permanently legalized. 
_______________________________________________________ 
        Walesa used his negotiating style to draw even his opponents to his side. According to 
Ascherson (1982: 8) Walesa was the consummate compromiser, always leaving doors open for 
further negotiation and often attempting to make opponents his collaborators: 
"...Walesa adored the actual business of negotiating...Many of his colleagues lacked this 
taste. They wanted to leave the negotiating table with all their demands won and no 
concessions made. But Walesa preferred a joint settlement, talked out until opponents 
became accomplices. 'Polak z Polakiem musi sic dogadac' - 'Pole must talk things out 
with Pole,' he used endlessly to repeat." 
 
    However, this 'win-win' style of negotiating and political wrangling was also peppered 
occasionally with theatrics.  In,  A Way Of Hope,  (Walesa 1987: 126 - 127) an unnamed writer 
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(identified only as "a friend and translator of Gunter Grass," a German author born in Gdansk; 
the writer is said to be a witness to the 1980 shipyard strikes) narrates Walesa's Christ-like 
carrying of a huge wooden cross, during the Gdansk negotiations, to the site just in front of the 
gates of the Lenin Shipyard where many workers were killed in a 1970 clash with police (see 
page ?? in history section).  A picture of the cross and mass being conducted under it appears in 
the center photo section of Kubik's 1994 book. The cross looks to be at least twice the height of 
individuals standing near it. The sight of Walesa carrying this cross was no doubt a very 'staged' 
event; even during my 2010 visit to the Gdansk Shipyard, with its capacity cut some 80% from 
its most productive days, a multitude of all types of materials handling machinery was available 
for such tasks. Obviously, Walesa wanted to physically carry the huge cross as yet another 
symbolic gesture of duty.  Later a permanent monument was erected here. Informant "PZ" told 
me that mass was conducted at this cross every day during the two-week negotiations of August, 
1980.  The cross was cemented into the ground and became a rallying point for the striking 
shipyard workers. 
     The same unnamed writer mentioned above then  describes Walesa in near saint-like terms. 
He wrote: 
"Never, under any circumstances, did Walesa employ language of any kind against 
anyone. This was a feature of his speeches: his harshest remarks never jarred his 
listeners; even when expressing himself most vigorously, he was never offensive. He 
never used insults and never swore. This was no doubt the result of his civilized attitude 
to life, closely linked to his Christian faith" (Walesa 1987: 126). 
 
    This same source then describes a crowd of thousands  shouting, "Lech, Lech, Lech," during 
the 1980 Gdansk negotiations, as they waited to hear a report from him. The description aptly 
demonstrates his charismatic appeal to the crowd: 
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"They (the crowd gathered outside during the negotiation) thought Lech knew 
everything, could achieve absolutely anything. He had become a myth, a legend. It was a 
naive faith which sprang from the fact that through his personality, his presence, his 
words, and his actions, Lech had cemented a movement previously diffused and achieved 
unity that had seemed impossible...." 
"Walesa gathered the crowd in front of the building, It was the first time for this, but this 
time, all fear had gone; they held their heads high. The power was welling up in this 
crowd, it was almost tangible, flowing from one person to another, limitless" (Walesa 
1987: 127). 
 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
     Sucharczuk (1994: 305) describes Lech Walesa to have been perceived  as, 
 
 "...an  "exemplary" personality: a devout Catholic, an excellent worker, a determined 
anti-Communist who took part in the worker's uprisings of 1970 and 1976, an energetic 
and committed organizer and agitator for the "free" trade unions who had, consequently, 
suffered greatly for his idealistic dedication to the workers' cause." 
 
    Sucharczuk  continues by noting that, "A large part of the Polish population became in a sense 
an emotional "community"  of Walesa's "followers" and "disciples" (306.)  Sucharczuk mentions 
a Polish journalist (G. Fortuna) who analyzed the many letters Walesa received.  "For the most 
part, these letters expressed adoration, affection, devotion and loyalty to Walesa, who is 
described as a great Pole, a great leader, or even as a Savior. Very often people confided in their 
letters to Walesa. They perceived him as a person of great compassion who could be trusted and 
who could help" (306 - 307.) 
     Ascherson (1982: 8 - 9) likewise notes the seemingly messianic appeal of Walesa to the 
crowds that followed him in Gdansk: "...the workers worshiped Walesa, they cheered him, 
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chanted his name, brought him little presents, reached out to touch him as he passed." Yet, this 
"messiah" was very human, and in this, the common people very much identified with him. 
Sucharczuk, again, very aptly summarizes: 
"His plain, direct style, riddled with mistakes and sounding like the talk of ordinary 
people appeared not only as revolutionary and refreshing after many years of 
propagandistic jargon, it also made Walesa an object of identification. This style emerged 
as the free and authentic expression (perhaps somewhat better formulated) of a simple 
leader of their own choosing and from their own part of the community" (304). 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
        In many ways Lech Walesa endeared himself to the people of his nation and to a large part 
of the world. Informant "B" mentioned the many gifts of food, clothing, medicine, and money 
that poured in to Poland from Western Europe and the U.S. during the worst years of the 
Solidarity struggle. These came by way of the Catholic Church and were distributed to those in 
need - especially to those with a family member jailed for activism in Solidarity - by the Church.  
      No doubt the world-wide news coverage of the charismatic Lech Walesa prompted this 
response. I personally remember a rally for Solidarity at the former Allied Chemical Semet 
Solvay plant in Ashland, Kentucky, sometime in the early 1980s. Big red badges were 
distributed with the Solidarity logo on them and  donations were asked for in return. "Lech 
Walesa," the man with a funny sounding foreign name, was one of us - a union worker who was 
making history by defying the USSR. This remembrance is quite a testimony to the worldwide 
support Lech Walesa helped to generate for his cause. Never before had the name of an obscure 
working-class individual from a Communist Bloc nation been uttered by a group of uneducated 
chemical plant workers in Appalachia; not until August of 1980. I contend that this world-wide 
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support was to a great degree due to Walesa's charismaticism, and this factor greatly facilitated 
the success of the Solidarity Movement. 
Factor 6)  A three-way coalition between the working class, the "Polska inteligencja" (that 
is, prominent public intellectuals, such as lawyers, academics, writers, filmmakers,  etc.) 
and the Polish Catholic Church further contributed to social solidarity within the 
movement and each group contributed elements lacking by the others. 
 
     Some analysts of the Polish Solidarity Movement (such as Laba 1991, Goodwyn 1991, and 
Murawski 1993) tend to emphasize the role of hourly workers in the success of the movement 
and downplay the contributions of other segments of society. The aim of Laba's entire book, for 
example,  seems to be 'proving'  that workers did more than intellectuals to facilitate Solidarity; 
little is said as to why the movement was necessary, how it came about, or what factors made it a 
success. Laba condemns what he calls "The Elite Thesis" (1991:3) apparently believing that to 
credit the educated class in Solidarity's  success is akin to a Leninist attitude toward working 
people, that is, to assume that hourly workers can think only to a level of "trade union 
consciousness" (5).  Goodwyn and Murawski take a similar stance against the  'intellectual class' 
and they even seem offended by analysts that credit the Church as a facilitator of the movement. 
My own findings, based on interview data from Solidarity participants, indicates that to take a 
divisive stand in 'crediting' or 'discrediting' certain groups is entirely against the historic reality of 
the events in Poland in the 1980s and also goes entirely against the  philosophy or ideology of 
the current Solidarnosc organization in Gdansk - The Fundacja Centrum Solidarnosci. 
     All of my informants who were personally involved in Solidarnosc and/or with the student 
unions affiliated with Solidarnosc were very adamant in the notion that the Solidarity movement 
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was possible because of  cooperation between different segments of Polish society. They 
understood and commented on the concept of social solidarity as the essence of the movement. 
Two informants made similar comments on the name of the movement itself in response to my 
questioning about reasons for the movement's success; they said it was, quite simply, 'solidarity' - 
social solidarity across classes, across geographic regions, even across national boundaries.  
Informant "B" mentioned that there really were no class divisions between intellectuals and 
workers in communist Poland, in terms of income, as, in "B"s words, "...college professors and 
plumbers both made about the same pay." 
      The following sections will  use my informants' interview data to back the claim that 
workers, intellectuals, and the Church all shared in facilitating the success of the Solidarity 
Movement. Secondary sources will  be tied-in to further  support this contention.  
____________________________ 
     I interviewed a current high-ranking director of  the labor union, Solidarnosc, in Gdansk at the 
Fundacja Centrum Solidarnosci.  He is a contemporary of Lech Walesa and began his career 
working in the Lenin Shipyard as a laborer and later as a welder. He was involved in the 
formation of Solidarnosc from its very beginning and is personally mentioned in Walesa's 1987 
book, A Way Of Hope, as an important contributor to the early organization of the union in the 
Lenin Shipyard. The union proper has in recent years become an 'umbrella' for several different 
specialized trade unions but the original union, Solidarnosc, still represents workers in the 
shipyards along the Baltic Coast (the Fundacja Centrum is the organizational umbrella for the 
various unions.)  There is currently a project underway to extend Solidarnosc across Europe, 
uniting many separate trade unions under the Fundacja Centrum. The Gdansk "director"  is 
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actively involved in this project, known as Europejskie Centrum Solidarnosci. The following 
excerpt from my interview with "the director", based on his personal involvement in the creation 
of Solidarnosc and on his current involvement in the union's expansion, demonstrates the 
society-wide origins of the movement, and its philosophy of inclusion: 
I ask, "Why do you think Solidarnosc was so successful?" 
"Director": "Well, we are not talking just about the trade union - Solidarnosc is an idea! 
If one person is poor and another is rich it is not solidarity. If one is working and another 
is not - not solidarity. If somewhere workers are having a bad way of life - bad 
conditions, low pay, dangerous environment - and others have good life - it is not 
solidarity. The idea is to help everyone have a good life. It is not just about wages - we 
try to keep wages close to same scale across industry...." 
 "Solidarity is needed across Europe - we include everyone - China, U.S., if they need us. 
The idea is to stand for all working people."    
 
I ask, "Was Solidarity only a worker's movement? Were other groups involved? 
"Director": Solidarity was not a political party till 1990. When we were building it 
everyone was involved - millions of people. Seventy thousand shipyard workers were 
here along Baltic Coast, and many factories of the whole country.  But also were writers, 
lawyers, scientists, even actors. Not just workers - all were members of Solidarnosc in 
1980s. They worked with us, they paid dues - 1% of their income. And there were 
donations from all over the world too..." 
I ask, "Was the Church involved?" 
"Director": "The Church too, yes. The priests came to the shipyard to organize services 
for the workers - everyday during the strikes. Mass was here, everyday. Everyone came 
together and helped. We had all we needed. Even farmers came and donated food - I 
remember a wagon of potatoes! Women baked bread and brought it to the shipyard gates. 
They gave food to the workers on strike. Then under martial law, many men were put in 
jail. Solidarity leaders, in jail. Those who protest - in jail.  How did their families live? 
Others donated - across Poland - across the world! Donations were sent to the  churches 
from all over the world and the churches would use money to provide for those with 
family in jail." 
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     To illustrate his point, "the director" gave me a magazine in which was an interview with 
Father Maciej Zieba, a priest who worked as an advisor to the union during the struggles of the 
1980s. Father Zieba would have been considered both a representative of the Church and a 
member of the intelligentsia, as he is a published writer,  theologian and philosopher. He is 
currently the head of the Europejski Centrum Solidarnosci.  The interview is in both Polish and 
English. The priest's comments on memories of his involvement with Solidarity demonstrate the 
inclusiveness of its philosophy. Below are his comments about running into former Solidarity 
members some thirty years later: 
"After all those years I happen to come across people who now are 50 or even 80 years 
old. The left, the right, Catholics, Jews, the agnostics, women, men  - but all of them say 
the same: "It was the most beautiful time of my life." It was a war of fear and uncertainty  
but it caused a bigger motivation...."  
"...our efforts are directed toward the promotion of Solidarity, which is always necessary 
- differently in Tibet, differently in Haiti or Sweden - but still necessary...We promote the 
idea of Solidarity and freedom through all our projects... We prove that the cruelties of 
the 20th century were not abstract, they really happened...If one has an idea, which is 
perseveringly promoted, then it is possible to get to people. Not by disputes or by force 
but with help from the truth and the exchange of experiences." (Zieba in Purzycki 2010: 6 
- 7.) 
_____________________________ 
 
     Informant "B" provided detailed  information on the involvement of the  KOR - Komitet 
Obrony Robotnikow, or Worker's Defense Committee - with Solidarnosc, a very important 
'worker/elite' coalition. 
   According to Ash (2002: 20) this committee was first formed in 1976 after a number of 
workers were arrested in the city of Radom, near Warsaw. The workers were protesting a huge 
and unexpected price increase on food - averaging 60%, according to Ash. A riot broke out and 
the protestors set fire to the Communist Party headquarters. As a result, "...harsh sentences were 
handed down by civil courts; thousands of workers were sacked (Ash 2002: 19.) The workers 
could not afford legal counsel. A group of lawyers volunteered to represent them, and this was 
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the beginning of the KOR. Over time, many dissident writers, outspoken academics, actors and 
filmmakers joined KOR. A group of 64 KOR members were present during the negotiations of 
the Gdansk Agreements, acting as legal advisors to  Solidarnosc. They played a critical role in 
balancing out the obvious advantages that Communist Party bureaucrats would have over a 
group of shipyard workers, in terms of legal knowledge. Lech Walesa is reported by Ash to have  
commented on the absolute necessity of the KOR legal counsel during the negotiations (2002: 55 
- 56.)  
     Informant "B" had been associated with a university-level student union directly tied to 
Solidarnosc. "B" had detailed knowledge of the KOR, and in line with the above mentioned 
account of Ash, had considered KOR as a vital contributor to Solidarity's success. "B" mentioned 
that prior to the 1970s academics and lawyers had seldom become involved with worker protests.  
Over time they realized that the State's promises of economic reform and 'better days ahead' were 
empty gestures. Below are excerpts from "B"s comments on this topic: 
"KOR was mostly lawyers and academics. They were independent thinkers who saw the 
government was not working - was never going to work. Poland was in big trouble - 
economic trouble. Some of KOR were Communists who turned against the system. Some 
were not promoted in system - some were lawyers who had wanted to be a judge and did 
not get the job. Some had been KGB lawyers! See, political reasons - that's why some 
turned to help workers . Others -  academics, intellectuals, writers - were not in Party 
system. They were for change because they saw the failure, corruption, lies. They were 
the 'brain power' for the movement. These guys helped student movement - sometimes 
underground - helped students publish newspapers underground." 
"Lawyers of KOR went with workers to negotiating table. They stood with them. The 
workers formed the demands - trade union free from State control, right to strike, free 
press, free flow of information - many things  - the workers made list. They wrote this on 
big signs and hung on gates of shipyard - big wood signs - big red letters! But, it was the 
lawyers who made the legal and official language. Workers formed demands - lawyers 
put it on paper!" 
"Also, some of these KOR had been in prison or had been banned from academic work. 
Like Vaclav Havel - had been put to some labor job - had to work in a factory. I knew 
one guy who because he participated in the strikes of 1960s, 1970s, he was put in prison. 
And received a ticket so he could never work in university again. Only job he could have 
was in a factory. But he said he was lucky - some guys like him, they send to forest to be 
logger!" (laughs) Everyone who had liberal ideas  - who could think for themselves - 
something was planned to hold them back. Because they were dangerous. If you could 
think for yourself, the Party thought you were dangerous." 
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    "B" also commented many times on the involvement of the Church with the Solidarity 
movement. Like the comments of "the director", earlier in this section, "B" mentioned the 
material help of the Church: 
"When martial law started, many members of Solidarity were arrested. But many got 
away and were hidden by the Church - by priests. The churches were like rescue places. 
And the trust that people had! - if church said so - it was right! Because they were always 
with the people, and for the people." 
"People identified with the Church almost like a political actor - as a political actor that 
brings opposition to the Party. Church was for freedom of religion, but also played a very 
political role, uniting people. After martial law came - and some families were without 
fathers or mothers  - who were in jail - there was no bread winner, well, the Church 
encouraged everyone to give donations to help these families. It was a very trusted 
network. Gifts, donations, from Western Europe, from the States, all distributed through 
Church. Nothing was missing - all went straight to the people." 
 
_______________________________________ 
 
 
    Another example of worker, Church, and intellectual cooperation comes from Kenney's 2002 
book, A Carnival Of Revolution.  Cooperation between the various segments of society in Poland 
was not limited to the 'official' workings of the KOR and Solidarnosc in Gdansk. Kenney 
describes (40 - 42) small-scale, grassroots groups that emerged in the 1980s, centered around 
churches, and offering everything from legal services for workers, donations of food, classes in 
Polish history, assistance with housing, services of plumbers, electricians, or roofers, and even 
organized pilgrimages to important religious sites. These were important, materially, but 
ideologically as well; "(the cooperative groups) showed how easily one could in fact pass the 
state by" (Kenney 2002: 42).  
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     Apparently most of these groups were informal and unnamed, however Keeney mentions "the 
most famous of all such ministries," located near Krakow and originating in the Lenin 
Steelworks (41). A mill worker, Kazimierz Fugiel, first organized the group in 1980 to help 
distribute donations of food from Western trade unions. It soon became connected with a local 
church and eventually became a center for neighborhood meetings that not only provided 
alternative means of meeting material needs but also, "...broke down the isolation and fear bred 
by martial law in Polish society" (41). The group became known as "The Social Fund For 
Workers' Self-Help," and  was a collective with services that apparently ranged from legal 
counsel to rabbit breeding (humorously mentioned in Keeney 2002: 41).  The group is a prime 
example of 'cross-class' cooperation in Poland during the Solidarity years.  
 
__________________________________ 
 
     A final example comes from what Penn (2005: 50 - 51) terms the "telerevolution." This is 
described as cooperation between workers,  members of Solidarity student groups, KOR 
members, English/Polish translators, and Western journalists. News related to the movement was 
relayed from Solidarnosc activists in the factories and shipyards, compiled and translated into 
English by university students, passed on to KOR members, who passed on the reports to 
Western news outlets such as the BBC and Radio Free Europe. In this way Western reporters 
gained access to news stories related to the Solidarity Movement, and, according to Penn, Poles 
also heard the news items broadcast back to them by the BBC and Radio Free Europe. Penn does 
not describe how the KOR activists were able to get the reports to Western journalists, but it is 
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assumed that as some of the KOR members were the 'elite' or 'inteligenecja' of Poland, they had 
international contacts.  
      The accessibility of broadcasts by the BBC and Radio Free Europe, however, conflict with 
my research. My informant, "AF", told me that all radio and TV signals in Gadnsk were blocked,  
except those officially approved by the Party. "AF" showed me a building atop Gradowa Hill, a 
high ridge on the outskirts of Gdansk, in which he claimed had been equipment used to block 
radio and TV signals.  
_____________________________ 
       
     To reiterate the contention of this section, the above described coalitions - whether in the 
history-making legal negotiations of shipyard workers and the Communist Party at Gdansk,  in 
grassroots, neighborhood co-ops spread throughout the country, or in the form of 
"telerevolutionists" - are all evidence of social solidarity across the various segments of Polish 
society, and  each in their own way facilitated the success of the movement as a whole. 
Individual group effort was greatly enhanced by collective group effort, in that the separate 
groups helped each other in tasks that would have been difficult or impossible to accomplish 
without the specialized skills of the various segments. If there was indifference  between the 
various segments of Polish society prior to the 1970s (as mentioned by "B" in relation to lack of 
worker support for 1968 student strikes and lack of intellectual backing of earlier worker strikes) 
then this attitude had apparently dissolved by the 1980s. Deteriorating economic conditions and 
desperation for resolve in all segments of society prompted the various groups to unite in 
solidarity and pursue common goals for Poland.  
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Factor 7)  Solidarity's success was due in part to the "Gorbachev Effect." 
 
     This is, perhaps, the most critical factor, as without the political opportunity of Soviet 
liberalization it is doubtful that a 'bloodless revolution' would have occurred. The leaders of 
Solidarity were obviously aware of this reality and although they operated under the adage, 
"evolution not revolution," (as quoted  by several informants) they, and the Polish people in 
general, lived with the dread of a Soviet military invasion. 
     This section will first use interview data to relate informants' opinions and firsthand 
observations concerning the political opportunity created by Mikhail Gorbachev's appointment 
as General Secretary of The Communist Party to the success of the Solidarity Movement. It will 
also demonstrate the precarious position that Poland was in prior to the "Gorbachev thaw," as 
remembered by informants. It will then use secondary sources to further explain the significance 
of  the "Gorbachev Effect." 
____________________________________ 
     I asked informant "B" how important he thought Gorbachev's role was in Solidarity's success.  
"B" felt that Gorbachev's liberal ideas had been extremely important in the overall 
democratization of Eastern Europe and the USSR. "B" also credited Gorbachev with facing the 
fact that the Soviet economic system was outdated and that  no amount of reforms or 
'improvement programs' would ever revitalize it. Poles in general had realized this many years 
earlier and their disillusionment with Party promises had, in part,  led to the idea of  Solidarnosc 
(as a political party)  as an alternative to the Communist Party. "B" also credited General 
Wojciech Jaruzelski's decision to enact martial law as a deterrent to Soviet military action (as the 
lesser of two evils, so to speak.) Excerpts from "B"s comments on this subject are given below: 
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"In 1956, 1968, and 1953 people had tried this and it was stopped by Soviet military." 
("B" was referring to attempts at violent revolts against the Soviet Union in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.) 
"So why did the Soviet Army not invade Poland? Well, it almost did happen during 
martial law.  Jaruzelski  - later in trial - he said,  "I had to say we have martial law - I had 
to close everything - I had to do this, otherwise the Russian tanks will be coming" And I 
think this was true - because there were tanks on the border - ready - they were ready!" 
"Gorbachev was a new breath - fresh breath on the political scene. Brezhnev was very old 
- he was just kept alive by medicine. (laughs) Gorbachev - his ideas - for first time he 
mentioned them - about democracy - he was almost thrown out of his position - I'm 
talking about 20 years earlier (than during his term as Party Secretary). He showed his 
intention, his view of the world was different - very different!" 
"The system was corrupted - Gorbachev realized this. No goods in stores, starvation - 
some deny this - he knew it was real! Ukraine is good example." ("B" related a long story 
of how the Soviets had displaced experienced farmers in Ukraine with Soviet collective 
farm managers and after 30 years of poor agricultural production were still in denial of a 
problem.) "Gorbachev faced the facts and admitted the failures - he knew this all had to 
change! Yes, Solidarity's reemergence was at right time - with Gorbachev. Otherwise, we 
may have had to wait much longer." 
 
     Informant "JB" also gave much credit to Gorbachev. His opinions were very similar to "B"s 
and his memories of the initial 16 month legalization of Solidarity (from the signing of the 
Gdansk Agreements to martial law) are vivid. Below, excerpts from an interview with "JB" 
provide a firsthand account of Solidarity's unity and the threat it posed to the Communist party 
which eventually led to martial law. Solidarity then 'went underground' until  the Gorbachev era. 
 
"Gorbachev was educated in Canada.  He knew about different ways of life. He knew 
different viewpoints, different alternatives. Their system was failing - he knew this. If 
Brezhnev had died earlier, and Gorbachev had taken over, it would have been easier -  it 
would have come sooner (the legalization of Solidarnosc would have come earlier.) But 
Andropov took over - Jaruzelski had to deal with Andropov! And Andropov was the guy 
who talked Khrushchev into invading Hungary. Andropov would have invaded Poland 
too - but he died! (laughs) There were already Russian soldiers kept in Poland and it is a 
miracle that Andropov did not use them. Jaruzelski held back this by making martial 
law." 
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" We were organized then - we had the whole country organized (Solidarity had the 
whole country organized). We would decide a strike will happen at noon today. At noon 
the church bells ring - workers leave the shipyard - put down their tools. Factories come 
to a stop. We could shut the country down if we wanted to! That scared them! (it scared 
the  government). They realized they were in big trouble - Jaruzelski was in big trouble! 
With Gorbachev, it could be peaceful - with the other guys - no - I don't think it would 
have been a peaceful transition. No, could have been very, very bad!" 
 
     "JB" comments were in reference to the displays of Solidarity's unity in the spring and 
summer of 1981 that led up to the enactment of martial law in December of that year. According 
to a Time magazine report (Hornik 1981) the union was so well organized at that time that a 
nationwide strike was possible. Although Solidarity had been officially recognized by the Polish 
Peoples' Republic on August 31, 1980 (the date of the signing of the Gdansk Agreements) few of 
the union's demands had been addressed by summer of 1981.  Hornik reported that a major clash 
between Solidarity protestors and police in the city of Bydgoszcz  and growing nationwide 
impatience with the Polish government's delays  prompted Lech Walesa to make a public 
statement calling for restraint. Hornik (1981) reported, "Walesa did his best to cool tempers 
during his visit to Bydgoszcz. "Not all the authorities are swine," the Solidarity leader said. Then 
he warned that "you must realize that a general strike would be the end of our struggle. One side 
has an army and we have none" (www.time.com/article/9171925506-1.00.html). 
    Hornik also mentioned that some 40,000 Soviet troops already stationed in Poland at Legncia 
were put on alert and began "Soyuz 81 Maneuvers," which were a systems-test of Warsaw Pact 
military communications. Altogether, Poland was at the brink of a national crisis. With millions 
of workers ready to walk off the job at Walesa's orders and Soviet troops on alert, Jaruzelski was 
called to Moscow to give an account of the disorder. 
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      Ash's description of this is chilling (2002: 154 - 155). He states that Jaruzelski was 
confronted by "seven of the most powerful men in the world,"  including Brezhnev, Andropov, 
and Mikhail Suslov, "the supreme guardian of ideological orthodoxy." Jaruzelski was questioned 
as to why he and his negotiating committee had given in to the language of the Gdansk 
Agreements , which, if actually followed, would be violations of basic Communist ideology. 
Jaruzelski was ordered to, "...turn the course of events and to remove the peril hanging over the 
socialist achievements of the Polish People." Ash says that this statement was perceived as even 
more ominous in Poland where it was translated to read, "reverse the course of events."   
      Jaruzelski, who as a loyal Communist, was also a Pole. According to informant "PZ", Walesa 
had trusted Jaruzelski and had even endorsed him as a reasonable and honest leader. Informant 
"PZ" showed me a cartoon picture of Jaruzelski as the Buddha. "PZ" said, "They called him, 
"The Buddha," because he was so calm. Or "The Welder" because he always wore these huge 
black sunglasses  - like welding goggles. That is because he was almost made blind by snow in a 
prison camp. Yes, we made fun of him - but I think he saved us from the Russian army."   
     Thus, the above scenario and various comments by my informants demonstrates the 
precarious situation Poland found itself in prior to the "Gorbachev thaw" of 1985. Solidarity had 
succeeded in uniting the nation against Communist party control, Walesa had called for restraint, 
and Jaruzelski had been blamed for allowing this threat to Communist Party rule to go as far as it 
had. Informants "JB" and "AF" believed (in retrospect) that Jaruzelski's government  never had 
intended to honor the Gdansk Agreements. They believed the signing of the Agreements had 
been yet another delay tactic while State economists tried to dream up more 'recovery plans,' and 
while Party bureaucrats tried to figure out how best to stop the Solidarity Movement.   They also 
believed,  looking back,  that the events leading up to enactment of martial law by General 
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Jaruzelski had thoroughly shaken Soviet leaders in Moscow. "JB" remarked, "They knew it was 
a matter of time. We knew it was a matter of time. The people were ready. Walesa was wise to 
back off. He always said, "evolution not revolution." Solidarity's prime opportunity for evolution 
emerged as Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR. 
______________________________ 
 
     This section will use comments from news sources in which informed observers remark on 
the importance of Gorbachev's role in facilitating the success of Solidarity. It will also include a 
quote from Gorbachev's Christmas Day resignation speech of 1991, in which he summarizes in a 
few paragraphs the failure of the Soviet System. His comments were perfect reflections of my 
informants' criticisms of the Communist system in Poland. His efforts to reform the system had 
failed and the Soviet Union was dissolved December 26, 1991. Without Gorbachev's initiatives 
of perestroika and glasnost the Polish Solidarity Movement and all it accomplished would have 
certainly been delayed, or perhaps would have never occurred. 
________________________ 
     In an excerpt from a 1989 PBS News Hour report, posted online on the 20th anniversary of 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, (November 9th, 2009 - http://www.pbs.org/newshour) several 
prominent politicians and academics discussed the reasons for the dramatic events that had 
recently occurred in Eastern Europe. News Hour host Jim Leherr asked the group, "Would this 
have happened today (referring to the fall of the Berlin Wall) if there were no Mikhail 
Gorbachev?" Paul Nitze, an advisor to several U.S. presidents on Cold War issues, answered as 
follows: 
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"I believe not. I believe Mr. Gorbachev created ideas and forces in that part of the world 
which contributed to developments in the GDR as well as in the rest of Central Europe. 
So I am not at all sure that this would have happened under different circumstances." 
 
    Nitze goes on to explain his view that internal problems in the Soviet Union were greater than 
any external threat to the nation. Another interviewee, Walt W. Rostow, introduced by Leherr as 
a former State Department planner and noted historian, elaborated on Nitze's remarks: 
"...I think there are very strong forces operating which have lead to the general position 
of Mr. Gorbachev. The stagnation of their economy since 1980, the new technologies 
which their whole apparatus finds great difficulty in getting ahold of, and the frustrations 
they've found in the world in which they've found nationalism a much more resistant 
force - and this has made it very expensive for them to carry on their activities...Mr. 
Gorbachev position is built on very hard facts and I believe his leadership has greatly 
accelerated the timetable for all of this." 
 
_________________________________ 
 
     A British news story from the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, titled, "Mikhail 
Gorbachev - The Forgotten Hero Of History," (Beaumont 2009) describes the events of 
November 9th, 2009 in which Hilary Clinton, Lech Walesa, "and the star guest, Mikhail 
Gorbachev," attended a ceremony at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. Beaumont gives 
Gorbachev the central role in the celebrated events. He quotes Timothy Garton Ash, who also 
attended the ceremony, as he honored Gorbachev for his, "breathtaking renunciation of the use of 
force," and citing Gorbachev as," a luminous example of the importance of the individual in 
history."  
     Beaumont mentions, "...the hard to define "Gorbachev Effect," and speculates that it consists 
of much more than Gorbachev's 'renunciation of the use of force,' as pointed out by Ash.  It is, in 
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Beaumont's view, a mindset that evolved over time as Gorbachev faced the realities of the Soviet 
system's failures and imagined  future possibilities for his country. Beaumont points out that this 
future was not the oversimplified notion popularized by some news sources at the time, which 
painted the collapse of communism as an automatic endorsement for unrestrained capitalism. He 
states:  
"It was Gorbachev's accession to position of general secretary of the Communist Party in 
1985 that finally would unleash ideas he had already been playing with during his rapid 
rise to power. It was not defined, as some misunderstood it, by a desire to emulate the 
west. Far from it. Instead, what he desired was to make more efficient and liberal a party 
that had lost its way." 
 
     Beaumont than quotes Gorbachev's close aide, Anatoly Chernyaev, who remarked that 
Gorbachev's liberal and modern ideas were not new, but the great significance lay in the fact that, 
"...a person who came out of a Soviet society conditioned from top to bottom by Stalinism began 
to carry these ideas." This seems to be the essence of "The Gorbachev Effect" - the acceptance 
and dissemination of the ideas of democracy, human rights, and economic modernization 
(www.gauradian.co.uk/theobserver/2009/nov/08/observer-profile-mikhail-gorbachev). 
     In a very similar vein, Informant "B" remarked to me that the absolute insistence on following 
traditional Communist Party ideology, regardless if it made good economic sense or not,  had 
been a great source of frustration for him. "B" likened it to blindly following a religion or to a 
form of insanity. "I remember that was the biggest thing for me," "B" said, " I couldn't take it. I 
said I will always look for the truth - look for what works, what is practical. I can think for 
myself. The Party was set in ways of old men from a time that we no longer lived in. Gorbachev 
was one of few who saw this."  
___________________________________________ 
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     Finally, an excerpt from Gorbachev's resignation speech condenses the scope of the 
Communist system's problems and the hope he had for positive change. His criticisms of the past  
and his proposed agenda for the future were very much in line with those of Solidarity. Thus, I 
contend, his six-year-long office as General Secretary created the political opportunity that 
ultimately made the goals of the Polish Solidarity Movement possible. All of my informants 
speculated on the scenario of a solidarity movement without inclusion of the "Gorbachev 
Factor." All concluded, from their experiences during the initial formation of Solidarnosc, their 
time living under martial law, and their historic perspective of the USSR's past record with 
rebellious nations, that the Polish Solidarity Movement would have been very different without 
this significant advantage.  
     Below are excerpts from Gorbachev's speech titled, "We Opened Ourselves To The World," 
given on December 25, 1991, reprinted in Gale Stokes book, From Stalinism to Pluralism: A 
Documentary History of Eastern Europe Since 1945 (1996: 292 - 293). Gorbachev first outlines 
the system's problems: 
"Fate had it that when I found myself at the head of the state it was already clear that all 
was not well in the country. There is plenty of everything: land, oil, gas, other natural 
riches, and God gave us lots of intelligence and talent, yet we lived much worse than 
developed countries and kept falling behind more and more." 
     "The reason could already be seen: The society was suffocating in the vise of the 
command-bureaucratic system, doomed to serve ideology and bear the terrible burden of 
the arms race. It had reached the limit of its possibilities. All attempts at partial reform, 
and there had been many, had suffered defeat, one after another. The country was losing 
perspective. We could not go on living like that. Everything had to be changed radically." 
 
     He then outlines his vision for the future: 
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"...the totalitarian system that deprived the country of an opportunity to become 
successful and prosperous long ago has been eliminated. Free elections, freedom of the 
press, religious freedoms, representative organs of power, a multiparty system became a 
reality. Human rights are recognized as the supreme principle." 
"...we live in a new world. The cold war has ended; the arms race has stopped, as has the 
same militarization that mutilated our economy, public psyche, and morals...." 
"We opened ourselves to the world, gave up interference into other people's affairs, the 
use of troops beyond the borders of the country, and trust, solidarity, and respect came in 
response. We have become one of the main foundations for the transformation of modern 
civilization on peaceful democratic grounds."   
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
  
     Several observations will conclude this thesis. First, in researching this movement in terms of 
identifying various factors that facilitated its success,  I was struck by the belief expressed to me 
by my informants of its inevitability. All interviewees expressed the belief that democratization 
and economic transformation in Poland would have occurred regardless of any "factor" that I 
inquired about - regardless, even, of Solidarnosc and the particular social movement it 
engendered. I do believe that the seven factors discussed in this paper were the most crucial or 
influential in Solidarity's success, however, the point is that my informants all believed that if not 
through the Solidarity Movement -  or through the political opportunity created by Mikhail 
Gorbachev, or through the charismatic leadership of Lech Walesa, or by the worldwide 
recognition that Pope John Paul afforded the movement, etc., etc.,  - if none of these factors had 
materialized, all believed that eventually and inevitably transformation would have occurred.   
      This belief was based not only on my informants' recognition of the severe economic 
dysfunction of the entire Soviet system but also on their recognition (perhaps now from 
hindsight) that this system was in so many ways - from its basic organizational and operating 
form to its attempt at controlling  communications and culture - simply outdated. By attempting 
to control  so many aspects of its citizens' lives and in attempting to shape their lives into 
conformity with a static ideology, the regime had truly created a "second world," one without the 
capacity for change as was the case with the "first world." The bureaucratic "dynasty," for lack 
of a better word, of ageing Kremlin chiefs (Leonid Brezhnev was 60 when he became Party 
Secretary and his successor, Yuri Andropov was 69 when he took the job) who set the entire 
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system's agenda were steeped in industrial era economic policy and in Stalin era social policy.  
As my informants adamantly told me, Poland's leaders and economic planners all had to answer 
directly to Moscow for approval or permission of nearly every move they made, (as did the 
leaders of all Poland's neighboring countries in Eastern Europe) and thus no amount of 
innovation on their part could improve the failing system; the geriatric Kremlin crowd could only 
envision heavy industrial production with  masses of loyal, semi-skilled proletariats at the 
controls as a viable scenario for "building socialism." 
      Through the 1950s, '60s, and '70s the Soviet and Eastern Bloc populations suffered for lack 
of basic consumer goods in the State's effort to reinvest as much as possible into heavy industrial 
facilities. However, by the 1980s, the system was also lacking in the emerging technological 
innovations that began sweeping over the Western world, and eventually resulted in the 
managerial and organizational shifts now expressed in the global capitalist system. My 
informants' stories of the severe lack of  communication and information technology during the 
Solidarity era - and they were referring simply to basic phone service and pre-computer era 
printers - is a striking example of a failure to even begin the material shift from a post-WWII era 
economy to the information age. The ideological shift had already begun in the minds of 
Solidarity's activists and in the minds of millions of their followers. 
      It is ironic and unfortunate that the post-WWII generation of Eastern Europe labored so 
greatly in the development of a modern industrial society, as did the same generation in Western 
Europe and the U.S., but most Eastern Europeans never benefited from the wealth created in this 
era;  no huge, semi-affluent middle class emerged in Poland as it did in the U.S. out of the 
industrial growth proceeding WWII. Yet, it was this generation in Eastern Europe that imagined 
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a better life, and as historical circumstances would have it, patiently worked to change their 
social, political, and economic systems in an attempt to attain that life. 
     What Poland lacked in economic and technological innovation it certainly made up for in 
innovative and eclectic methods of protest, resistance, and information dissemination during the 
Solidarity era. I was fascinated by my informants' stories of how strikes were called at a pre-
planned hour by the ringing of church bells, how "bill-stickers" risked jail time to hang flyers 
calling for Solidarity rallies, how samizdat newspapers were carried across international borders 
to help expand the movement throughout Europe, how evening "walks" became a form of mass 
protest against government-endorsed news shows, and how religious ceremonies were used as 
non-violent, symbolic acts of resistance. In this area alone - in surveying the wide range of 
protest strategies used by Solidarity - there is much opportunity for further research. In addition 
to the range of strategies, the content of the messages of protest and resistance also offers 
potential for research. Content analysis of the many samizdat newspapers printed in Gdansk 
alone would be a major research project.  
     Potentially, each of the seven "facilitating factors" of this thesis could be elaborated on by 
further research. Obviously, a larger number of interviews would expand the range of individual 
perceptions of the movement, as would fluency in Polish or a 'full-time translator,' in relation to 
all the printed sources of available data. Also, the plethora of symbolism, ceremony, and 
tradition attached to Solidarity in its opposition to the State offers a world of potential 
anthropological interpretation. In examining any of the above, one may also ask to what degree 
each played in facilitating Solidarity. My analysis offers no such measure, but is mostly 
description. 
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     Another interesting question open for investigation would be examining the delicate balance 
between protest and revolution, to a great degree maintained solely by Lech Walesa, which 
(apparently)  prevented Soviet military intervention while at the same time prolonged the 
movement, allowing for further political liberalization in the USSR. Without this perfect balance 
the outcome of the Solidarity Movement could have been very different. Soviet military action 
could have silenced all dissent, or, on the other hand, too little action on the part of Solidarity 
could have resulted in the movement fading away from within.  
     It may also be said that Solidarity created its own political opportunity in offering its agenda 
as an alternative to that of the Communist Party. This perspective also invites further study, as 
does examining the movement from the Soviet perspective. 
       U.S. perceptions of the movement also call for investigation, especially in regards to the 
inaccurate notion that Poland (for that matter, the USSR as well) was eager to adopt unregulated, 
"wide-open" capitalism and fully reject socialism. Ronald Reagan, for example, and those of his 
neoliberal economic persuasion, seemed certain that they had convinced the world that "greed is 
good," and that all nations emerging from control of "the evil empire" were very anxious to 
practice "economic Darwinism." Reagan even seemed to take credit for the entire transformation 
of Eastern Europe and Russia.  At his insistence that Mr. Gorbachev, "tear down that wall,"  so 
goes conservative mythology, Gorbachev did so! This distortion of history is an insult to the 
entire Solidarity generation in Eastern Europe and to generations of dissent in the USSR.   
______________________ 
    In conclusion, I allow that my time in Gdansk was very limited and my language skills very 
basic. Still, I consider the interview data I collected to be a valuable contribution to the study of 
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the Polish Solidarity Movement, as my informants were eyewitnesses to the unfolding of this 
history changing era. Their stories - some in perfect English, some in a mix of Polish, simple 
English, and hand gestures, and some fully translated to me by acquaintances  both arranged for 
and stumbled onto - answered for me questions I had thought about for some 30 years. Sharing 
my own story of our local OCAW union's small financial donations and big "moral support" for 
Solidarity during the 1980s, I believe, instantly opened doors - quite literally, the gate of the 
Gdansk Shipyard and the Gdansk Solidarnosc Local - to me. Every contact I made not only 
answered the questions I asked but went much further, sharing their own personal memories with 
me, pointing out places where certain events happened, and relating to me their part in 
facilitating Solidarity's success. I consider myself very fortunate to have heard their stories.   
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Appendix 
__________________________ 
21 Demands Document  
(Translated, paraphrased  from copy available through Wystawa Drogi Do Wolnosci, Gdansk) 
Strike Information Bulletin 
Inter-enterprise Strike Committee 
Gdansk, August 22, 1980 
 
 
The Inter-enterprise Strike Committee also represents the personnel of enterprises and offices that 
have not joined the strike because their work is indispensable to society, and should not be 
disrupted. The committee's intention is to negotiate for all work forces on strike. The primary 
condition to opening negotiations with the government is their agreement to reconnect all telephone 
and telecommunications lines. The specific demands of the work forces on strike , as represented by 
the MKS, are as follows: 
 
1.  Recognition of the Free Trade-Union, independent of the Party and of employers... 
 
2.   Guarantee of the right to strike, and of the indemnity of strikers and their supporters. 
 
3.  Guaranteed freedom of expression and of publications...an end to the suppression of 
independent publications and the opening up of the mass media to representatives of all political 
and religious persuasions. 
 
4.  Restorations of rights to persons dismissed for having defended workers' rights...and to students 
excluded from higher education because of their opinions...Liberation of all political prisoners...and 
an end to repression for crimes of conscience. 
 
5.  Access to the mass media to inform public opinion of the creation of the Inter-Enterprise Strike 
Committee and to make its demand public. 
 
6.  Initiation of efficient measures for relieving the country's economic crisis by mass circulation of 
all information relating to the socioeconomic situation...and opportunity of citizens to take part in 
discussions concerning economic reforms. 
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7.  Payment to all strikers for days on strike... 
 
8.  Monthly increase of 2,000 zlotys to every worker's base pay to compensate for the latest price 
increases. 
 
9.  Establishment of salary scales for all positions. 
 
10.  Assurance that all foodstuffs are available to the home market; export of surplus food only. 
 
11.  Introduction of rationing (with books) for all meat products (until market stabilizes.) 
 
12.  Suppression of government-sanctioned "floating prices" and the payment in foreign currencies 
for scarce items in special "hard currency" stores... 
 
13.  Appointment of management staff according to merit, not to party membership. Withdrawal of 
privileges from militia, security forces, and Party members by making family allowances the same 
for all citizens... 
 
14.  Lowering the retirement age (to pre-Revolution age.) 
 
15.  Payment of pension funds (to post-Revolution level.) 
 
16.  Improvement of working conditions and health services, plus full medical assistance for all 
workers and families. 
 
17.  The creation of adequate day-care centers and nurseries for the children of working mothers. 
 
18.  Paid maternity leave of three full years to allow mothers to raise their young children. 
 
19.  Reduction of the waiting time for apartments. 
 
20.  Increase in travel allowances and cost-of-living allowance... 
 
21.  Saturday as a work-free day for all...Compensation for work on Saturday: extra vacation days 
or granting of other free days, with pay... 
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Marshall University 
Informed Consent Template1 
Informed Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
An Analysis of The Polish Solidarity Movement 
 
Richard Garnett  PhD,  Principal Investigator 
 
Introduction 
You are invited to be in a research study.  Research studies are designed to gain scientific knowledge that 
may help other people in the future.  You may or may not receive any benefit from being part of the 
study.  Your participation is voluntary.  Please take your time to make your decision, and ask your 
research investigator or research staff to explain any words or information that you do not understand. 
 
Why Is This Study Being Done? 
It is being done to learn more about the Polish Solidarity Movement. 
 
How Many People Will Take Part In The Study? 
About 30 people will take part in this study.  A total of 50 people are the most that would be able to enter 
the study. 
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What Is Involved In This Research Study? 
You will be answering some questions about your participation in the Polish Solidarity Movement and/or 
about your life in Poland prior to 1989. If you are an American you will be answering some questions 
about your participation in a labor union and about your experiences at your place of work. These 
questions will allow the researcher to compare and contrast the experiences of workers in American and 
Polish labor unions.  If your answers are recorded on tape or digital recorder all of the recordings will be 
erased or destroyed at the end of the study. 
 
How Long Will You Be In The Study? 
You will be in the study for about one year. There may be a follow-up interview that you can participate 
in if you wish. 
You can decide to stop participating at any time.  If you decide to stop participating in the study we 
encourage you to talk to the study investigator or study staff as soon as possible. 
The study investigator may stop you from taking part in this study at any time if he/she believes it is in 
your best interest; if you do not follow the study rules; or if the study is stopped. 
What Are The Risks Of The Study? 
There are no known risks to those who take part in this study. 
Are There Benefits To Taking Part In The Study? 
If you agree to take part in this study, there may or may not be direct benefit to you. We hope the 
information learned from this study will benefit other people in the future. The benefits of participating in 
this study may be that the information you are contributing will help us better understand social 
movements. 
What About Confidentiality? 
We will do our best to make sure that your personal information is kept confidential.  However, we 
cannot guarantee absolute confidentiality.  Federal law says we must keep your study records private.  
Nevertheless, under unforeseen and rare circumstances, we may be required by law to allow certain 
agencies to view your records.  Those agencies would include the Marshall University IRB, Office of 
Research Integrity (ORI) and the federal Office of Human Research Protection (OHRP).  This is to make 
sure that we are protecting your rights and your safety.  If we publish the information we learn from this 
study, you will not be identified by name or in any other way.  
     If audio recordings of your interview are made they will be erased as soon as the researcher reviews 
them and records any pertinent data from them in the form of a written transcript. Any written transcript 
of your interview will be kept in a locked file cabinet accessible only by the researcher. If any of the 
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information you give us is used in writing up a research report your name will not be used, nor will any 
details be used that would allow any reader of the report to identify you. 
 
 
What Are The Costs Of Taking Part In This Study? 
There are no costs to you for taking part in this study.  All the study costs, including any study tests, 
supplies and procedures related directly to the study, will be paid for by the study. 
 
Will You Be Paid For Participating? 
You will receive no payment or other compensation for taking part in this study. 
 
What Are Your Rights As A Research Study Participant? 
Taking part in this study is voluntary.  You may choose not to take part or you may leave the study at any 
time.  Refusing to participate or leaving the study will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to 
which you are entitled.  If you decide to stop participating in the study we encourage you to talk to the 
investigators or study staff first. 
 
Whom Do You Call If You Have Questions Or Problems? 
For questions about the study or in the event of a research-related injury, contact the study investigator, at 
(304) 696-2800 or (304) 696-6700.  You should also call the investigator if you have a concern or 
complaint about the research. 
For questions about your rights as a research participant, contact the Marshall University IRB#2 
Chairman Dr. Stephen Cooper or ORI at (304) 696-4303.  You may also call this number if: 
o You have concerns or complaints about the research. 
o The research staff cannot be reached. 
o You want to talk to someone other than the research staff. 
 
You will be given a signed and dated copy of this consent form. 
SIGNATURES 
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You agree to take part in this study and confirm that you are 18 years of age or older.  You have had a 
chance to ask questions about being in this study and have had those questions answered.  By signing this 
consent form you are not giving up any legal rights to which you are entitled. 
 
 
________________________________________________ 
    Subject Name (Printed) 
________________________________________________            _________________ 
    Subject Signature                                                                                         Date 
_______________________________________________ 
    Person Obtaining Consent (Printed) 
________________________________________________            _________________ 
     Person Obtaining Consent Signature                                                           Date 
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Marshall University 
Szablon oświadczenia świadomej zgody2 
 
Świadoma zgoda na uczestniczenie w badaniu naukowym 
Analiza Polskiego Ruchu Solidarność 
 
Doktor Richard Garnett, Główny Badacz 
 
Wstęp 
 
Zapraszam do udziału w badaniu naukowym. Celem badań klinicznych jest zgromadzenie wiedzy 
naukowej, która w przyszłości moŜe pomóc ludziom. Uczestniczenie w badaniu moŜe Panu(i) przynieść 
korzyści lub nie. Uczestniczenie w badaniu jest całkowicie dobrowolne. Proszę spokojnie przemyśleć 
swoją decyzję i poprosić badacza naukowego lub personel prowadzący badanie o wyjaśnienie wszystkich 
słów bądź informacji, których Pan(i) nie rozumie. 
 
Dlaczego prowadzimy to badanie? 
Badanie jest prowadzone w celu uzyskania większej wiedzy o polskim ruchu Solidarność. 
 
Ile osób weźmie udział w tym badaniu naukowym? 
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W tym badaniu weźmie udział co najmniej 30 osób. W badaniu będzie mogło wziąć udział wyłącznie 
włącznie 50 osób. 
 
 
Co obejmuje to badanie? 
Odpowie Pan(i) na kilka pytań dotyczących Pana(i) udziału w polskim ruchu Solidarność i/lub swoim 
Ŝyciu w Polsce, przed 1989 rokiem. Jeśli jest Pan(i) Amerykaninem/Amerykanką odpowie Pan(i) na kilka 
pytań dotyczących swojego udziału w związkach zawodowych i o doświadczeniach w miejscu pracy. 
Pytania te umoŜliwią naukowcowi porównanie i przeciwstawienie doświadczeń pracowników w 
amerykańskich i polskich związkach zawodowych. Po zakończeniu tego badania, odpowiedzi nagrywane 
na taśmie lub w nagrywarce cyfrowej zostaną zniszczone. 
 
Jak długo będę uczestniczyć w badaniu? 
Pana(i) uczestnictwo w badaniu potrwa około jednego roku. MoŜe teŜ być przeprowadzony wywiad 
uzupełniający, w którym moŜe Pan(i) wziąć udział, jeśli wyrazi Pan(i) taką wolę. 
W kaŜdej chwili moŜna się wycofać z badania. Jeśli postanowi Pan(i) wycofać się z badania, prosimy jak 
najszybciej porozmawiać z badaczem naukowym lub z personelem prowadzącym badanie. 
Badacz naukowy moŜe w kaŜdej chwili przerwać Pana(i) udział w tym badaniu, jeśli uwaŜa, Ŝe będzie to 
w Pana(i) najlepszym interesie; jeśli nie będzie Pan(i) przestrzegać regulaminu badania; lub jeśli badanie 
zostanie przerwane. 
 
Jakie ryzyko jest związane z badaniem? 
Brak znanego ryzyka dla osób uczestniczących w tym badaniu. 
 
Czy udział w badaniu wiąŜe się z jakimiś korzyściami? 
Jeśli wyrazi Pan(i) zgodę na uczestnictwo w tym badaniu, moŜe Pan(i) na tym skorzystać lub nie. 
JednakŜe, wiedza uzyskana z uczestnictwa moŜe w przyszłości pomóc innym ludziom. Korzyści płynące 
z uczestnictwa w badaniu mogą być tego rodzaju, Ŝe przekazana wiedza pomoŜe lepiej zrozumieć ruchy 
społeczne. 
A co z poufnością? 
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Uczynimy wszystko, co w naszej mocy, aby zapewnić zachowywane danych osobowych uczestników. 
Nie moŜemy jednak zagwarantować pełnej poufności. Przepisy federalne nakazują nam zachowanie 
poufności danych uczestników. Pomimo tego w nieprzewidzianych i rzadkich okolicznościach, ma mocy 
obowiązujących przepisów moŜemy być zmuszeni pozwolić pewnym instytucjom przejrzenie Pana(i) 
danych. Do takich instytucji naleŜy Marshall University IRB, Office of Research Integrity (ORI) oraz 
federalny Office of Human Research Protection (OHRP). Ma to na celu zapewnienie chronienia przez 
naspraw i bezpieczeństwa uczestników. Jeśli opublikujemy wiedzę zdobytą w tym badaniu, nie ujawnimy 
Ŝadnych nazwisk ani innych danych.  
   Jeśli wywiad będzie nagrywany, takie nagranie zostanie skasowane po zapoznaniu się z nim przez 
badacza i po zapisaniu wszystkich danych związanych z badaniem w formie transkrypcji. Wszelkie 
transkrypcje z wywiadów będą przechowywane w zamkniętej szafie na akta, do której dostęp będzie mieć 
wyłącznie badacz. Jeśli jakakolwiek podana przez Pana(ią) informacja zostanie wykorzystana podczas 
pisania sprawozdania, Pana(i) dane nie zostaną uŜyte, tak samo jak i nie zostaną uŜyte Ŝadne dane, które 
umoŜliwiłyby odbiorcy sprawozdania w zidentyfikowaniu uczestników badania. 
 
Jakie są koszty związane z uczestniczeniem w tym badaniu? 
Uczestnicy badania nie ponoszą Ŝadnych kosztów. Wszystkie koszty badania, w tym za wszelkie testy 
wykonane w badaniu, materiały i procedury bezpośrednio związane z tym badaniem poniesie to badanie. 
 
Czy otrzyma Pan(i) wynagrodzenie za uczestnictwo? 
Nie otrzyma Pan(i) wynagrodzenia ani innej rekompensaty za udział w tym badaniu. 
 
Jakie prawa ma uczestnik badania? 
Udział w niniejszym badaniu jest dobrowolny. MoŜe Pan(i) zdecydować nie wziąć udziału lub kaŜdej 
chwili zrezygnować z uczestnictwa. W wypadku odmowy lub rezygnacji z udziału w badaniu nie poniesie 
Pan(i) Ŝadnej kary ani nie utraci przysługujących świadczeń. Jeśli postanowi Pan(i) wycofać się z 
badania, prosimy najpierw porozmawiać z badaczem lub z personelem prowadzącym badanie. 
 
Do kogo naleŜy zadzwonić w przypadku pytań lub problemów? 
Pytania na temat badania lub w wypadku odniesieniu obraŜeń w związku z badaniem, naleŜy się 
kontaktować z badaczem pod numerem telefonu (304) 696-2800 lub (304) 696-6700. Do badacza naleŜy 
równieŜ dzwonić w przypadku problemów lub skarg w związku z tym badaniem naukowym. 
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Pytania dotyczące praw uczestników badania naukowego naleŜy kierować do Przewodniczącego IRB nr 
2, doktora Stephena Coopera w Marshall University lub do ORI pod numer telefonu (304) 696-4303. Pod 
ten numer moŜna teŜ dzwonić, jeśli: 
o ma Pan(i) obawy lub skargi w związku z tym badaniem naukowym; 
o nie moŜe się Pan(i) skontaktować z personelem uczestniczącym w badaniu; 
o chce Pan(i) porozmawiać z kimś innym niŜ personel uczestniczący w badaniu naukowym. 
Otrzyma Pan(i) podpisany i datowany egzemplarz niniejszego formularza świadomej zgody. 
PODPISY 
Zgadza się Pan(i) na wzięcie udziału w tym badaniu naukowym i potwierdza, Ŝe ukończył/a Pan(i) 18 rok 
Ŝycia. Miał/a Pan(i) moŜliwość zadawania pytań na temat uczestniczenia w tym badaniu i uzyskał/a 
Pan(i) na nie odpowiedzi. Podpisując ten formularz świadomej zgody, nie ceduje Pan(i) przysługujących 
Panu(i) Ŝadnych praw. 
 
________________________________________________ 
  Imię i nazwisko (drukowanymi literami) 
________________________________________________      _________________ 
  Podpis                                                  Data 
________________________________________________ 
  Imię i nazwisko osoby pobierającej zgodę (drukowanymi literami) 
________________________________________________      _________________ 
   Podpis osoby pobierającej zgodę      Data 
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Questionnaire in English  
 
General Topics: 
1.  Solidarnosc  
2.   Daily life in Gdansk during Solidarity Movement 
     Martial Law 
     Work  
     Economy  (alternatives?) 
     Communication   (alternatives?) 
     Education 
     Religion 
3. Comments about:  Lech Walesa, Pope John Paul, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Jaruzelski, 
     General comments about any other person or topic  
     General comments comparing pre-1989 to current times 
     General comments about future of Solidarnosc, of Gdansk, of Poland in general 
 
Solidarnosc: 
Were you a member of the union? 
Were you an activist?  
Did you participate in strikes, marches, protests?  Any other activities? What were these 
experiences like? 
What do you remember most about those days? 
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How was Solidarnosc funded? Were resources scarce? Did members pay dues? 
Were people encouraged to join or participate in Solidarnosc? Were some people opposed to the 
movement? 
Were there other unions...State sponsored unions? What were these like? 
Why did you join or participate? 
Did you receive any education or training from Solidarnosc?   
How did Solidarnosc get its message or agenda out to the public? 
What was the main message or agenda?  
Why was the movement so successful? 
What has the movement accomplished? 
Is the union still active? 
What are the most important lessons the world can learn from this historic era? 
 
Daily Life In Gdansk During The Solidarity Movement: Martial Law, Work, Economy 
What was life like in Gdansk during the movement? What memories stand out most clearly? 
What was life like during Martial Law? 
Were their shortages? What kind? How severe? 
Was housing in short supply? Did you have a house or apartment? Was it affordable? 
Did you own a car? Were there restrictions on travel? 
How does the pre-1989 economy compare with today's economy? 
Were there alternatives to the regular economy? Did people, for instance, raise a garden or raise 
any livestock to supplement their income? Were items available on the "black market?"  
Did people help each other by trading work or trading services or skills? 
Were there any other innovative ways of supplementing income?  
Where did you work during this time? What was your job like? Can you describe your place of 
work and your particular job? 
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Did you feel a sense of loyalty or obligation to your place of work...to your union (union before 
Solidarnosc)...to your co-workers...to your craft, or profession? 
What kinds of benefits did your job have?  Medical care? Retirement? Vacation? Sick leave? 
Maternity leave?  
Were you paid well? 
Were you ever unemployed?  
 
Communication: 
To what extent were TV, radio, newspapers, journalism, etc. controlled by the State before 1989? 
Did this change under martial Law?  
Was there access to news from external sources...Radio Free Europe, BBC, or any other source 
outside Poland? 
Were personal communications censored?  For example, were letters censored? Phone calls 
monitored?  Did people freely communicate? 
Was news about Solidarnosc censored? How was Solidarnosc portrayed by the news?  
What was the most important method of communication for Solidarnosc? 
Did Solidarnosc publish its own newspapers?  
Were samizdat or bibula papers common? Did you read them? What were they about? Did they 
help to  organize and spread the movement? Did they help hold the movement together while it 
was outlawed? 
Were you ever involved in writing, printing, or distributing samizdat papers? Did you know 
anyone who was involved? 
What kind of personal communications and printing devices were available in Poland during the 
1980s...regular telephone service? Copy machines? Word processors? Typewriters? How was 
samizdat publishing done?  How was it distributed? 
What were "Uniwersytet Latajacy?"  ("Flying Universities?") Were these important to the 
Solidarity Movement? 
After 1989, did free and open communication begin immediately?  
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Education: 
What was education like in Poland before 1989? 
Do you believe that you got a good education?  
Did the Soviet Union and  Communist Party influence education?  In what ways? 
Were the ideas of Marx, Lenin, or Stalin presented in school? Were alternatives to these ideas 
presented?  
Was Russian language mandatory? 
Did you learn about the capitalist economy or democratic government in school? 
Were there business management classes in schools? Were these based on State Economics or 
private enterprise? 
How were Western nations  - The USA, United Kingdom, Western Europe, portrayed in school?  
How was Poland and Polish history presented?  
Was general education free?  Could everyone get college education? Was it expensive?  
Did college students have considerable academic freedom? Were there ideological standards to 
meet?  
In what ways has education changed since 1989?  
Was Solidarnosc discussed in colleges and schools? Did many students support the movement? 
 
Religion:  
Did you regularly attend church during the Solidarity Movement?  Still attend? 
Was the Solidarity movement ever discussed in church? 
Did the Church, in general, support Solidarnosc? In what ways? 
Do you believe the goals of Solidarity were in-line with the teachings of Catholicism - with the 
general message and teachings of Pope John Paul II?  
Do you believe that Pope John Paul had a supernatural or divine mission in supporting or 
promoting Solidarnosc? Did many people believe this?  
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Did Solidarnosc connect itself with the Church...that is, was the Church mentioned in 
publications or messages of any kind produced by Solidarnosc? 
Did you ever see sacred images of the Church, such as The Black Madonna (Our Lady of 
Czestochowa) or Our Lady of Fatima, connected to Solidarnosc in any way? 
 
 
Comments about famous people of the Solidarity era: 
Lech Walesa, Pope John Paul, Mikhail Gorbachev...how important were these people to the 
success of the movement? 
Would the Solidarity Movement have succeeded without these people? 
Other important individuals?  
Comments about General Jaruzelski? Any other influential people? 
General comments about any other person or topic? 
General comments comparing pre-1989 to current times? 
General comments about future of Solidarnosc, of Gdansk, of Poland in general? 
 
General interview schedule for individuals who had previously (or still are) worked 
industrial jobs (this section used only in US interviews.)  
Were you (or are you) a member of an independent labor union?  
In what kind of trade or industry did you work while in the union? 
What was your job like? Can you describe your place of work and your particular job? 
What were your relations with your co-workers like?  
Did you feel a sense of loyalty or obligation to your co-workers...to your union...to the company 
you worked for? 
Do you believe that your fellow workers would stand up for you or come to your aid in a time of 
trouble...let's say, if you had a grievance against the company, or if you had an injury or lay-off 
and could not work. 
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Are you working now? Is your new job unionized? How do you feel about your fellow-
employees, your union (if unionized) and the company you now work for in terms of loyalty or 
obligation? 
Were you ever involved in a strike while unionized? What was that like? Was the strike 
successful in terms of achieving its goals? Why or why not? 
Why, do you believe, did your plant or industry shut down? Why, in general, do you think that  
so many plants are closing? 
 
Questionnaire in Polish  
 
Uwagi na temat edukacji w Polsce przed rokiem 1980 
 Gdzie uczęszczałeś do szkoły podstawowej lub średniej? W jakich latach chodziłeś do szkoły? 
 Jakie miałeś przedmioty? 
 Czy, ogólnie, ideologia Maksa, Lenina lub Stalina bądź komunistyczna była przedstawiana w 
szkole? 
 W jakim zakresie były te ideologia przerabiane? 
 Czy moŜesz podać konkretne przypadki? 
Czy te ideologie były w programie nauki lub lekcji? 
 Czy moŜesz opisać, jak te informacje były przedstawiane – przez kogo?  Jak?  Na lekcjach, w 
ksiąŜkach, na obrazach, w symbolach, muzyce? 
 Czy uwaŜasz, Ŝe twoje doświadczenie było typowe w twoim pokoleniu? Jak to było u innych 
osób?  Jak to było u innych pokoleń? 
 Jaką miałeś o tym opinię?  Krytyczną? 
Gdzie chodziłeś do college’ W jakich latach chodziłeś? 
Jak moŜna opisać zakres wolności naukowej w college’u? 
Czy istniały normy ideologiczne, które musiały być spełnione w twoim programie nauki? 
 
Uwagi na temat organizacji Solidarności 
Gdzie mieszkałeś i pracowałeś w 1980 i 1981 roku? 
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W jaki sposób byłeś zaangaŜowany w działalność Solidarności? Jaką miałeś rolę? 
Jak zostałeś pozyskany? W jaki sposób przystąpiłeś? 
Dlaczego przystąpiłeś? 
Czy zachęcano ludzi do przystąpienia? 
Czy ludzie wszystkich, róŜnych klas lub zawodów byli zainteresowani Solidarnością? 
Czy róŜne klasy ludzi przystępowały z róŜnych powodów? 
Czy konieczne było płacenie składek miesięcznych? 
Jak dobrze była Solidarność finansowana? Czy wydawało się, Ŝe środki były niewielkie? 
Czy wiesz, jakie skąd się brały główne środki finansowe Solidarności? 
W jakiego rodzaju działalność w Solidarności byłeś zaangaŜowany? 
Czy moŜesz podać konkretne przypadki? Jakie masz inne doświadczenia? Inne role? 
Czy otrzymałeś w Solidarności jakieś przeszkolenie? Jakie? Kto cię szkolił? 
Czy było to szkolenie ideologiczne? Jaka była jego treść? Czy moŜesz je opisać? 
Czy szkoliłeś lub nauczałeś innych ludzi z tematu Solidarności? Jaka była jego treść?  
Czy dotyczyło ideologii? Czy była to próba rekrutowania ludzi? 
 
Uwagi na temat informacji w Polsce przed rokiem 1980 
 
W jakim stopniu w Polsce do 1980 roku były kontrolowane przez państwo środki masowej 
informacji – tzn. TV, radio, dzienniki, czasopisma?  Czy to się zmieniło w stanie wojennym?  
Czy wiadomości na temat Solidarności były cenzurowane? W jaki sposób była Solidarność 
przedstawiana w wiadomościach?  
W jaki sposób przekazywała Solidarność swoje komunikaty społeczeństwu? 
Czy był dostęp do wiadomości ze źródeł zewnętrznych – wiadomości z Radia Wolna Europa lub 
BBC,  na przykład, lub ze źródeł niekontrolowanych przez państwo? 
Czy Solidarność publikowała własny dziennik? Czy było to zgodne z prawem?  
Czy publikacje podziemne były powszechne? Czy je czytałeś? Jaka była ich treść?  
Czy publikacje państwowe były powszechne? Czy je czytałeś? Jaka była ich treść? 
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Czy byłeś zaangaŜowany w pisanie, drukowanie lub dystrybucję wydawnictw podziemnych? 
Czy znałeś kogoś, kto był?  
Czy uwaŜasz, Ŝe publikacje podziemne odgrywały waŜną rolę w utrzymaniu zainteresowania 
Solidarnością w czasie stanu wojennego?  
Czy uwaŜasz, Ŝe publikacje podziemne były najwaŜniejszym środkiem przekazywania 
informacji o Solidarności w stanie wojennym? 
 
 
 
 Uwagi na temat roli Kościoła w Solidarności 
 
Czy w czasie istnienia ruchu Solidarności regularnie chodziłeś do kościoła? 
Do którego Kościoła chodziłeś? 
Czy w Kościele rozmawiano o ruchu Solidarności? 
Czy twój Kościół, albo inny znany ci kościół, angaŜował się we wspieranie Solidarności?  W 
jaki sposób Kościół to robił?  
Czy uwaŜasz, Ŝe cele Solidarności były zgodne z nauką Katolicyzmu – powiedzmy, w zgodzie 
ze słowem papieŜa Jana Pawła II? 
Czy uwaŜasz, Ŝe papieŜ Jan Paweł II miał „nadnaturalną” lub „boską” misję w związku z jego 
współpracą z Solidarnością? Czy wiesz, czy wielu ludzi tak uwaŜa? Czy Solidarność 
kiedykolwiek wspomniała o tym związku w swoich publikacjach lub innych informacjach? 
Czy kiedykolwiek widziałeś obrazy świętych Kościoła, jak na przykład Czarnej Madonny lub 
Najświętszej Maryi Panny Fatimskiej bądź Najświętszej Maryi Panny Częstochowskiej w 
jakikolwiek związane z Solidarnością? 
 
 
Pytania ogólne 
Dlaczego według ciebie Solidarność odniosła taki sukces? 
Dlaczego przystąpiło do niej tak wielu ludzi? 
 Jakie wpływy miał Lech Wałęsa, papieŜ Jan Paweł II i Michaił Gorbaczow na ostateczny 
rezultaty działalności ruchu Solidarności? 
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Czy uwaŜasz, Ŝe wynik byłby inny, jeśli jedna lub więcej z tych osób nie zajmowałaby swojego 
stanowiska? 
Co postrzegasz jako największe osiągnięcie Solidarności?  
Wymień najwaŜniejsze rzeczy, jakie tamta epoka historyczna niesie światu jako lekcję? 
 
Ogólny harmonogram wywiadów z osobami, które poprzednio (lub w dalszym ciągu) 
pracowały na stanowiskach w przemyśle.  
Czy byłeś (lub jesteś) członkiem niezaleŜnego związki zawodowego?  
 
W jakiej branŜy lub w jakim przemyśle pracowałeś, gdy byłeś członkiem związku zawodowego? 
Jaką miałeś pracę? Czy moŜesz opisać swoje miejsce pracy i pracę jaką wykonywałeś? 
Jakie miałeś relacje ze współpracownikami?  
Czy miałeś poczucie lojalności lub zobowiązania wobec współpracowników...związku 
zawodowego...firmy, w której pracowałeś? 
Czy uwaŜasz, Ŝe koledzy z pracy stanęliby w twojej obronie lub czy pomogliby ci w trudnych 
czasach...powiedzmy, gdybyś miał skargę przeciwko firmie lub gdybyś odniósł obraŜenia lub 
zostałbyś zwolniony i nie mógł pracować. 
Czy obecnie pracujesz? Czy w nowej pracy istnieją związki zawodowe? Jakie masz obecnie 
uczucia, jeśli chodzi i lojalność i zobowiązania, wobec swoich kolegów z pracy, związku 
zawodowego (jeśli w zakładzie istnieje związek zawodowy) i wobec firmy, w której obecnie 
pracujesz? 
Czy będąc członkiem związku zawodowego brałeś kiedykolwiek udział w strajku? Jak to 
wyglądało? Czy strajk wywalczył zrealizowanie jego celów? Dlaczego tak lub nie? 
Dlaczego według ciebie twój zakład został zamknięty lub przestała istnieć twoja branŜa? Ogólnie 
mówiąc, dlaczego według ciebie, tak wiele zakładów jest zamykanych? 
Czy uwaŜasz, Ŝe na twoim, lokalnym, obszarze dojdzie kiedyś do oŜywienia gospodarczego? 
Dlaczego tak lub nie? Co według ciebie moŜna zrobić, aby oŜywić lokalną gospodarkę? 
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View Of Gdansk 
 
The shipyards stretch into the distance along the Baltic Coast. Workers lived in the brick 
apartment houses practically within reach of the grasp of giant shipyard cranes that have became 
a landmark of the city. At its peak in the late 1970s some 70,000 people were employed in 
shipbuilding in the "tri-cities" of Gdansk, Sopot, and Gdynia. 
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Looking Out Toward The Baltic Sea 
 
Although greatly reduced in capacity today, the remnants of the old Lenin Shipyard are 
nonetheless enormous. Industrial infrastructure lines both banks of the Wisla stretching out to the 
sea. Gdansk  has been a center for shipbuilding since the time of Peter the Great.   
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Repair Yard At The Mouth Of The Wisla 
 
Drawbridges raise to lets ships pass into the Wisla from the Baltic Sea. Stocznia Gdanska is still 
a very active maintenance and repair yard.  
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Power Plant On The Wisla 
 
The stacks of a coal-fired power plant are seen in the background of this picture. The plant is on 
the Baltic Coast but lines up nearly with the center of  Gdansk, and is only a few blocks from the 
main city center. It is joked to have been a "gift from Uncle Joe Stalin." Coal smoke and fly ash 
turned the winter snow black around the plant. Nearly all buildings in Gdansk are heated by 
steam generated at this plant. One way to distinguish Eastern Europe from Western Europe, I 
was jokingly told, was that in Eastern Europe there was not enough money to bury the steam 
pipes. These pipes do run above ground all over the city, and on the grounds of the power plant, 
local residents took advantage of the escaping heat from the transmission pipes to extend the 
growing season for vegetables....and to thus have something to eat during the dire food shortages 
of the 1970s and '80s. 
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The Syn Antares Under Construction 
At its peak in the 1970s Stocznia Gdanska produced an amazing 40 to 50 large, oceangoing ships 
per year - that's  about a ship every week!  Today, only one large ship is currently under 
construction, the Syn Antares, shown here (although several smaller ships are currently being 
built).  It is a specialty ship, built to transport liquefied natural gas with a 9000 cubic foot 
capacity. It's being built for Antares Shipping, a global group with headquarters in New York 
and London.  
For scale, note the man standing under the crane. These giants were built in 1970 by a Finnish 
company as an investment by the Soviet Union. They were intended to modernize the yard - at 
that time, called The Lenin Shipyard.  However, an interviewee told me, the cranes were 
outdated at the time of their  installation and never performed as the manufacturers claimed they 
would. Outdated technology was typical in most Soviet Bloc industries and was often 
compensated for with intensified human labor. There was no unemployment in the  Communist 
system, but, as a 44 year veteran of the shipyard commented, "...the work was inhuman. After 10 
or 15 years in this yard, a man's health was gone." 
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Inside The Sub-Assembly Building 
 
Ship subcomponents are built under-roof in gigantic buildings then assembled outside at the 
drydocks. 
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Welders At Work Inside Stocznia Gdanska 
 
I interviewed hourly workers, craft supervisors, a ship designer, and upper-level managers at the 
yard. A welding supervisor took me inside a large assembly building to show me how ships were 
pre-fabricated in smaller sections before outside assembly. A Ukrainian investment group now 
owns Stocznia Gdanska and employs about 2000 people. The aim of the Ukrainian company is to 
compete with Asian shipbuilding companies, not through cost, but through quality. The goal is to 
produce the highest quality ships in the world at the Gdansk yard. These will include ships for oil 
and gas exploration and ocean oil field maintenance with the most advanced technologies 
available as standard onboard equipment. The yard is also doing high-tolerance steel fabricating 
for the Baltic Coast's booming commercial construction business. They are also currently 
manufacturing columns for offshore wind turbines and are installing equipment to build the 
entire wind generator units - generators, blades, and all installation components. 
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Bases For Wind Generators 
The shipyard is transitioning toward construction and installation of offshore "wind farms" in the 
Baltic region. This is the first stage in construction of  base columns for the wind generators.  
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A Shipyard Worker Gets A Laugh From My Attempts To Speak  Polish 
 
Luckily, I had interpreters available! Several "higher-ups" at the shipyard spoke fluent English, 
but most hourly workers spoke only a few words of broken English, if that.  Still, we 
communicated with a handful of  Polish and English phrases, gestures, and the universal 
language among workers of  laughter and a chance to take a coffee break on a cold day!  Today, 
Polish TV is saturated with American shows, some subtitled and some voiced-over, giving all 
Poles somewhat of a daily "English lesson," and English is learned in school by most all young 
people. Prior to the late 1980s, Russian language was mandatory in all public schools and it was 
taught from 2nd grade on. This was a conscious and deliberate effort to "Russify" the population. 
University students following Solidarnosc protested to have the Russian language requirement 
dropped. 
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John Paul And Benedict Keep Watch In The Design Office  
 
Poland is the "most Catholic" country of all - you are seldom out of sight from symbols of 
Catholicism. Just the mention of the name, Jan Pawel Drugi, (John Paul II) very often brings 
tears to the eyes of Poles. Many regard John Paul with a sacred reverence unknown to Americans 
in relation to any religious figure - including Jesus Christ. John Paul was believed by many to 
have a "supernatural mission" to free Poland from the Communist Party and to "consecrate 
Russia to the sacred heart of Mary." These beliefs stem from the Fatima Prophecies and were 
legitimated by John Paul's dedication to this cause. Several of my interviewees attributed the 
support of John Paul for Solidarity as the most important factor in its success.  
 
 
 
252 
 
 
Where Lech Jumped The Wall 
 
John Paul may be a "sacred hero" to Poles, but Lech Walesa is a close second - however, he's 
certainly not viewed as sacred! This spot is where "Lech jumped the wall," as local legend goes. 
Lech was fired from the yard for passing out literature against the Communist sponsored trade 
unions and in favor of starting up an independent labor union. During a strike in August, 1980, 
he climbed over the shipyard wall (at the spot in this photo), jumped up on an excavator parked 
at the site, started spontaneously addressing the striking workers, and at that moment became the 
unofficial leader of what would become the Solidarity  Movement. Workers all over Poland and 
all over the world identified with him, and his simple message of working-class dignity, 
solidarity, and social justice, regardless if sometimes the actual wording was "rather unusual." 
One of my contacts from the University of Gdansk had once translated a live speech by Walesa 
for some English journalists. She said:  
"Walesa speaks his own language. He is impossible to translate fully into English - he is 
impossible even to fully understand in Polish! He uses all kinds of  - well, I guess you'd 
call them - 'workers speech'....stories, phrases, jokes - things that made my face turn red, 
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and things I was at a loss to translate! But the workers absolutely loved him! They knew, 
by his speech, that he was one of them. There was no pretending - he said exactly what he 
felt, just as it came to his mind! I was terrified when I translated for him!" 
The sign on the wall translates roughly to: "No wall ever frightened Walesa." This is a reference 
to barriers in general (perhaps his lack of formal training in politics and public speaking), the 
shipyard wall itself, and perhaps in reference to the Berlin Wall as a symbol of Communism and 
a wall against free speech. 
 
 
 
Solidarnosc Graffiti  
Graffiti from the Solidarnosc era is still visible in many places in Gdansk. Here "Solidarnosc" is 
visible in letters three feet tall on the highest gable of an assembly building. 
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Winter Weather Does Not Stop Work At Stocznia Gadanska 
 
Looking past the farthest reaches of the shipyard out to the open Baltic Sea. 
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Gardens 
 
As described in this thesis, ramshackled gardens sprawled up the hillsides all around Gdansk. 
They were a source of food during the decades of shortages. The irony is that there was no 
unemployment in Gdansk - great wealth was generated by the shipyards and everyone worked 
long hours. The Soviet Union extracted this wealth in turn for supposed "trades" with Poland. 
The result was desperate shortages of all food items and consumer goods. Many alternative 
methods of producing or otherwise securing something to eat became commonplace in Gdansk. 
Gardens sprang up not only on hillsides, but in city parks and on the spare land surrounding the 
shipyards and the power plant. These drastic shortages of  all necessities of life were the main 
reason for the strikes and unrest that led to formation of Solidarity. 
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Backyard "Terraced Gardens" 
 
In Gdansk every square foot of available land was used for private gardens during the severe 
food shortages of the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Here metal scraps are used to create 
small strips of garden space up a hillside. Note the larger terraced strips in the background. 
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Homemade Greenhouses  
Like the gardens, greenhouses and sheds for small livestock extended up steep hills behind many 
houses in Gdansk. These sources of local food production supplemented the often empty store 
shelves. 
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Typical Neighborhood 
 
A typical neighborhood near the shipyard. Owner-built additions to houses, cobbled together 
with salvaged stones and bricks (following picture) became bedrooms for adult children and their 
spouses. Housing was in extreme shortage and it was common to wait for a decade to get an 
apartment. Most young couples in the 1970s and 1980s had little choice but to remain in their 
parent's home. Conventional building supplies were practically unavailable, so many 
"alternatives" emerged, including pilfered materials and assorted scraps from the many industrial 
plants in the region. The "room additions" shown below, are built of  what looks to be salvaged 
corrugated metal, various grades and types of plywood, a mix of used brick and concrete blocks, 
and local, uncut rocks, plastered into the walls. Perhaps these rough rocks were removed from 
the hillside gardens behind the house.  
Housing and food were not the only things in short supply. All basic household appliances and 
furniture required a long waiting list. Lucky housewives with a washing machine, one informant 
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told me,  often made a little extra money by renting the machine by the hour to neighbors!  Cars  
- even used cars - were a long-awaited luxury. A joke about this era was told to me by an 
interviewee and goes as follows: 
"A man wanted to buy a car in Gdansk in 1970. So, after many months of paperwork and 
bribes with local Party chiefs, he obtained the correct forms to do so. He went to a place 
that sold a few cars and presented his paperwork. However, he was told he would be 
placed on a waiting list and his wait would be approximately 10 years. Still, he demanded 
to know the exact date he could buy his car. The dealer said, "In ten years...in ten years!" 
But the man was persistent and kept demanding an exact date, Finally, the dealer said, 
"OK, to shut you up, I'll give you a date. Come back on August 3rd, 1980."  The man 
exclaimed, "I can't come that day! That's the day there coming to install my phone!"   
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Shrine Of The Black Madonna Of Czestochowa 
 
In the 1000 year-old Church of St. Mary, in downtown Gdansk, is located this shrine of the most 
holy icon in Polish Catholicism. It is fully explained in this thesis. 
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Students Taking Bread To Striking Shipyard Workers - 1980 
(From a display at University of Gdansk) 
 
In 1968 University students across Poland rioted in protest of State-enforced policies that limited 
their academic freedom...few workers supported them. In 1970 workers protested high food 
prices and drastic shortages...few students supported them. By 1980 nearly everyone was 
working together in solidarity...students, professionals, and hourly workers. One elderly 
interviewee told me that the KOR  (workers' defense committee) was, in his opinion, a very 
influential "bridge" between the various groups in Polish society, and greatly worked to unite all 
the various segments. He described the KOR as a group of lawyers, professionals, and academics 
- mostly Jewish, in his personal experience - who realized that total social cohesion was 
absolutely necessary in the fight against Communist Party domination in Poland. They also 
realized, as did Walesa, that this was going to be a very long battle - "evolution not revolution." 
Pope John Paul II had a similar vision - long-term battle, total unity. He even attempted to 
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include a notion of "Pan-Slavic unity" into his rhetoric, calling for all "Slavic people" to 
recognize their common cultural origins. This however, did not seem to work too well as Poles 
still had living memory of WWII and had daily experience of attempts at "Russification," as well 
as the daily frustration of living in the dysfunctional Soviet-dominated economy. If anything, 
Polish national identity was defined by opposition to Russia, so, I believe, the "Pan-Slavic" idea 
had little effect.  
 
 
Lech Walesa and an Unidentified Coworker During The 1980 Strike 
(From a display at University of Gdansk) 
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Strikers at the Shipyard Gates 
(From a display at University of Gdansk) 
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Monument To Slain Workers 
 
This monument commemorates the December 1970 shootings of striking workers in Gdansk and 
Gdynia. State militia troops opened fire on unarmed workers who had gone on strike to protest 
steep increases in food prices. The exact number of deaths and injuries is not known, as the local 
police and militia harassed and threatened the families of the workers who were shot. Many 
families of victims were forced to move away from the local area as to suppress details of the 
shootings. Some workers simply "disappeared" and  some were buried the same night without a 
funeral..."like dogs," as one interviewee told me. This interviewee was a witness to the 
shootings, as he was involved in the strike at the Gdansk shipyard the day this occurred. 
"Official" historic accounts vary from 44 to 88 deaths, but my informant says he estimates at 
least 1000 people were injured by police, ranging from gunshot wounds, to beatings, broken 
bones, and assault on crowds with vehicles (strikers were simply run-over with police vehicles.)  
265 
 
Most interviewees cite this day, December 16, 1970, as the "unofficial" day the Solidarity 
Movement actually began. It was a decade later before the Solidarity Union was formally 
organized and still another decade until it became legally and permanently 
recognized..."evolution, not revolution," was the movement's slogan.  
I attended the memorial ceremony at this site, December 16th, 2010, on the 40th anniversary of 
the shootings. The following six pictures are from that ceremony: 
  
 
 
The Mayor of Gdansk Speaks at the Ceremony 
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Flags of Stocznia Gadanska 
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Wreaths To Honor The Slain Workers 
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A Large Crowd Attended The Ceremony As Hymns Were Sung 
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Decorative Lanterns Carried By Those Who Lost Family Members In The Shooting 
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Solemn Tribute To The Past - Each Lantern Represents A Life Lost 
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Stocznia 4-Ever 
 
No explanation was found for the mix of Polish and English wording in this painting on the 
shipyard wall. Local university art students are painting these murals. The point is clear: over the 
girl's heart is the phrase, stocznia (shipyard) 4-ever. The iconic shipyard cranes, a landmark 
symbol of Gdansk,  are in the background. Even the younger generation in Gdansk - those born 
after the 1989 transition -  are proud of the Solidarity heritage, the shipyard, and the historic 
struggle tied to the city and its symbols. One young art student told me: 
"The skyline with those shipyard cranes is beautiful to me! It's like a form of abstract art. 
When I was little, I'd pass by the shipyard and they would be moving - they looked alive, 
like some kind of huge animals! And at night they are lit up. Now I feel very proud of 
this city and of all that happened here, even though I know it just through stories from my 
mom and dad."  
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Self Reflection 
The mural painters ponder their work and their future in Gdansk. 
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